



# Development in a Drugs Environment: A Strategic Approach to 'Alternative Development'

A Discussion Paper  
by the Development-oriented Drug Control Programme (DDC)

## **The Development-Oriented Drug Control Programme (DDC):**

On behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the GTZ is implementing the supraregional „Development-oriented Drug Control Programme“ (DDC) since October 2003. The DDC works systematically and across regions with the "development-oriented drug control" approach within German and international development cooperation. Special consideration is given to the drug problem within the context of crisis prevention and conflict transformation, HIV/AIDS prevention, poverty reduction, rural development as well as youth and health promotion. The aim is to find effective solutions through joint efforts and integrated approaches. Internationally, the DDC supports the promotion of the balanced and development-oriented approach of the German Federal Government as well as the integration of its objectives and principles into the strategies of the partner countries. Besides working within the field of drug prevention and drug treatment in Asia and Latin America, the DDC continues to pay special attention to supply reduction and alternative development issues.

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## Executive Summary

Whichever way we look at it Alternative Development is at a crossroads: there is confusion over language and terms, concerns over the technical capacity of implementing bodies, and the growing view that the attribution of both drug control and development outcomes to alternative development projects remains opaque. The result is funding for alternative development projects continues to fall.

There are certainly many in the wider development community who question how alternative development differs from conventional rural development and whether the inclusion of key cross cutting issues such as poverty, gender, the environment and conflict have actually manifested in improvements in the lives and livelihoods of primary stakeholders. Without more robust evidence of the impact of these programmes on both human development indicators and illicit drug crop cultivation, as well as improved confidence in the effectiveness of those bodies that have traditionally designed and implemented alternative development programmes, it is unlikely that levels of funding for the kind of discrete area based alternative development projects of the past will actually recover.

More recently in Afghanistan, and increasingly in other source countries in Asia, the term 'alternative development' has been substituted with 'Alternative Livelihoods' with little recognition of the conceptual and operational differences. Elsewhere terms such as 'Sustainable Alternative Livelihoods' and indeed 'Sustainable Livelihoods' itself are sneaking into the rubric of drug control agencies as they search for a common language and legitimacy with the development community.

Even the term 'Alternative Development' still means 'many things to many people'. For those whose performance is measured simply in terms of reductions in the amount of opium poppy and coca grown, alternative development is seen as simply as the 'carrot' to the eradication 'stick', and the provision of development assistance is contingent on reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation. For others, reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation are an externality of a development process (that includes extending good governance and the rule of law) aimed at achieving sustainable improvements in lives and livelihoods. In terms of both process and the primary goal there is still much disagreement with regard to alternative development.

However, there is a danger of 'throwing the baby out with the bathwater'. Alternative development projects have achieved both development and drug control outcomes in specific geographical areas where more conventional development agencies are often not even present, despite the prevailing levels of poverty and conflict. For those who have experienced the low levels of literacy, high incidence of food insecurity, infant mortality and malnutrition that typically exist in illicit drug crop producing areas, as well as the lack of governance and prevailing levels of violence and intimidation from both state and non-state actors, arguments about the relatively high income of opium poppy and coca growing households seems rather inappropriate and ill informed. To this group the subsequent improvements in the income and quality of life of communities that often accompany alternative development projects at the same time as levels of opium poppy or coca cultivation fall are obvious, even if they might have been documented better or achieved more cost effectively.

Given the concentration of illicit drug crops in marginal areas where weak governance, conflict and poverty prevail it is clear that the current impasse on the role of the development community in improving the lives and livelihoods of those residing in illicit drug crop producing areas has to be overcome so that both development and drug control communities can meet their different but interrelated objectives. Yet, there is a need to recognise that greater engagement by the development community will not be achieved by launching a new marketing campaign and trying to sell what is already considered a faulty product more effectively, or simply tinkering with the name in the hope that non one notices the 'alternative development' product has actually passed its 'sell-by-date'. Instead, there is a need for the proponents of alternative development to learn from the wider development community in terms of conceptual frameworks, understanding the nature of change in rural livelihoods, and in particular, to recognise that the more traditional project type intervention has its limitations and that a wider-sectoral approach is required to build an enabling policy environment for development efforts to have make a real impact. At the same time, there is a need for the development community to move way from what can be a rather unsophisticated and outdated model of the 'profit maximising illicit drug farmer' and further its understanding of the complex role that illicit drug crops play in the livelihoods of the rural poor.

This Discussion paper is aimed at promoting just such an understanding between both communities. Indeed, it is targeted at a wider development community that has often been at best suspicious of the illicit drug issues and a drug control community that has often proved insular and unable to draw on the lessons learned from the implementation of more conventional rural development interventions over the last decade. The paper is intended to provoke both communities into a more constructive dialogue: a dialogue that is aimed more at developing a deeper understanding of the considerable overlap between drug control and development agendas; and that promotes partnership – no longer based on the distinct and rather artificial discipline of 'alternative development' in which neither development nor drug control community have ownership – but based on agreed principles of integrating an analysis of the causes of illicit drug crop cultivation into conventional development programmes, a common understanding of how development outcomes can translate into drug control achievements, and an ethos of doing 'development in a drugs environment'.

