Colombia: Drugs, Guerrillas and US
involvement

By Gabriela Aguero

In the Valleys of sweetness

came
down the exterminators

in the highest peaks of the mountains

Of your sons was the fog lost

but they reached them

one by one until they died

destroyed in the
torment

of their earth tepid flowers

that tried to escape beneath the plants

“Now
they come for Cuba”-
Pablo Neruda

Any
authoritative formulation may be inadequate; new formulations are always
needed. These new formulations can no more contain or capture any physical
bodily reality than did the old. They are however the effect of lived
experience as it presses against constructed theories. The result is not a new
theory that will now express reality but the realization that every symbolic
system is fragile, vulnerable, and replaceable. (Nye 1987)

Follow the seven sacred teachings of the Anishenabe
people of Turtle Island and everything will be alright. Love, Respect, Humility, Honesty, Courage, Wisdom, and Truth.

Abstract

An extremely complex protracted
and bloody internal conflict has been ragging in Colombia for the last 40 years.
Several theories regarding the origins of this intrastate war date back to La Violencia a violent period in Colombian
history that erupted in 1946 after the assassination of the presidential
candidate Gaiviria and which lasted for the next 20 years. Setting the tone for
what would set the record as the longest internal war in Latin
America, the war is unfortunately far from over. The factors
influencing this complexity are related in part to Colombia’s geography,
history, economy and the internal political feuds that have supported one of the
most powerful Marxist guerrilla groups in the continent: the FARC (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) recently renamed with the added suffix EP
or Popular Army (Ejercito Popular).

The
prevailing state of lawlessness that is constantly associated with this conflict
creates a specific set of qualities that made Colombia a perfect breeding ground
for the traffic of illegal psychotropic drugs. Amongst them the Coca factor has had the most
relevant impact on the funding and continuation of this conflict. This paper
will analyze the diverse dynamics that have made illegal trafficking
indispensable to fund the war for all parties involved  trying to explain how the US involvement
in combating the drug traffic has fuelled, complicated, exacerbated and
politicized Colombia’s “drug problem”. To aim at a resolution
or at least a set of recommendations a model of multi-track diplomacy will be
explored taking into account how Colombia’s drug war affects
other conflicts on a world wide scale involving multiple actors. Caution and
measure in this respect are indispensable for any attempt at resolution to Colombia’s
drug problem is bound to elicit controversy. Not only has its reputation as a
drug dealing country become engrained in the culture of the nation, but its
consequences have affected neighbouring countries as well. Colombia’s drug fuelled
economic impact is responsible for funnelling international transactions
involving multimillion dollar exchanges of weapons and laundered money. Whose
problem is the drug problem remains to be seen. The chain from production to
consumption is complicated, arduous and above all it involves many players
whose livelihoods depend on it. The roles of the peasant and the land itself
are the most vulnerable. To this framework I will juxtapose images by the photographer
Jason Crowe who documented the conflict back in 2002. The black and white
beauty of the photographs will act as a contrast and a reality made visible
with the words of this paper. Art as photography will pull the reader into
either contesting or approving creating a tension and a dialogue. In the words
of Susan Sontag in Regarding the Pain of
Others:

“It is because a war doesn’t seem as if it
can be stopped that people become less responsive to the horrors. Compassion is
an unstable emotion. It needs to be translated into action, or it withers. The
question is what to do with the feelings that have been aroused, the knowledge
that has been communicated. If one feels that is nothing “we” can
do, but who is that “we”? And nothing that “they” can
do either, and who are “they”? (Sontag, 2003)

The Colombian Conflict at a glance

Most historians coincide with the idea that the
origins of the conflict in Colombia
are retroactive to La Violencia. This
process started a downhill de-legitimization process that begun much earlier in
Colombia
than in any other Latin American country creating a level of violence which
transformed itself into a cultural construct, a way of operating. Evolving from
a traditional rural society based on the haciendas
it tried to become a model of urban pre-capitalist society.  Colombia is, was and still is two
worlds in one.

La Violencia originates with an internal feud between
the two main parties that have ruled the nation since the onset of their
creation: the Liberals and the Conservatives. While a Pan American conference
was being held in Bogotá a popular left wing leader called Elicier Gaitán was assassinated in Bogotá. The result of this assassination was an escalation
in popular unrest that ended with the killing of Gaitan’s assassin and ensuing
riots that left several thousand dead and the city destroyed. The Bogotazo, as the episode came to be
called, was an expression of mass social frustration and grief by a people who
had lost the man who represented their only potential link to the
decision-making process. This violence spread to rural areas and continued
unrelentlessly for the next eighteen years until 1958 claiming thousands of
lives. This extremely
complex phenomenon was characterized by both partisan political rivalry and
sheer rural banditry. The basic cause of this protracted period of internal
disorder, however, was the refusal of successive governments to give in to the
people's demands for socioeconomic change. After the Bogotazo, Ospina who was in
government became more repressive. In the 1949 presidential election, the
Liberals refused to present a candidate; as a result, Gómez, the only
Conservative candidate, took office in 1950. A neo-fascist constitution in 1953
gave more autonomy to the presidency, expanded the powers of departmental
governors, and strengthened the official role of the church in the political
system. Gómez directed his repression in particular against the Liberal
opposition, which he called communist. At the height of the violence, the
number of deaths reportedly reached 1,000 per month. Ospina was deposed and a Military
Junta took power through Rojas Pinilla in 1953 and finally elections were
allowed in 1959 with a reform of the constitution. This portion of history is
indispensable to understand what would happen after. When the frustrated
revolutionary efforts of the Colombian brooding insurgency fuelled by the Cuban
Revolution through the ELN, FARC and M19 Marxists guerrilla groups were not
left to bare fruit in plans for a frustrated revolution and remained
underground for the next forty years. A guerrilla insurgency war ensued. The
successive creation of a National Front that ended La Violencia only perpetuated the power of the two elite parties
that would alternate in power in conjunction with the already powerful landowner’s
elite. To this threat followed the creation of autonomous armed groups such as
the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) and other paramilitary insurgents
that took the fight into their own hands and became the 6th arm of
the Colombian army. The majority of human rights abuses are attributed to these
paramilitary groups who are able to carry out killings with great impunity.
Every single one of these groups has its own internal alliances and indirectly profits
from the drug trade in one way or another, controlling different shifting
territories around the country. This has created a “truly symbiotic
relationship…of groups that might not share ideological goals, but their
financial and political existence is dependent on the creation of an
alliance". (Steinberg, 2000)

Violence
Now and The Patriot Plan

A government soldier wounded by an IED (Improvised Explosive Device)
planted by FARC rebels lies alongside his dead friend while medics attach
splints to his shattered legs. Paujil, Caqueta. (Jason Howe 2002).

According to the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights and Americas Watch,
there were more political killings in Colombia
last year than in the rest of the Western Hemisphere
combined. This statement could be true of the present as the lives that are
being lost to this conflict count in the hundreds of thousands over the years in
which the civil war in Colombia
has been ragging. The main issue for the continuation of this protracted
conflict is in direct correlation to the availability of funds to fight this
war. Several different issues are at hand aiding the economy of the war in Colombia.
First is the drug trafficking that suddenly became a huge source of funds
during the 1970s then aided in part by a weak and inefficient government.