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## **Abbreviations**

ADB:	Asian Development Bank
ALWG:	Alternative Livelihood Working Group, Afghanistan
BMZ:	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung)
CICAD:	Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
DfID:	Department for International Development (UK)
EC:	European Commission
FAO:	Food and Agriculture Organization
F.A.R.C.:	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)
GTZ:	German Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH)
IADB:	Inter-American Development Bank
JICA:	Japan International Cooperation Agency
MISFA:	Microfinance and Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan
NEEP:	National Emergency Employment Programme
NGO:	Non-governmental organisation
NSP:	National Solidarity Programme (Afghanistan)
UNDAF:	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC:	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development

# **Development in a Drugs Environment: A Strategic Approach to 'Alternative Development'**

## **1 Background**

Over the last decade the development community has recognised the need to broaden their sphere of responsibility, take on issues such as governance, conflict resolution, and security sector reform, and attempt to directly influence the wider policy environment that ultimately shapes the lives and livelihoods of the poor. Behind this shift lies a greater understanding of the complex nature of poverty: how it is not just poverty of income that such a large proportion of the developing world have to endure but a poverty of socio-economic, political and legal rights that leave them vulnerable to shocks and crisis and with few opportunities to escape their plight.

Given that within this context pro-poor interventions are not just aimed at increasing incomes but addressing the wider economic and political structures that create and maintain poverty, the development community has had to take a more strategic and coordinated approach to its work. There is recognition that the more traditional project type intervention has its limitations and that a wider sectoral approach is required to build an enabling policy environment for development efforts to make a real difference to the poor. In particular, greater attention has been given to identifying strategic entry points where development interventions can facilitate a demonstrable change in the lives and livelihoods of the poor; work with potential agents of change in government and civil society to champion this work; and build partnerships with other donors that will elicit the necessary technical, financial and political support for its replication.

In the last few years, those involved in drug control and in particular in interventions primarily aimed at reducing the cultivation of illicit drug crops, so called 'alternative development', have also recognised the need for a more strategic and coordinated approach to their work. The constraints on project level interventions have become increasingly apparent as illicit drug crops have become more and more concentrated in areas of conflict where the development of licit livelihood options are severely constrained by the wider socio-economic, political and ecological environment that prevail. It is now increasingly accepted that no single project can address the myriad of motivations and factors that influence illicit drug crop cultivation (even at a local level) and that the elimination of coca and opium poppy will be dependent on the achievement of broader development goals, including establishing the institutions required for formal governance and promoting civil society, strengthening social protection mechanisms, as well as encouraging licit on-farm, off-farm and non-farm income opportunities.

The multi-sectoral nature of the current task, targeted more at nation building and reconstruction than alternative development *per se*, points to the need for a broader ownership of the drug control agenda by a range of development actors - national, bilateral, multilateral and non government and not just specialist drug control agencies such as UNODC. This shift in emphasis has led to development practitioners and experts in 'alternative development' referring to 'development in a drugs environment' - an approach that seeks to mainstream counter narcotics as a cross cutting issue within national development programmes.

To facilitate this broader approach there has been greater outreach by those involved in alternative development to the wider development

community, such as the World Bank, the European Commission and some of the larger bilateral development donors and non government organisations, who do not have a history of close engagement with the illicit drugs issue. BMZ/GTZ have been catalytic in this work drawing on their experience in development orientated drug control, and in particular their pioneering work in alternative development over the last 25 years, to drive forward a pro-poor approach to reducing illicit drug crop cultivation. They have been instrumental in highlighting the inter-linkages between the production of coca and opium and key development issues such as conflict, poverty, and gender at a time when few other development organisations were engaged (See Annex). More recently, UNODC has restructured itself recognising the overlap between development and drug control agendas.

However, whilst considerable progress has been made in some source countries, most notably Afghanistan, illicit drug crop cultivation remains a difficult issue for many in the development community to come to terms with. It is a subject matter that those both in the headquarters of international development agencies and in the field often feel uncomfortable with. Indeed, development actors often question the reasons for engagement on the drugs issue, wondering whether it actually complies with the value set of development organisations and the pro-poor remit that some institutions even enshrine in legislation. Sometimes, the drugs issue even challenges the ideology of development actors in areas as diverse as how markets function to concepts of legality.