The concept of combating drugs in Colombia
to eradicate coca-growing is not new. US
intervention in Bolivia
up until the election of Evo Morales was based in complete eradication of the
coca plantations together with alternative methods of cultivation and offering alternative
sources of livelihood for the peasants in the coca plantations. In the film The Real Thing (Sanders, 2002) the
filmmaker Jim Sanders explores the world of the coca rebellion in Bolivia
well before Morales became president. What he discovers is that the peasant
population was the main target of the eradication campaign as they became besieged
by the military forces. The Human Rights abuses described in the film by the
peasants themselves make clear that the situation was getting out of hand. The
scapegotism of the Bolivian military forces involved in the drug traffic had
found a culprit. It is clear that very similar events are taking place in Colombia
according to Human Rights organizations, for the ideological war that is going
on between Marxist and Right wing forces is also hurting the vulnerable peasant
and the civilian population. The efforts to curve these abuses are
intrinsically outlined in the demands from countries contributing to the drug war
in Colombia.
According to Human Rights Watch in a recent report:

The
United States remains the
most influential foreign actor in Colombia. In 2005 it provided close
to U.S. $800 million to the Colombian government, mostly in military aid.
Twenty-five percent of U.S.
security assistance is formally subject to human rights conditions, but the
conditions have not been consistently enforced. Certification of 12.5 percent
of the assistance was delayed in the first half of 2005 due to serious setbacks
and lack of progress in key investigations of military abuses, among other
factors. Nonetheless, the certification was ultimately granted, with the U.S.
State Department citing late progress in some specific cases.  In February
2005, the member countries of the G-24 group of international donors to Colombia met in Cartagena
to discuss continuing cooperation with Colombia. Members of Colombia’s
human rights community expressed disappointment over the resulting Cartagena
Declaration, which, while reaffirming the terms of the preceding London
Declaration, was viewed as weaker than the earlier document on various human
rights issues. (Human Rights Watch, 2006)

This disappointment has to do
with the cultural approach to the war on drugs. The Patriot Plan together with the
Plan Colombia, pursued by the actual President of Colombia Alvaro Uribe in his
second mandate, is geared to establish the biggest military effort in Colombian
history.  In order to curve the
drug-trafficking this project is specifically targeting the FARC forces who due
to the destruction of the two major drug cartels in Medellin
and Colombia
have gained control of the drug trafficking. The Plan Liberty One was the other
major effort to curve the influence of the guerrillas in the urban areas of Bogotá.
The majority of the insurgent war activity happens in the country-side
specifically in the departments along the coast. What is significant is the
perception of this war from two different points of view: for the Colombian
government it is more a case of the drug trade as an economic problem whereas for
the US
administration this is a military operation that has now shifted to be labeled
a war on terrorism. Various sources
indicate that this economic drug problem represents 300 billion of dollars a
year placing the ‘enemy resources’ on the level of nations rather
than businesses budgets. “Such a wealthy, amorphous and flexible
enterprise is not easy or cheap to destroy” (Pearl, 1990)

The
economic, social and political effects of the war on drugs in Colombia have been dramatic.
Through thirty years of war the funding that the drug trade has originated has
been one of the most significant obstacles to peace (Thoumi, 2002). This
profound crisis has changed the nature of the institutions in Colombia to a degree unprecedented even
influencing Colombia’s
policies. The Patriot Plan was created in conjunction with US military and
strategic assistance. Its main objective is to destroy the guerrilla forces in
a 116 square mile swath of Southern Colombia and constitutes the most
sophisticated and largest offensive that has been carried through in Colombia
with an investment of 30 million in funding from the US going to the Colombian
Armed Forces (though much of it is also ending in Colombia’s network of
corruption). These operations started in 2003 in the Departments of
Cundinamarca (where Bogotá is located) as “Libertad 1”.  Then, in December 2003, under the name of
Operación Ano Nuevo, a second offensive was mounted in the Caqueta Dpt. against
the FARC. The Plan Patriota currently incorporates 18000 soldiers, with over
800 US military advisors and
600 US
contractors responsible for fumigation initiatives. Plan Colombia on the other hand is the other plan
which is funded by US
aid and involves around $1.3 billion dollars. Since 1997 Colombia has absorbed $4.5 billion dollars in
aid since 1997 becoming a sinkhole of US foreign aid. For the next two
years the budget is around $700 million transforming Colombia
the single biggest US
recipient of international aid in the world after Israel
and Egypt.
Yet this conflict and the political implications of the hegemonic power behind
it have other ramifications. The recent plans of construction of a US military
base in Paraguay permitting the landing of large aircraft and capable of
housing 16.000 troops is worrying Human Rights groups and military analysis in
the region for what this kind of
new development could mean for the region. (El Deber,
2005)

Colombia’s
economy is also rich in oil. Its production is now being leased to Occidental
Petroleum and it is also a major target by the guerrillas. The Cano-Limon pipeline
represents a strategic, economic an environmental disaster when the attacks
blow up the pipelines. This disaster has literally spilled over to neighboring
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela who are also receiving large numbers of internally
displaced refugees from Colombia and have thousands of troops stationed on
their borders. Internally Displaced refugees in Colombia constitute a third of the
population with an estimated 16000 children now fighting as soldiers in the
different armed groups. The Plan Patriota has but exacerbated this situation to
create a humanitarian crisis of which little is disclosed in the media.
(Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 200). The fight against Coca though  has other more deepening implications.

Coca, the plant at the center
of the storm...Human rights leader Alfredo Vasquez Carrisoza argues that the
discussion is out of place...

...What is important is not that there be new
constitutions, but that they be enforced...

...said Clara L6pez Obreg6n, a progressive
Liberal who was the UP's candidate for mayor in Bogota...

...All will be required to provide services
previously funded by the central government-from potable water to highways,
schools, hospitals, transportation and electricity...

...Increasingly active over the last decade,
civic movements have held strikes to obtain their demands, one of which was the
direct election of mayors...

...Since the elections, the violence has taken
on a new dimension, engendering absurd and desperate legisla- tive measures
which point to the government's inability to control the situ- ation...

...Here, constitutions are not enforced...

...Once a Lib- eral stronghold of large cattle
ranchers, the UP has made inroads, winning four mayoralties in the last
elections...

...As in most Latin American countries, members
of the military do not vote and are prohibited from having party
affiliations...

...Twelve UP members have been killed in this
hamlet in the last year...

...While the reforms did bring some of the
guerrillas into the political process, the armed forces remained outside of the
"democratic opening...

...And in neighboring Pifialito, 14 people,
including both UP and Liberal party members, were massacred one night last
February...

...As of yet there has been no serious effort
to renew peace talks with the guerrillas...

...Now I have learned that many problems can be
solved by working with the police chief...

...And its southern jungle area, now under FARC
guerrilla control, is a major center for coca production...