Whilst some of these concerns are understandable there are many misconceptions about opium poppy and coca growing households that still prevail. Indeed, all too often

development workers cast aside their experience and training and refer to the wealth of opium poppy and coca producing households and the oxymoron of 'profit maximising subsistence farmers'.<sup>1</sup> They talk of high gross returns per hectare to 'average farmers' and ignore their years of experience that have proven the risk adverse nature of rural communities.<sup>2</sup> Inequitable land tenure, labour, and credit arrangements that often prevail in rural communities and the significant impact they have on the economic returns on any agricultural activity are typically forgotten when development practitioners talk of coca and opium poppy farmers. There is also a tendency to favour the now outdated income related definition of poverty and ignore the more complex rights based approach that has emerged over the last few years and that captures the very circumstances that the vast majority of opium poppy and coca growing households in Asia and Latin America endure.


It is clear there is still much to be done to convince the wider development community to engage in an area where it has a clear mandate and so much to offer. This paper seeks to go some way in doing this. The first section underlines the overlap between a conventional development agenda that seeks to eliminate poverty and an alternative development agenda that seeks to eliminate illicit drug crop cultivation. It highlights the role alternative development interventions have played in increasing the livelihood options of the rural poor by absorbing marginal areas into the wider nation state, not just physically through the provision of roads, but culturally linguistically and legally through the provision of education and the application of civil law. The second section outlines the history of alternative development and how a lack of a clear understanding of how households move from licit to illicit livelihoods (and subsequently vice versa) have hampered design,



implementation and weakened the evidence base for advocacy. The third section recognises that alternative development is at a hiatus and that it no longer offers a solution to scale and nature of the illicit drug crop cultivation in many source countries. It suggests that there is a need to broaden the ownership of the drugs issue amongst key development agencies at both the national and international level and outlines what is required at an analytical, institutional, political and policy level to achieve this.

The paper concludes that there is a real opportunity to build on the achievements in mainstreaming drugs within the wider reconstruction and development process in Afghanistan. Achievements that are based on a growing analytical base, a close partnership between alternative development specialists and development practitioners and a common understanding of illicit drug crop cultivation as a development issue. The paper suggests that there is no less need for such an approach in other source countries and that it is the role of alternative development specialists to focus their attention on producing the evidence base with which to support their development colleagues.

**Opium Poppy Cultivation 2002 - 2003**



World Drug Report 2004, UNODC, p.63


**Coca Bush Cultivation 2002 - 2003**



World Drug Report 2004, UNODC, p.100

## 2 Development in a Drugs Environment: the Overlapping Agendas

### 2.1 Poverty, exclusion and vulnerability



#### 2.1.1 Poverty - the income model

Many development practitioners still think of illicit drug crop producers as wealthy and therefore falling outside their 'pro-poor' sphere of responsibility. All too often this judgement is based on the assumption that the illicit drug crop cultivation is a hugely profitable endeavour. It can be. Some illicit drug crop producers may indeed be relatively wealthy in terms of income and there may even be some evidence of conspicuous consumption amongst them. However, the majority are not income rich. They are often subject to inequitable land tenure and credit arrangements which mean they may obtain only a share of the final crop and perhaps even worse have sold much of their share in advance at prices well below the rate at harvest time. They are exploited by traders of both licit and illicit goods and services, paying higher rates for inputs and being paid lower farmgate prices for their opium or coca crop due to their distance from legal markets and the lack of state presence and regulation. They find themselves 'taxed' by non-state actors, 'insurgents' or 'warlords', or indeed officials of the state. The end result is that the gross return per hectare crudely calculated and cited by journalists and policy makers from drug control organisations are simply not those earned by the majority of opium poppy and coca producing households.<sup>3</sup>

Nor does the common perception that illicit drug producing households have relatively high incomes seem to be supported by much of the available data. For instance, in Myanmar and Laos, opium producing households are estimated to earn around US\$ 200 cash income per annum;<sup>4</sup> in Vietnam, the highland communities growing opium poppy have the lowest household incomes in the country and less than half the average for rural areas;<sup>5</sup> in both Buner and the Eastern Dir valley, Pakistan, the average per capita income was half the national average at a time when opium poppy cultivation in these areas was at its most prolific;<sup>6</sup> and in Afghanistan, even the relatively resource wealthy, who may acquire a higher return on opium poppy though their control over land and financial assets, still earn little more than a dollar a day per capita income.<sup>7</sup>

#### 2.1.2 A more holistic understanding

Of course, development practitioners are some of the first to refer to the complex nature of poverty. How being poor is not just an issue of having insufficient income to buy a minimum basket of goods and services but should be seen more broadly as 'a lack of basic capabilities to live in dignity'. A definition that draws on the socio-economic, environmental and political dimensions of poverty where the poor find themselves vulnerable to shocks and crisis, unable to access health and education services, subject to discrimination, and excluded from the political and legal rights experienced by many of those in mainstream society.<sup>8</sup> The rural poor, in particular, are described as having, amongst other things, marginal landholdings (often without land title), limited income streams, poor access to physical and social infrastructure, and residing in areas that leave them vulnerable to the extremes of nature.