CoCo

It is said that the Virgin Mary chewed on the coca as
she lamented the loss of her son leaving her teeth marks on the barks of the
Coca. Coca the plant growing as a bush in the lush slopes of Colombia has ancient meaning to the inhabitants
of the Andes. Revered by the Mayans and the
Incas this plant was used in ceremonies dating hundreds of years before
colonization. Used by shamans in religious ceremonies as well as an offering
and a tool to predict the future, coca is described in ethno botany as one of
the “wise plants”. Amongst other more powerful mind altering
substances contained in them wise plants
are said to have contained the essence of
truth for the people of the Americas
before the conquest.

Coca is a native plant
that grows hardy in the warm and humid climates of Colombia,
Bolivia and Peru.
Infusions from the plant as well as the customary chewing of the leaves raises
blood pressure helping with the symptoms associated with high altitude or apunamiento. The stimulatory alkaloids
contained in the leaves were mixed with lime an agent that helps absorption.
Coca utensils have been found in archaeological sites dating more than 3000
years. Once the Spanish realised the chewing of the leave made Indians more
resilient and able to work long hours they allowed the “devils’
plant to be chewed and used as currency. Coca has been conceptualized as malevolent
from the onset. Yet the powerful identity it shares with the Andean people has
been at the center of the controversy in the fight to destroy it and the source
of all tribulations.

The demonization of coca
is explained in Coca in Colombia in the Ship of Fools
by Beatriz-Acevedo Olguin (Mama Coca 2002) a researcher in Drug Policy who
describes the approach to fighting the war on drugs as compared to
Foucault’s ideas on the treatment of madness. As regards Colombia
specifically and especially after September 11, this treatment presumes power
relations, knowledge construction between two world views. In this case its
attacks are based on the US War on Terrorism. Olguin’s thesis evaluates
how this war is left in the hands of the police and the military shunted from
agency to agency (health, education, hygiene) to finally transform it into a
security issue. As with the extraction of the Folly that promised the cure for lunacy, the extraction and
eradication of coca at the source will eliminate the drug problem in the
countries of consumption. The prohibitionist discourse emanates from a social
construction of this issue

Society has certain ideas regarding drugs. These ideas
influence drug policy. Based on a sociological theory of William and Dorothy
Swaine-Thomas, a determined image of reality stated in a social group can be
reproduced as a fact. In the case of a drug system, the social construction
that links drugs with crime, produce a consequent reality. (Acevedo 2002)

This relationship is what determines how the policies
are established and mirror public opinion. In this respect this relationship
between the conceptual meaning of coca as cocaine and its effects on society
goes further to encompass an overarching concept of illegality in direct
opposition to its symbolic meaning and the effects that cocaine has on the body
when consumed. This concept in itself creates a dependency to a substance that
when inhaled elevates the levels of serotonin in the body therefore creating
the illusion of pleasure. Laboratory animals subject to cocaine addiction have
died of over dose due to heart attacks since cocaine makes the body loose the
ability to “tell” when enough is enough. Dopamine is released into
the body from the brain as a “reward” for life enhancing behaviour
(eating, having sex) sending messages to the body to engage in those behaviours
again. Cocaine artificially produces this chemical therefore tricking the body into experiencing the
same chemistry that produces what can be labelled as ‘cocaine psychoses’.
This psychosis includes symptoms such as aggression and disturbing
hallucinations not to mention heart disorders. (Australian Better Health
Network). Curiously Arango and Child in their article on the subject (Arango
and Child 1987) argue that the technology to produce cocaine was invented in
the mid 1960s by the members of the US Peace Corps. They state that the Peace
Corps personnel who enjoyed marijuana when they arrived in the early 1960s,
soon discovered coca-chewing. In their search for better “trips”
they developed the cocaine-refining technology in use today (Thoume 59)

The number of addicts to
cocaine and other drugs in the US
is staggering. This issue is in itself not at the center of the storm for the
drug in the shape of the plant where it originates is mainly persecuted at its
source. Drug treatment and awareness are very insignificant compared to the
billions of dollars spent on the War on Drugs in Colombia. The US approach to the fight on drugs has created an
escalating military conflict of unprecedented consequences to the already
complicated set of variables operating in Colombia. Not only is the War on Drugs but also on Terrorism,
which though outdated in the rest of the world, still continues in Colombia.
Specifically this war is fought against the left guerrilla groups of the ELN
(Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional) and the FARC-EP who though directly profiting
from the traffic by charging taxes and offering protection to the drug network,
are also a target of an ideology war by both the government of Colombia and the US government. To and extent the
ideological fight between right and left of the Cold War is over in the rest of
the world. Unfortunately in Colombia
the characteristics of this intrastate conflict have once more included the US as
an old time player in the search for hegemony in the region. This war though
technologically superior is a war against guerrilla insurgencies being reproduced
in other parts of the world right now. It has the feel of a black and white oldie
replay of the Cold War and it resembles the deterioration of the US involvement in Iraq.

The International Drug cartel and Conflict

“The umbrella
organization known as the AUC has been long criticized for the brutal methods its
forces use, in particular against the civilian population. The militias are
also known to receive support from wealthy landowners and Government forces”.
(Jason Crowe, 2002) This is a powerful depiction of the pride of this fighter
yet his pose is fearful and ultimately deadly. These fighters have a lot invested
in their role in the war as they represent the interests of the elite. It also
portrays an individual who has chosen anonymity and has fundamentally decided
to remain hidden yet for the general public their role has been as the 6th division of the Colombian
army. This function that the paramilitaries are playing in the conflict
fighting the Marxist guerrillas is contentious and ridden with accusations by
human rights’ groups. Their right wing ideology makes them closer in aims
to the side that the traffickers play in the conflict. They have been found
responsible by the highest number of human rights abuses in the country. Though
presently de-mobilized the paramilitaries still pose threats and abuses to the
population. (Human Rights Watch, 2005)

According to Phil
Williams in his article on crime and conflict Translational Criminal Enterprises, Conflict and Instability (Williams,
1999) a number of very specific characteristics must be present in a state for crime
to occur. The weakness of the state is the most prevalent one. The other is a judicial
system under threat in Colombia
especially by the drug lords who is frozen and ineffective. Ethnic tensions can
be present or ideological ones as in the case of Colombia, regional rivalries and
geographical strategic placement. The main tool of operation for these criminal
enterprises called cartels in Colombia
use corruption to operate and de-stabilize the rule of law “corroding
political behaviour and political institutions, and weakening civil
society” (Williams 97). Pablo Escobar, who once ruled the Medellin Cartel
in Colombia
and was killed by the drug counterinsurgency a few years ago, had become
enthralled in his power and had dreams of reaching public office. His
ascendance to political power is unique amongst other cases of drug or narco-states
like Colombia
where the drug barons had acquired such power and notoriety that they aspired
to validate it officially in political seats of office. The drug cartels of Medellin and Colombia due partly to the
inefficacy of the state administration, have taken over tasks such as the
construction of infrastructures of education, leisure, real estates complexes,
and other enterprises that were once reserved to the state. This benefactor
role of the drug mafia has also worked in their favour creating political
support from the population. Such confidence was used when the drug cartels
orchestrated the killing of justice minister Lara Bonilla as a result of retaliation
to tougher government measures involving extradition of drug barons to the US.
Once Escobar was killed in 1993, the Cali Cartel, a more subtle and less
violent organization, rose to the top even funding Ernesto Samper’s
presidency campaign with millions of dollars.  As we speak this two cartels are
basically functionally dismantled though other smaller and less public drug and
trafficking organizations are doing the same effective job now in conjunction
with the FARC-EP. As an unrelenting force the crime continues yet its origins
and control are not that simple and the measures to combat it not effective.