### 2.1.3 Its applicability to illicit drug producing areas

For those familiar with the illicit drug crop producing areas of Asia and Latin America, these more informed definitions of poverty describe the very circumstances that the vast majority of opium poppy and coca growing households endure. For example in Afghanistan, opium poppy cultivation is at its most concentrated amongst those households with limited access to both land and irrigation. These households experience the highest population densities and levels of food insecurity. They are areas that are remote with few government services and where farmers are subject to the whims of whatever armed powerbroker has currently taken charge of the area. There are few on farm and off-farm income opportunities aside from opium poppy cultivation. Indeed, in many areas of intense cultivation access to land, credit and off-farm income are a function of opium poppy cultivation.



**Coca producing household in Peru: illicit drug production does not lead to a sustainable improvement of the peoples living conditions**

In Colombia, poverty is more prevalent in areas with illicit coca cultivation than for the country as a whole, whilst the regions of Narino, Meta and Caqueta, all areas of intensive coca cultivation, have some of the highest numbers of people living in poverty and extreme poverty,<sup>9</sup> infant mortality rates are higher than other rural and urban areas, and malnutrition is endemic.<sup>10</sup> In Laos, opium poppy is grown in remote highland areas where poor health and illiteracy prevail, where physical and social infrastructure is negligible, and where the population typically finds itself marginalised by the

'Lowland Lao' both economically and politically, despite being more numerous in number. Even in the opium poppy growing areas of the Lebanon over one third of households are estimated to live below the poverty line and with landholdings of only one hectare (of which three quarters of these had less than one quarter under irrigation), few households having land title (constraining access to credit and government investment) and the severe shortage of schools or any form of health service, it is difficult to see what possibilities the rural poor have of escaping their plight.<sup>11</sup>

And these examples are not unusual; other source areas experience similar conditions. Infrastructure, access to potable water and government health and social service provision are often limited or non-existent across the opium poppy and coca growing areas of Latin America, and South East and South Asia. Indicators of malnutrition, infant mortality<sup>12</sup> and illiteracy<sup>13</sup> have proved to be consistently and substantially higher than national averages.<sup>14</sup> Basic health indicators such as mortality, morbidity and birth rates are all higher than national averages. Moreover, generally, over 90% of households in source areas have been found to be entirely dependent on agriculture as a source of livelihood, few non-farm income opportunities exist.

Yet, despite this reliance on agriculture, the farming sector has proven structurally weak, with poor marketing, small landholdings, an absence of credit facilities, and a lack of irrigation. Environmental degradation, low quality inputs and poor agronomic practices have led to extremely low yields, resulting in food deficits of between 2 and 7 months.<sup>15</sup> The loss of direct entitlement has led to a greater reliance on opium and coca as a means of securing subsistence.<sup>16</sup> For many households in source areas drug crops generate the greatest proportion of household

annual income, a significant proportion of which is used to purchase food for consumption. None of this evidence would suggest that the so called 'lucrative' drugs trade has led to economic and social development in source areas nor that those cultivating illicit drug crops fall outside the mandate of mainstream development agencies.

## 2.2 The relevance of other priorities of the development community

### 2.2.1 Gender and child labour

It is also clear that illicit drug crop cultivation cuts across a number of other key themes prioritised by the development community. For example, given the labour intensive nature of the crops, unremunerated family labour is essential to both opium poppy and coca cultivation.<sup>17</sup> In Latin America, the families not only contribute to coca cultivation on their own household land but on the land of neighbours and relatives through reciprocal labour arrangements.<sup>18</sup> This contribution by family members is critical to minimising labour costs, particularly during periods of low farmgate prices.



Peasant woman harvesting coca

In Afghanistan<sup>19</sup> and Pakistan<sup>20</sup> women play an active role in most stages of opium poppy cultivation. Furthermore, in Afghanistan, fieldwork has revealed that where children are withdrawn from school to assist with

household agricultural activities it is almost exclusively for the purpose of opium poppy cultivation. Again, it is the resource poor who are most likely to withdraw their children from education for this purpose.<sup>21</sup> In South East Asia, women not only provide the bulk of labour for opium poppy cultivation<sup>22</sup> but the amount of labour available within the household, in particular women and children, will often determine how extensively the crop will be grown.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, it is also the women that have to meet any shortfall in income that arises from the high levels of opium addiction that can be prevalent amongst the males of the household in highland communities in Laos and Thailand.<sup>24</sup>

### 2.2.2 The environment

The cultivation of illicit drug crops (and possible policy responses) also has implications for the environment. For every hectare of coca cultivated households clear a further 3 hectares of forest in order to cultivate food crops and tend livestock. Estimates suggest that between the early 1970's and the late 1980's, 700,000 hectares of Amazonian rainforest were cleared as a direct or indirect result of coca cultivation.<sup>25</sup> Since the 1990's a number of national parks were also encroached by coca cultivators in Peru, Bolivia and more recently Colombia, increasing the rate of deforestation and concomitant loss in biodiversity. The relocation of production to new areas in Peru such as Apurimac-Ene, where cultivation doubled between 1988 and 1994 following an outbreak of *Fusarium oxysporum*, a soil borne fungus, in the Upper Huallaga Valley, has also led to denuded slopes and increasing incidences of flooding.<sup>26</sup>