The Colombian drug trade
is not a simple story of South American supply and North American demand.
Within Colombia,
the drug trade has complicated pre-existing social origins in the conflict
between the traditional landowners and the landless. The success of the drug
trade allowed narcotraffickers to buy land, in a sense joining the ranks of
traditional landowners, but with different interests and goals. The traditional
land conflict continues but in the context of the armed protection of the
haciendas from the peasants. (Holmes et al., 167)

Economic power is
fundamental in reproducing conflict as is the ideological counter-pining of the
organizations that benefit from the trafficking. As stated before the Cold War
paradigm is still prevalent only that it also exists in the forces fighting
within the country. The Paramilitaries are ‘self-originated’
right-wing forces created to counteract the left wing guerrilla insurgency war.
While the drug-traffickers ally themselves ideologically with the paramilitaries
they have business with the guerrilla groups who charge them tax for protection
and transportation. These two issues are usually collapsed into one though the
relationship is far more complicated. Since the US destroyed the two large
cartels in Cali and Medellin the geographical shifting of the production has
not created narco-guerrillas but rather the guerrillas are extorting just a
portion of the commercial transaction for their use in weapon purchases (from
Russia in this case and in exchange for drugs). At the same time this increased
dislocation of the war on drugs (which mainly focuses on destroying the coca
plantations themselves) has affected the peasant’s livelihood itself. In
a backhanded unexpected way this measure has gained the FARC-EP renewed peasant
support.

As for
the paramilitaries especially the AUC (United Self-Defence Groups of Colombia)
which has an active force of fifty thousand and is funded by landowners,
businesses and drug dealers their mandate is: ‘coming together to protect
the lives and property of the citizens from the guerrillas because the
Colombian sate was unwilling to or unable to do so” (Holmes 168). The AUC
has recently been pressured into de-mobilization by the US in part due to the escalating
human rights abuses that involve massacres in several parts of the country.
This diminished presence has fuelled the guerrilla in turn to take over other
parts of the country and to profit from the trafficking even more.

Environmental
Dangers

This network seems so simple to operate in a production of a product
that is also very easy to produce. The
process to transform coca into cocaine is very simple. Just a Google search on
the internet will provide several recipes that start with the coca paste
available. After the harvest the leaves are dried and then crushed then mixed
with kerosene into a paste that is then dried. This is the base of the product
that will be then commercialized to the first level and that traffickers will
produce into cocaine by adding a number of chemicals to produce the finished product.
“Cocaine is 2Beta-carbomethoxy-3Beta-benzoxytropane; C17H21N04. Cocaine
Hydrochloride USP is a crystalline, granular, or powder substance, having a
saline, slightly bitter
taste that numbs tongue and lips. Cocaine
Hydrochloride is a local
anesthetic”. (The Internet Drug Index). In Colombia make shift laboratories
exist in the countryside as well as in homes where the cooking utensils can
serve for that simple purpose of transformation. Yet this simplicity and
availability has created a war against a plant.

A young girl helps her mother pick coca leaves in the small cooperative
of Putumayo. (Jason Crowe, 2002)

The main focus on the eradication of coca is by using fumigation. Planes
stationed in different areas of the country consistently kill the plants. Pilots
risk their lives routinely being shot down by the guerrillas and the population
on the ground suffers from the after effects of the poisons being sprayed. The
issue is to destroy the production at its source by spraying a compound called paraquat a highly toxic herbicide that
causes pulmonary fibrosis and was first used on the crops of Mexican marihuana.
Colombia
is the only American country where forced eradication strategies with aerial
fumigation of Roundup (which is the commercial name for the chemical) are used.

The commercial
brand Roundup covers a family of Monsanto herbicides, based on the active
ingredient glyphosate and the surfactant POEA. The
difference between the product formulas lies in the concentration of glyphosate
and/or of POEA, or in the proportion of amines. Other surfactants may even be included without any warning, and are
considered a business secret. (Mama Coca)

Other surfactants such as CosmoFlux and CosmoInD has
been permitted, is the country where crop cultivation has spread the most.

POEA is the acronym for surfactant
polyoxyethylamine, included in all formulas of Roundup and other
glyphosate-based herbicides. POEA is a mixture of etoxyled amines derived from
animal fat, with a toxicity five times greater than that of glyphosate. (Mama
Coca)

The side effects of these
chemicals on humans have largely been proven in developed countries though the
technologies for eradication that have been prohibited in the developed world
are still being used in developing countries. This has been considered by some
analysts as an outright invasion in the internal affairs of another country.
They have urged the Colombian legislature to resort to legal means to stop the
spraying as stated in the following statement:

The Colombian Ombudsman's
Office has declared that aerial eradication with chemicals has not proven its
effectiveness in the struggle against the production of psychotropic
substances.

The
struggle against said substances stresses criminal policies which contravene
the Colombian state's constitutional obligation to protect its citizens’
rights and private property and fails to abide by the public policies which
regulate the state’s obligation to this end, namely:

a-
to provide, as of the positive differentiation
principle, special protection for the most vulnerable of its peoples (minors,
displaced populations, members of ethnic groups and rural populations);

b-
to protect its citizens’ right to health,
food, public health and, consequently, to their lives and a dignified life;

c-
to protect its citizens’ right to not be
displaced from their homes; and

d-
to provide environmental protection and
conservation, the protection of the nation's natural resources and of ethnical,
ecological, and culturally protected areas as of the sustainable development
principle.

All
of the aforementioned rights are decreed by the stated social-state-of-law
objectives whose guiding principles are solidarity and human dignity.  Within this framework of ideas, all of
the state's institutions should address their efforts to guaranteeing the
defense of human rights as stipulated by international treaties and the
Colombian constitution and legislation. That is to say that, the nation's
authorities cannot, when implementing public policies (in this case the war on
drugs), neglect or apply exceptional measures which disregard these rights. (Mama
Coca)

This legal document is just one example of the
vulnerability of the situation as it relates to the relationship of two states
with an apparent shared agenda. The fight to curve the production of a plant
originating a substance that is affecting the lives of the chain of production
and the human beings connected to it is problematic. From the peasants who
plant coca to the consumers at the end of the chain they are all affected. A
different safer approach must be found. While the concept of using herbicides against weeds and
camouflaging foliage (such as Agent Orange in Vietnam)
is not new, using them against crops is. A new development in this area and due in part to
the controversy of the chemicals involved, has been the idea of using a fungus
that would “eat up” the plant. This project has been handed over to the United
Nations which has already produced extensive quantitative and qualitative
documents on the production of coca in Colombia. (United Nations Office of
Drugs and Crime, 2006) Their report on the situation is alarming especially if
we consider that the ruggedness of the terrain makes for the plantation of coca
only to be visible from the air. By getting the UN to take on the fungus project, the US government not
only gets political cover, but makes it harder to release information about the
program. Unlike the US
government, the UN has no Freedom of Information
Act guaranteeing outsiders access to official documents. Biological Weapons
Convention and morphing it from "biocontrol" into "biowarfare." While both the US and UN
will not recognize these terms, the secrecy surrounding the project and the
lack of independent monitoring of the US fungus development, the lack of media
exposure to the project, and the classified nature of the development program
in its early years leave serious questions
unanswered. Ironically, the great majority of research on Fusarium focuses
on combating it as a major food-crop killer. The soil-borne mold infects crops
by secreting toxins into their roots, which then putrefy and dissolve the
plant's cells, often eventually killing them, or worse, poisoning humans or
animals who feed on contaminated plants or plant products. The fungus can
survive in the soil for years. The idea of using a fungal herbicide to kill
drug plants began in the 1970s after a fungus,
later identified as EN-4, began to kill off the coca at a soft drink research
plantation in Kauai, Hawaii. In 1986, the ARS began a full-blown
research project, classified for a time, to find a biological agent to kill
coca. By 1991, the government had invested at least $14 million in it. Congress
has now given the State Department $23 million originally slated for
mycoherbicide development in the US, which State plans to pass on to
the UN. (Massey, 2001)

Aaerial eradication has seriously affected weak and
marginalized communities of poor farmers, Indigenous Peoples, and settlers.
Hundreds of complaints from these communities were registered with local and
national offices of the Colombian Human Rights Ombudsman. Aerial spraying of
the herbicide has caused eye, respiratory, skin and digestive ailments;
destroyed subsistence crops; sickened domestic animals and contaminated water
supplies. Children are starting
to be born with severe life debilitating illnesses that have not yet fully been
tied to the spraying. Birth defects in some cases are lethal as the
aftereffects of the chemicals in the soil surrounding the sprayed areas remain
in the soil for many years. The US State Department denies that there are human
health effects from spraying glysophate in Colombia. Medical reports on the
other hand link exposure to glysophate herbicides with short term symptoms
including blurred vision, skin problems, heart palpitations, and nausea.
Studies have also found associations with increased risk of miscarriages,
premature birth, and non-Hodgkins lymphoma. Monsanto as quoted in Rachel’s
Massey’s Echoes of Vietnam (2001) article makes a comparison of the
environmental situation of Colombia with that of Vietnam and states that the
company producing the chemical was finally forced in court and challenged not
to advertise the product as “safe, non-toxic, harmless or free from
risk” (Massey 2001)

As we all know the after effects of Agent Orange in Vietnam
are still affecting its population even years after the war stopped. This toxic
war is destroying another countries ecosystems and the health of innocent
civilians. Thanks to a FOIA (Freedom of Information
Act) request, there is a list of US-funded base construction projects paid for
in 2005 with Defense Department counter narcotics funds and it can be found available
on the internet but nothing is made available of the studies relating to the
effects of intervention in this ecological war. These reports were produced as required
by Congress in the 2006 Defense Authorization Law that was supposed to give
explanations for total Defense-budget counter-drug aid to every country in the
world. For some reason, the report only includes Defense-budget counter-drug construction
aid, which is only a fraction of what most countries' militaries get through
the Pentagon's budget. We must not forget that Colombia
is the third largest beneficiary of US aid in the world. This is not
only related to the war on drugs or the Patriot Plan but has much deeper
political explanations. Colombia
is strategically located in Latin America.
Conversely, the US political
interest in Colombia might
prove another downhill disaster as the one being experienced in Iraq
right now. Counter-insurgency guerrilla warfare seems to be a war that produces
no winner or losers rather it seems to escalate out of control until someone (in
this case the US) realizes the loses are too big and creates an artificially
produced stalemate. Considering that there is such little news about Colombia
in the media, the blanket of anonymity gives the Pentagon ample if not wider
scope of action. Though not proved, human rights groups are protesting against
the idea that the US is
presently “testing” new warfare technology, ideology and that the
philosophy of School of the Americas
training is alive and flourishing in Colombia. What is troubling is the
millions of dollars spent also include beneficial aid to much needed programs
in economic and social development. If this aid had no political implications
and did not represent a ‘carrot’ to be granted as a prize for
following another countries agenda perhaps there could be some hope here. When
the US was about to invade Iraq to destroy that countries alleged biological
arsenal Senator John Mica from Florida was instrumental in pushing the
“green war” in Colombia by lobbying Congress to accept the use of
biological agents to destroy coca plantations (fungus and spraying included).
(Sunshine Project 2002)

An attempt to resolve the impossible

Relationships develop between FARC recruits living
in the camps but can only continue with approval from a commander.

Near San Vicente del Caguan, Caqueta. (Jason
Crowe, 2002)

If love can be possible in times of war anything
can. Perhaps it is the inability to see the future, the tunnel vision of
conflict that forces human beings to continue with the daily chores of living
that make that possible. Even to fall in love during war there is a need for
approval. How do Colombians bear the brunt of a war that has long left them
behind? How did these two young Colombians become convinced to join the FARC guerrilla’s
insurgency in a country that has been fighting for 40 years and what are the
solutions to this conflict? How can a model of conflict resolution be applied
to this complex situation without falling short of utopian? First Colombia
has to get the United States Patriot Plan off their backs but how does it
continue with an ingrained attitude to the drug problem as a war? If a country has been fighting for
this long against and between itself basic notions of peace are pieces that are
missing in a puzzle.

Such
hopeful efforts of communities of peace like those of the rural municipality of Carare where the peasants have decidedly
left the violent system must be studied and reproduced training other
communities in passive resistance methods. Fear is paramount to this effort to
resist violence without using it. How did Rosa Parks overcome the fear of not
giving up that seat? She was surrounded by a community of people who supported
her efforts. Peace can not be achieved alone or in isolation. The model of
Multitrack diplomacy is but a re-call to consider community as an option.(Diamond
and Mc Donald, 1996)  A country with
this level of violence escalating daily in rural and city areas alike which erupts
unannounced and affects all citizens’ makes for an interesting case to try
and plant a seed of peace. What has
been lost is so much that nothing else could
be lost. No amount of grass root efforts from the middle tier elites as
Lederach proposes can create peace effectively if the big power players do not
follow through. How is that created? The utopian societies that exist in Colombia
need to become educational centers that would deter the lovers in the picture
to kiss while holding a weapon. This image is a dichotomy of the utopian love
in the ruins of Colombia
where life must go on regardless.