Deforestation and soil erosion due to illicit drug crop production

Intensive coca cultivation on the poor tropical soils of source areas in Colombia has also led to increasing amounts of pesticides and herbicides being used. Residues from both these and the chemicals used in the refining process end up in the waterways contaminating the drinking water of humans and animals, as well as polluting other bodies of water. In Afghanistan, the abandonment of crop rotation in some areas is thought to have led to disease and falling yields not just for opium poppy cultivation but also for other crops, including wheat. Furthermore, the cumulative affect of the ongoing drought and high opium prices has led to farmers sinking tube wells and further lowering ground water.

### 2.2.3 Conflict

Illicit drug crop cultivation has also become closely entwined with conflict in each of the areas they are produced.<sup>27</sup>

This conflict typically takes the form of disputes over resources between socio-economic and ethnic groups, however, in some areas it has manifested in military action. The coincidence of illicit drug crop cultivation and armed groups in Colombia,<sup>28</sup> Myanmar and Afghanistan is obvious. However, in Laos, Peru, Pakistan and even Thailand, armed conflicts have occurred in areas of illicit drug crop cultivation. In this environment weak state institutions

and their lack of legitimacy amongst the rural population is exacerbated by the presence of criminal elements. Repressive state policies only serve to exacerbate the situation further.<sup>29</sup>



Weak state presence in remote drug producing areas encourages the dominance of violent groups

Indeed, these conflicts can also be exacerbated by the kind of policy response adopted to reduce illicit drug crop cultivation. For instance, experience suggests that an over emphasis on eradication has led to increasing conflict in countries such as Myanmar, Peru and Colombia as households have relocated into regions that are beyond the control of the state. Indeed, some analysts, including USAID, have suggested that the Peruvian government's curtailment of the aerial spraying of Spike in 1989 was a consequence of the growing alienation of coca cultivators and the increasing support for Shining Path that resulted from the campaign.<sup>30</sup> Reports suggest that in Colombia, the support for F.A.R.C. has grown due to the aerial eradication campaigns of the Colombia government.<sup>31</sup> For farmers these conflicts leave them vulnerable to violence, intimidation and extortion from both state and non-state actors.

## **2.3 What development efforts can achieve**

### **2.3.1 Increasing levels of income**

Development interventions in illicit drug crop producing areas have disproved the rather defeatist and unfortunately ill-informed argument that nothing can compete with opium poppy and coca. In the highland areas of northern Thailand, annual family cash incomes tripled thanks to diversification of agricultural production and livestock. In Buner, in Pakistan, household incomes doubled between 1983 and 1991 despite the elimination of opium poppy.<sup>32</sup> Also in Peru, household incomes have almost doubled from US\$ 1,190 to US\$ 2,200 despite considerable reductions in coca cultivation.<sup>33</sup>

Moreover, even though the development efforts in these areas have sought to diversify income sources rather than find single crop alternatives to coca and opium poppy, more profitable crops have been found. For instance, in Thailand, the substitution of flowers for opium poppy has led to a fifty-fold increase in profits. In the Chapare rubber has been found to accrue four times that of coca per hectare.<sup>34</sup> In Pakistan, onion has proven to be a more profitable crop than opium poppy. In Lao it is potatoes that earn more than opium and in Lebanon it is garlic.<sup>35</sup>

### **2.3.2 Improvements in quality of life**

Moving beyond the more simplistic economic measures of progress, there have been clear improvements in the quality of life of primary stakeholders in these areas following development assistance. Life in an area like Dir in Pakistan is notably improved following a decade of assistance as well as the elimination of opium. An area that was previously known for its isolation, poor roads, lack of electricity, and public display of guns and opium shops has been absorbed into the national

economic, legal and political framework of the country. Indeed, physical infrastructure combined with interventions aimed at diversifying agricultural production have provided the impetus for many households to shift from the cultivation of opium poppy to legal on-farm, off-farm and non-farm income opportunities.

Moreover, these interventions and in particular the improvement and extension of the road network, have provided the Government with improved access to the area so that it can provide social infrastructure, such as schools and health facilities, as well as establish law and order within some of the more remote valleys of the district. The elimination of opium poppy has led households to look beyond agricultural production and adopt more diversified and integrated livelihood strategies that include non-farm income opportunities. Vocational training is in high demand amongst those men who are currently working as unskilled labourers within and outside the district.

Moreover, despite the conservatism of the area both men and women from poorer households are expressing their need for improving the access of girls and boys to education, recognising its longer-term social and economic benefits. As such there has been change in perception amongst primary stakeholders who no longer see themselves as belonging to isolated communities, distinct even from their wider tribe in the neighbouring valleys, but members of a wider nation state.<sup>36</sup>

Recent indepth fieldwork in Peru revealed that a shift from coca to palm oil production in the Aguaytia Basin has allowed farmers to save, invest in their future and educate their children. Levels of employment increased with the growing economic prosperity that palm oil had brought. Improvements in physical security were given a premium by the primary stakeholders

of alternative development projects, even on those occasions where a reduction in coca had been accompanied by falling levels of family income.<sup>37</sup>



**Palm oil production plant in Aguaytia, Peru: Peoples living conditions are improved**

In other source areas the benefits from moving from an illicit to a licit livelihood have been better quantified. In Nam Lang, in Thailand, for instance, the impact of newly introduced cash crops resulted in the tripling of cash incomes from US\$ 90 in 1990 to US\$ 240 in 1994. Furthermore, over 90% of villages were receiving primary health care and 92% of children had received vaccinations for diphtheria, tetanus and polio. The result has been reduced rates of infant mortality, sickness and malnutrition.<sup>38</sup> In Doi Tung in Thailand cash incomes not only increased by almost ten fold from the equivalent of US\$ 90 per capita to US\$ 730 over a 15 year period but they diversified to such an extent that non farm income, in the form of wage labour and trade, made up over 80% of the total household cash income. Household expenditure patterns have also changed to reflect the improvements in the lives and livelihoods of primary stakeholders with 40% of a far greater level of expenditure being spent on non-essential items in 2002 compared to zero in 1989. Education standards have also improved with those not receiving any form of education falling and those attending primary, secondary and higher education all increasing by up to four fold.

Given the prevailing poverty in illicit drug crop producing areas and the improvements that have been made in the lives and livelihoods of those that inhabit them, it remains a mystery why development practitioners with so much to offer have been so reluctant to engage with the drugs debate. Whilst it has already been established that there are a number of misconceptions that may have led to development practitioners not recognising the overlapping nature of both development and drug control agendas, there is also a need to establish whether there are elements of the current interventions aimed at reducing illicit coca and opium poppy, so called 'Alternative Development', that may have played a role in alienating the mainstream development community.

### **3 Alternative Development: So Many Things To So Many People**

#### **3.1 Alternative development: A history**

Alternative Development has evolved over the years. It emerged from the failure of the crop substitution initiatives of the 1970s and from the integrated rural development approach of the 1980s. During the 1970s crop substitution projects successfully identified alternative crops but failed to alter the market and infrastructural constraints that households faced in traditional areas of drug crop cultivation. The broader integrated rural development approach of the 1980s sought to redress this emphasis on replacing income and promote the integration of traditional areas of cultivation into the economic and social mainstream. It consolidated crop substitution initiatives with food for work schemes; income generation opportunities; social development initiatives aimed at improving education, health and access to potable water and sanitation; and



infrastructural projects to improve access to markets.

However, the relocation of drug crop production from traditional areas to new areas of cultivation in the late 1980s prompted a further reappraisal of drug control, resulting in the broader strategy of 'alternative development' that has sought to integrate regional development assistance with law enforcement initiatives. At the core of alternative development is a recognition that drug crop cultivation is interwoven with numerous other issues that go well beyond the micro-economics and agronomy of coca and opium cultivation.

In practice, alternative development has come to mean different things to different organisations and individuals, a position that is supported by the rather broad nature of the definition declared at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1998:

*'A process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural development measures in the context of sustained national economic growth and sustainable development efforts in countries taking action against drugs, recognising the particular socio-cultural characteristics of the target communities and groups, within the framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs.'*

To some alternative development is indeed a broad approach that seeks to address the underlying development problems that are the cause of illicit drug crop cultivation, to others alternative development has simply represented a means by which to negotiate reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation with the authorities at the national, regional and local level. In its crudest form this can be the difference between the provision of short-term single sector initiatives, such as

physical infrastructure or agricultural extension, and a more integrated programme of rural development assistance over a decade or more.

Moreover there are regional differences. In Latin America, as opposed to South and South East Asia, alternative development generally pursues a more income replacement model that focuses on finding crops that have the economic potential (either as a crop or after processing) that can compete with coca and opium poppy. Somewhat surprisingly, the diversification of on-farm, off-farm and, in particular, non-farm income opportunities is typically not part of a strategy for both increasing the level and the security of household incomes in Alternative development projects in much of Latin America: it is unclear why.

Whilst some argue that it is regional context and specific problem analysis that has led to these different approaches there is little supporting evidence of such a claim. If anything even the most basic diagnostic and analytical work that has become a prerequisite for the design, appraisal and subsequent implementation of more conventional development projects or programmes over the last decade is often foregone when primary stakeholders are also illicit drug producers.