Much
has been written on the value of dialogue despite differences. Dialogue can
only exist if the ground is fertile and the environment feels safe. For
Colombians to start feeling safe the drug-traffickers need to be accounted for as
a separate entity once the other issues of violence are controlled. By
demobilizing the AUC the US
effort has but shifted the power to other actors like the FARC allowing them to
gain control of the drug-traffic commerce in taxes and benefits. The recent
peace treaties to exchange FARC prisoners for hostages collapsed in part due to
the attitude of the present administration of Uribe’s government which is
escalating the conflict to unprecedented heights. His plan Convivir has now involved civilians in a network of informants that
are rewarded on television while wearing masks in order to remain anonymous. Due
to protests by Human Rights groups the plan was abandoned. The other plan in
place is the creation of an army of peasants that would carry their guns home
at night while on duty putting them in danger to become targets of the armed
groups. How do this people know who is going to attack them is a complicated
issue. When violence has spread and becomes obliterated, darkened and blurred
the only option is peace. Peace does not come as a result of institutions being
created for that purpose as a rule. In Latin America the ingrained animosity
with the United States
as the patronizing and destructive power it has unfortunately become through
its failed foreign policies, is the first hurdle to overcome. In Colombia that
is validated by presence of US troops on the ground which even if they only
account for 800 at present represent the infamous School of the Americas
political approach to Latin America as a training ground for what can’t
be done somewhere else in terms of warfare.

The involvement of the
different actors in a Multi-track effort has to be consistent in this case.
This would involve NGOs that could coordinate action across continents. The
first series of activist protests have to occur in the US pressuring the government to
modify their policies on the drug on war and terrorism. Needless to say the
fear of 9/11 pervades the minds of those who are left to carry the flags of
peace but a concerted non-violent series of demonstrations could be put
together piecing together different actors. The US
citizenry is presently worried with the events taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan so this calls for the
actions of the Diaspora perhaps to intervene.

In the film Maria Full of Grace we observe how this
community of Colombians living abroad reproduces the societal failures of their
native Colombia
not fully integrated but rather escaping a system that haunts them even abroad.
To feel secure a network of players has to be established that can have religious
organizations as main actors. Colombians are in their majority Catholic and the
church has international connections that can be used to create peace
communities in the US
composed of Colombians interested in returning home to teach non-violent
methodology. The sources of funding are always problematic for peacemakers as
the rule is to consider the capitalist model as exploitative and the stiffness
of funders necessitates of the input of specialists in grant writing. Priority
has to be placed in those organizations in the US that are specializing in
Latin American Issues such a WOLA (Washington Office in Latin America) who
routinely analyzes the situation in Colombia and tries often unsuccessfully to
influence the politicians offering forums for activists to create papers and
recommendations on different issues concerning Latin America. These offices
efforts have to be disseminated in the countries they benefit to slowly resolve
the biggest gap of trust between Latin America and the US. In its latest report on Drug
War Monitor WOLA suggests that

A serious
evaluation of present policies and open-minded debate on drug control alternatives
are sorely needed if we hope to make any progress. A more effective and more
humane policy should be based on the recognition that, while controlling
illicit drug abuse is a legitimate and important goal, drugs will be produced
as long as there is demand for them. (Yongers an Rosin Ed. 2004)

This puts into perspective the main issue at hand in the US
policy against the war production that perpetuates the blame on drug
consumption on the “other” that produces it. The sticks that have
been mentioned through this paper have brought carrots of the military type but
very little in the use of US
expertise in other areas than the military. Thanks to a FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) in the US one can find a list of
US-funded base construction projects paid for in 2005 with Defense Department
counter-narcotics funds that comes from a report, required by Congress in the 2006
Defense Authorization law that was supposed to total Defense-budget
counter-drug aid to every country in the world though that for some reason only
includes Defense-budget counter-drug construction aid, which is only a
fraction of what most countries' militaries get through the Pentagon's budget.

It
is not that the information is not available is that the information in the
media is selectively disseminated. Peace reporters that tell this story
creating avenues and options or at least raising awareness of the issues can
surely raise a case with the economic side of the conflict. Colombia after all is the third country in the
world receiving America aid
after Israel and Egypt.
(Drugs and Democracy in Latin America -The Impact of U.S.
Policy

Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, Editors)

In
her article on Grassroots efforts to build peace in Colombia Maria Lucia Zapata
(Beyond Intractability 2006) discusses Lederach’s concept of the
construction of Sustainable Peace as an effort that starts with the concept of
peace developed by all players.

Community
justice in Colombia
is an interesting cultural resource for conflict transformation that can
contribute to long-term peacebuilding. According to Edgar Ardilla from the National University in Bogotá,
“community justice” can be defined as those initiatives and
mechanisms for the administration of justice based on the traditions and
customs of a specific community. There are different manifestations of
community justice in Colombia.
Some of the most important are equity conciliation (Conciliacion en Equidad),
peace justice (Justicia de Paz) and indigenous jurisdiction (Jurisdiccion Indigena).
Although there is difference amongst them, they share the following
characteristics: They have constitutional and legal recognition; traditions,
custom and common sense are at the core of the mechanisms. Especially in the
case of equity conciliators and judges of peace, they are people from the
community who volunteer their time. They do not need to have a specific
professional legal background. Finally, the agreements they facilitate have the
same legal standing as the decision of judge. (Lederach 2002)

The
agents of this transformation are the actors themselves who desperately need
the development aid and humanitarian relief in order to concentrate on peace.
As previously discussed US
investments in Colombia
through the Patriot Plan have been concentrating on the war on drugs and the
military assistance needed to end it. Structural reconstruction is
indispensable if peace will take shape. Colombia does not fall under the
category of a post-conflict society therefore efforts at rebuilding
institutional and political structures need to be done while the fighting
continues. That in itself is a real challenge. The demobilization of the AUC
paramilitaries for example is a perfect opportunity to put into play concepts
of reconciliation, forgiveness, trust-building and future imagining. For this
it is fundamental that the state understands that the role of community equity
conciliators who are developing these alternative methods must be protected.
Most of the population does not participate out of fear. In Cartagena some of these models are starting
to create a different culture one based on community rather than personal
efforts to peacebuilding. According to Jaime Benavidez:

Initially, criminal
bands ruled the community. There we robberies at any time. But as we were
creating norms the situation got better. Currently we have security zones, frentes de seguridad, and we have
monitoring system. We haven’t created a paramilitary group, no! We have
monitoring groups of volunteers who want to protect the neighbourhood. The
weapons they have are a whistle and a phone. Currently, the community has the control. The government has not fulfilled
its promises to the communit. So if the municipality comes to impose something,
the community will reject it. But if they (the local authorities) look for the
way to contact the leaders people will accept. People do not believe in the
government and its authorities. (Zapata, 2206)

The
efforts the conciliators are making have overarching consequences. According to
Zapata conciliators believe that the most fundamental method to make these
techniques for peace, equity conciliation and community initiatives effective
is to teach youth and children to resolve conflict in a peaceful way in order
to help them become agents of their own transformation. In the absence of trust
for the government the guerrillas and paramilitaries have often taken on the
role of judiciary. The role of conciliator emanating from the community is
therefore essential but they need both the support of the community and the
state. Justices of the peace who practice equity conciliation have the potential
to balance the influence of the guerrillas. In Colombia the culture of violence is
pervasive. Drug-traffickers who exist outside paradigms do not accept any form
of justice. They exist outside any model of control because their main interest
in fuelled by profit. In that respect what needs to happen is that the peasants
involved in coca plantations, the workers who run the labs and control the
process of production are offered alternatives to their livelihood. No peace
could be reached before this happens. As Lederach puts it: “Violence is
known: peace is the mistery”. If basic needs are fulfilled perhaps the
imagination can start to operate again.