### **3.2 Alternative Development: A critique**

It is certainly clear that the concept of alternative development has reached a hiatus, lacking both a clear and coherent strategy, as well as funding. Its association with repression, eradication and development assistance that is contingent on reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation, particularly in Latin America, has made it an unpopular term.

### 3.2.1 A weak analytical base

However, the major constraint that has faced Alternative Development has been that in a world of increasing accountability and performance measurement there has been a failure to explain what has worked and whether reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation can actually be attributed to specific interventions.<sup>39</sup> Ultimately the blame for this analytical vacuum lies with an overemphasis on aggregate reductions in drug crop cultivation as the indicator of project success and the neglect of the processes by which households move from illicit to licit based livelihood strategies.<sup>40</sup> The result has been the causal relationship between the development outputs of these projects and their drug control goal, 'the change model', has remained loose and undefined.<sup>41</sup>

Indeed, drug crop producers have generally been treated as a homogenous group and little consideration has been given to the multi-functional role that drug crops play in livelihood strategies in source areas, providing access to land, labour and credit, as well as providing an important source of off-farm income opportunities for those with insufficient land to satisfy household basic needs.<sup>42</sup> As such, interventions have not been targeted to address the specific reasons why particular socio-economic groups engage in illicit drug crop cultivation but have taken a more formulaic approach, providing a relatively standard package of activities to what are considered a relatively standard set of beneficiaries.

This lack of analysis at the micro-level has meant that there has been an inadequate understanding of how the particular composition of activities offered by alternative development projects will actually influence households in their decision to cultivate illicit drug crops.<sup>43</sup> Consequently, it has typically been the wealthier members of communities, who are less dependent on opium as a

means of accessing resources, which have benefited disproportionately from alternative development projects.<sup>44</sup> This has had an impact on the achievement of both drug control objectives, due to the relocation of more marginal drug crop producers to neighbouring areas,<sup>45</sup> and the broader development goals, such as equity.<sup>46</sup>

### 3.2.2 A Lack of development capacity

Moreover, in the 1990's alternative development came to borrow elements of *best practice* from conventional development initiatives, such as *gender*, *poverty* and *community development*, without explaining why these issues were relevant to the overall drug control objectives of the intervention. Consequently, despite the strategic importance of addressing the needs of both women and men from both drug control and conventional development perspectives, an issue such as gender has remained largely marginal, limited to mere components of interventions rather than an integral part of the underlying strategy of alternative development interventions.<sup>47</sup>

Similarly, whilst project documents often refer to the *poor* or the *poorest*, these groups are rarely defined and the political and economic structures that create and maintain poverty are generally not addressed in project design and implementation. Without this analysis the most vulnerable are typically neglected during project implementation to the detriment of both development and alternative development objectives. The failure to explain the significance of these more conventional development issues from a drug control perspective has led many donors and drug control analysts to question the efficacy of their inclusion in drug control projects at all, despite their strategic importance.<sup>48</sup>

### 3.2.3 A lack of clear strategy

For those from the development community there has been on occasions little discernible difference between the activities implemented under the auspices of alternative development and those undertaken by the typical rural development programme, implemented by a variety of national, multilateral and non-government organisations across the globe. This perception, combined with concerns over the development capacity of specialised drug control agencies that have implemented alternative development projects,<sup>49</sup> and a tendency for reductions in illicit drug cultivation in one area to be accompanied by increases in opium poppy and coca cultivation in a neighbouring area, has led many observers to question the value-added of alternative development as a concept.



Alternative development is more than conventional rural development

Furthermore, advocates of alternative development have found it difficult to explain what differentiates alternative development from conventional rural development interventions given the absence of a clear understanding of the motivations and factors that influence illicit drug crop cultivation. This analytical gap has led to projects being criticised for poor design<sup>50</sup>, poor management, and a lack of strategic direction both internally and in how to coordinate their development efforts with other drug control interventions, most notably eradication.<sup>51</sup> In the

absences of a clear strategy, the temptation has all too often been to pursue the significant reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation that have been promised to donors without any clear understanding of how this might best be achieved.<sup>52</sup> All too often this can lead to the introduction of short-term strategies, such as universal eradication and conditionality, that deliver an immediate drug control 'success' (and hopefully future funding) rather than sustainable change in the lives and livelihoods of illicit drug crop producers which will ultimately help them shift from illicit to licit livelihoods.