Amongst the efforts to
bring awareness to the issues of violence in Colombia is the performance group Rayuela who puts together events in
which thousands of participants create art actions on the streets of Bogotá.
In their last effort four thousand women sat on chairs holding umbrellas on the
streets of Bogotá to denounce human rights abuses and to call to an end
of the violence. This type of performances can create ripples of peace as it
decodes meaning from what the media or the political messages are telling the
population on the need continue fighting. It is only when one is asked to stop
and think or imagine that an alternative is possible and changes can occur. The
women ask for reconciliation and reparation and an end to the hostilities.
Dressed in black and sitting in the chairs they are waiting for reality to
change yet their power resides in their passive resistance which becomes active
as they inhabit the space of the city. As a living sculpture to be contended
with their actions exert non-violent power of resistance.

This
type of participatory art activism has the potential to initiate change at the
grassroots making visible what has been hidden in the imagination of a peaceful
tomorrow. If individuals are not allowed to grieve first and become aware of
the pain they are suffering healing will not happen. This repression of the
fear and pain of years of violence has spread to all of society who co-exists
in a new state of affairs becoming
part of the culture. The reproduction of cultural concepts of violence
can’t change until the concept of violence transforms into peace. As a
society grieves the next stages can bring construction but denouncing human
rights and asking for ‘a stop to
violence’ has to come as a stage previous to the dialogue. Feelings
must be validated before the difficult discussion about peace starts. By
creating consensus in the creation of this art-performance action Rayuela is
calling into action all citizens from every walk of life, to participate as it promises
the ‘sweetness of peace’ that has been forgotten by the pain of
war.

Their efforts and those
of the inhabitants of Carare are similar in intention:

In 1965 guerrillas established a presence in the
Carare region. In 1973, when the army came in to evict the guerrilla groups,
violence from both armed groups against the peasants started. This was later
exacerbated by the presence of paramilitary groups. By 1987 over 500 peasants
had been killed and, in a fateful meeting the military and the paramilitary
offered the peasant leader’s four options: side with the military, side
with the guerrillas, leave the region or die. The peasants, who had sought to
stay independent of the violence, chose a fifth option: to organize
non-violently for peace and development, and thus the association of peasant
workers (ATCC) was born, with the slogan for the right to life, peace and work.
The ATCC's tactics were simple: constant dialogue with all parties (military,
paramilitary, guerrillas, government) and an unshakeable commitment to
non-violence.

The war between the paramilitary forces and the
guerrillas is now history in the region. Nevertheless, the town needs social
programs contributing to the well-being of the community. Today, the community
of El Corregimiento has 27 sectors: a police station, 5000 inhabitants, with
100 living in the inner city, 28 kms. from the municipality of Cimitarra
connected by good roads. The community has four churches, three schools, an
agricultural college, a community action group, a telecommunications site, a
medical station, the first phase of a wharf, and two women's groups, an
agroforestry and enterprise cooperative association which promotes health and
of course the association of peasant farm workers of Carare (ATCC). The ATCC is
the ultimate expression of peaceful co-existence in this area, its strong point
is saying "No" to violence and "Yes" to life, peace and
livelihood through the use of only dialogue and understanding. As Ms. Maria Medina commented "If
someone arrives in town who is armed, we talk with him and tell him he cannot
use firearms here. Everyone who comes in a manner of peace is well received".
In El Corregimiento de la India the white flag is the only weapon of the town!

In 1990, the ATCC received the Nobel Peace
Alternative prize, the 32 million pesos they received as the monetary prize was
used; to purchase a piece of land for cultivation programs, to build a mill and
to put up a medical post. In 1990 ATCC also received the Right Livelihood
Award, from which this description of their work is drawn. (Asociacion de
Trabajadores Campesinos de Carare)

These
efforts are admirable yet they do not transcend the news. Victoria Sanford
(2002) in her paper The Moral Imagination
of Survival: Displacement and Child Soldiers in Guatemala and Colombia describes
the efforts of youth who have been de-mobilized from several armed groups in Colombia
and have created youth centers for Peace. Abject suffering has fuelled their
determination to non-violence against forced recruitment in these utopian
groups for peace. Alvin
in the community of Costo de Oro explains: “A weapon resolves nothing,
weapons destroy the soul. I have seen this happen since my childhood” (Sanford, 75)

Civilians caught in the crossfire look desperately for a chance to flee.
Puerto Rico, Caqueta (Jason Crowe, 2002)

Other regional diplomacy solutions

For these peace efforts to succeed the focus to the
peace process can’t become fruitful if the funding to continue the
struggle is present. The Main issue is coca
trafficking. All the other drug trafficking
dwindles in comparison to the network of consumption that this drug has created
in the criminal network. Morales who started off as a leader of the
MAS (Movement towards Socialism) and is now the President of Bolivia has said
that he wishes to legalise coca cultivation, whilst stressing that this would
not mean legalizing the manufacture of cocaine. The problem is that Bolivia
grows much more coca than it can consume itself, and most production goes into
making cocaine. By international law, Bolivia
is prevented from exporting products made of coca to other countries. Since
the early 1980s, the United States has used all available leverage to coax
successive Bolivian governments to eradicate coca. It was the eradication program in Morales's
native Chapare that first gave him a leg-up in local
politics, and Morales can ill afford to lose his local support through a policy
of eradication.

Connecting these activists efforts
to US intervention, drug-trafficking and war is complex as the pieces of the
puzzle that will eventually become peace will fall into place when these
communities reproduce into more cohesive groups around the country. According
to the International Crisis Group in a paper with a series of recommendations
to the Uribe government, the main issue to be dealt with is very pragmatic yet
these can operate in conjunction with the resistance to violence. First  the efforts to
strengthen the interediction of shipments of drug and chemical precursors that
must be destroyed controlling as well the stop the money laundering efforts.
Developing and alternative infrastructure of farming that is not depending on
the planting of coca or poppies in land that will be confiscated to the
narcotraffickers and ceased by the government. Suspend fumigation of coca fields
unless absolutely necessary but not until the environmental impact study has
determined that is viable and if so to eradicate human inhabitants from the
area. To create consensus with producing countries as for the strategies to be
utilized and create conference groups and international forums especially
involving the United Nations General Assembly. Guarantee the de-mobilization of
paramilitary forces making sure that all ties with the narcotraffick have been
broken. To recognize that the FARC and ELN are not simply involved in traffick
of drugs but that they hold an ideology that motivates them politically into
armed insurgency. Programs to create
dialogue and awareness in the population must deal with the land problem as
well as with social programs to create alternatives to joining the guerrillas
in rural populations. A full investigation into human rights abuses is
fundamental as is the confiscation of illicitly acquired land and property by
the guerrilla groups. The mandate to cut all connections with traffickers would
also become part of a deal to demobilize paramilitaries in order to start
conversations with the two guerrilla insurgent groups. As regards the US the
ICG it recommends that the assistance to Colombia to re-establish the rule of
law is fundamental by offering expertise to train police and the military as
well as the forces dealing with interdiction of droga shipments and lawful
arrest of traffickers, money laundering networks in the US and Colombia. That
the assistance in dollars becomes more equitable between security issues and
economic rural development considering that the creation of sustainable
institutional systems is indispensable.

Alter the balance so there is an even division
between security assistance on the one hand and rural economic assistance,
governance help and social funding on the other, including by increasing
substantially aid for alternative and rural development programs.Encourage the
National Academy of Science, the Institute of Health and the National Research
Council to join in a comprehensive study of the range, benefits, implications
and consequences of harm reduction measures in tackling drug demand in the
U.S., including abstinence-oriented medically administered drug consumption
experiments that have been conducted in Europe or elsewhere. Consult widely on
possible implications for cutting demand of harm reduction measures and
mechanisms for incorporating them in both source and consumption countries; if
a consensus is reached that they would indeed reduce demand and so cut into
profit margins that affect both supply and armed conflicts, work to amend the
international drug policy framework in UN conventions accordingly. (ICG 2002)

To the European Union and its Member States the ICG
recommends an increase
scientific study of harm reduction measures as well as assistance to Colombia
for alternative development programs with a view to reducing aerial spraying to
a minimum, .To provide more logistical and technical assistance to Colombia for
interdiction of drug and chemical precursor shipments and to the surrounding
countries who are coca growers as well to aid in all this respect by lending
expertise and allying themselves in a group effort. And in particular this two
recommendations make it feasible to happen:

To the United Nations
General Assembly:

Consider seriously first steps toward introducing harm reduction
measures in source and consumption countries into the international drug policy
framework before the 2008 UNGASS evaluation deadline, including by integrating
the concept into the Guiding Principles of Drug Demand Reduction and to the International
Financial Institutions (IFIs):Assist Colombia to design and
implement a broad rural development strategy, including alternative development
programs in coca and poppy growing regions, and resettlement of populations
where necessary. (ICG 2002)

In the question of a bilateral effort to fight the
drug traffic these recommendations recognize that it is not only a US-Colombia
affair.  Yet if the concept of the
illegal traffic of drugs is put in an international relations framework there
is possibilities to broaden and control it if not monitor the ideological
concepts behind this war fought against drugs.  Between the two countries a reproduction
of political and ideological relationships is still present. As previously
stated this relationship has historical connotations that presuppose a
philosophy of intervention and approach to Latin American-US relations based on
the idea that strategically Latin America is part of the ideological background
of US
foreign policy and therefore fertile ground for reproduction (The Iran-Contra
Affair is one example).

FUDRA, the militaries rapid reaction force use US made
Blackhawck helicopter gunships on search and destroy missions against the rebel
groups (Jason Crowe, 2002)

If we
consider as analysts say that the Cold War is over we could very easily dismiss
this previous statement however observing the shift of Latin American politics
to the left or to more socialist oriented administrations, the case is not so
impossible to carry through. Chavez in Venezuela recently re-elected is
consistently trying to create alliances between Latin American countries based
on economic, social, political and cultural cooperation and exchange. The Contadora
Group though not presently active in influencing the Colombian peace efforts,
was instrumental in the writing the Guatemalan Esquipulas Peace Accord in 1986.
Although not recognized by the US due to its recognition of the Sandinista
government in Nicaragua this accord initiated by the work of  Oscar Arias recently re-elected
President of Costa Rica and Nobel Prize winner is a hopeful Latin American
effort that could be recreated in the case of Colombia. Further Esquipulas II defined a number of measures to promote
national reconciliation, an end to hostilities, democratization, free elections, the
termination of all assistance to irregular forces,
negotiations on arms controls, and assistance to refugees. It also laid the
ground for international verification procedures and provided a timetable for
implementation. These measures are desperately needed in Colombia. As discussed in a Third
Party Intervention paper for this class Oscar Arias could become a very important
player in infusing hope to the Colombian peace future. The Colombian organisation, the Permanent Civil
Society Assembly for Peace presented such a peace plan already. The plan
suggests that the regional elections scheduled for October 2007 be used as a “plebiscite
for a ceasefire”; that Latin American governments form a “Contadora
Group” as has happened in Central America be reproduced and that the UN
Secretary General play a mediating role, and that the EU and the US modify
their cooperation policies towards Colombia so as to strengthen democracy and
human rights. (Center for International Policy Program, 2006)

Beyond these efforts the present tepid efforts of the
Cuban government to help peace talks with the ELN in particular could become
significant if we consider that the government of Colombia has willingly released
prisoners to attend the peace talks in the island. Not publicized as it should
be around the world, these talks stress the need to work in conjunction with
several facets of diplomacy beyond ideology to foster peace in the region. Cuba is a major crossing point of drug traffic
due to its proximity to Florida and the US.
The embargo still in place is one fundamental piece of ideological blocking
stone in creating collaboration between the protracted Cold War actions of the
two countries. Perhaps discussion on more than the political level are
necessary to face the underlying US-Latin American relationship confrontation
that must become more respectful and less patronizing in all areas of contact.
The concept of the other as different is still prevalent even at the regional
level. Stereotypes that presume inherent qualities about each other must
change. Perhaps the groups that are calling for dialogue will prevail within
governments, civil society and the community at large. Artists, peasants,
workers, and the people of Colombia
will eventually make their voices heard.

Colombia is clamouring for peace and we need to listen.

A young boy standing inside a
Red Cross food and clothing store is watched by other displaced children
through a barred window. Territorial fighting between Government forces,
FARC rebels and rightwing militias have displaced more than 2 million
Colombians. Many of these now live in camps and shanty towns throughout the
country. A young boy standing inside a Red Cross food and clothing store is
watched by other displaced children through a barred window.

La Hormiga, Putumayo (Jason Howe, 2002)

Keeping Quiet

Pablo Neruda

Now we will count to twelve

and we will all keep still.

This one time upon the earth,

let's not speak any language,

let's stop for one second,

and not move our arms so much.

It would be a delicious moment,

without hurry, without locomotives,

all of us would be together

in a sudden uneasiness.

The fishermen in the cold sea

would do no harm to the whales

and the peasant gathering salt

would look at his torn hands.

Those who prepare green wars,

wars of gas, wars of fire,

victories without survivors,

would put on clean clothing

and would walk alongside their brothers

in the shade, without doing a thing.

What I want shouldn't be confused

with final inactivity:

life alone is what matters,

I want nothing to do with death.

If we weren't unanimous

about keeping our lives so much in motion,

if we could do nothing for once,

perhaps a great silence would

interrupt this sadness,

this never understanding ourselves

and threatening ourselves with death,

perhaps the earth is teaching us

when everything seems to be dead

and then everything is alive.

Now I will count to twelve

and you keep quiet and I'll go.

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