### 3.2.4 Weak institutional knowledge

But what are project designers and implementers to work with? Where is the evidence base from which to develop a more effective response to illicit drug crop cultivation? Unfortunately, insufficient attention has been given to lessons learned and best practice in the field of alternative development. Where efforts have been made they have typically focused on how projects are managed rather than analysing the processes by which households move from illicit to licit livelihoods. Impact monitoring is still not undertaken systematically despite numerous calls from evaluators and donors alike, and after a decade of experience in this area amongst mainstream development practitioners.<sup>53</sup>

Institutional memory has also proven weak. UNODC, who has the mandate for providing technical support on alternative development projects, could have performed better.<sup>54</sup> There has been a lack of investment in building the necessary cadre of expertise that is required to support national governments and project managers in designing and implementing what should be catalytic projects aimed at establishing what works in moving farmers from illicit to

licit livelihoods, and subsequently sharing this knowledge with those involved in larger scale rural development programmes. There has also been insufficient research into the drivers of opium poppy and coca cultivation and how these differ by locality, and socio-economic and gender groups, with which to inform project and programme design. Moreover, project managers, whilst rural development specialists have typically been unfamiliar with illicit drug crop cultivation and how development and drug control impact might be maximised by better timing, targeting and sequencing interventions. Yet due to the overall lack of capacity and limited knowledge base these managers have generally been given insufficient technical support from their country office and headquarters.<sup>55</sup>

Ultimately, alternative development projects have proven structurally weak. Whilst many interventions have undoubtedly been associated with localised successes both in terms of reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation and improving the lives and livelihoods of primary stakeholders, there are questions over whether these results are directly attributable and could have been achieved in a more cost-effective manner, and in particular with less negative consequences for the more vulnerable and the environment.<sup>56</sup> As such, alternative development remains a blunt instrument with need of greater refinement if it is to prove an effective instrument for both drug control and conventional development objectives. Most importantly, alternative development will remain confined to the margins both in terms of funding and policy influence, unless greater attention is given to developing a clearer understanding of what works and why.

## **4 The Way Forward**

### **4.1 Beyond the Project**

There is a growing consensus that the alternative development approach has

its limitations, particularly as illicit drug crop cultivation becomes increasingly concentrated in areas of conflict where the development of licit livelihood options are severely constrained by the wider socio-economic, political and ecological environment that prevail. The realisation that these marginal areas typically do not have sufficient agricultural potential, to absorb their existing population were opium poppy and coca to be eliminated, has led to increasing moves to develop a broader based approach to the development of alternative livelihoods for illicit drug crop producing households.<sup>57</sup>

Experience from the few national success stories, such as Thailand have highlighted the importance of generating licit employment opportunities in urban areas through macro economic growth. More importantly the Thai effort has revealed the necessary investment in 'nation building' (where US\$ 2.6 billion [current prices] was invested in the development of the northern areas between 1970 and 2000) as a prerequisite to the success of more discrete Alternative Development efforts (where the investment was nearer US\$460 million [current prices] over the same period). The Thai example tends to suggest a sustainable solution to illicit drug crop cultivation goes well beyond the scope of specific project interventions or one line ministry but needs a concerted and coordinated effort across arrange of different sectors and ministries.



Counter narcotics is a multi-sectoral and cross cutting issue that needs to be also on the agenda of the development actors

Indeed, it is now increasingly accepted that no single project can address the myriad of motivations and factors that influence illicit drug crop cultivation (even at a local level) and that the elimination of coca and opium poppy will be dependent on the achievement of broader development goals, including establishing the institutions required for formal governance and promoting civil society, strengthening social protection mechanisms, as well as encouraging licit on-farm, off-farm and non-farm income opportunities. The multi-sectoral nature of the current task, targeted more at nation building and reconstruction than alternative development *per se*, points to the need for a broader ownership of the drug control agenda by a range of development actors - national, bilateral multilateral and non government – and not just specialist drug control agencies such as UNODC. This shift in emphasis has led to development practitioners and experts in alternative development referring to ‘development in a drugs environment’ - an approach that seeks to mainstream the counter narcotics as a cross cutting issue within national development programmes.

#### **4.2 Mainstreaming: What is it?**

Ultimately mainstreaming is not rocket science; it is simply embedding the objective of illicit drug crop elimination in national and regional development programmes. By doing so it is anticipated that not only will it be possible to maximise both the development and counter narcotics impact of these programmes but also it will be possible to bring greater resources to bear. For instance, in Afghanistan donors have pledged approximately US\$ 8 billion of assistance for reconstruction and development between 2004 and 2007. It is anticipated that were this assistance programmed in such a way as to both develop greater synergies between development interventions and maximise its impact on opium

poppy elimination, as well as ensure no assistance (such as irrigation) encouraged further cultivation, it would be a more cost effective strategy than supporting a large number of area-based projects.

Moreover, by ‘mainstreaming’ the burden of responsibility for opium poppy elimination does not fall on one ministry, donor or international agency who, given the interdisciplinary nature of the drugs issue, will undoubtedly be overextending their policy and programmatic capacities. Instead, it allows both policy and implementing organisations to pursue areas of work in which they have comparative advantage but to do so in coordination with other institutions similarly implementing in sectors where they have specialist skills. The potential for economies of scale are obvious. As are the advantages for extending service delivery through the appropriate line departments rather than creating geographical enclaves under the jurisdiction of one line ministry with all the inconsistency of policy and programme that such an approach can entail.

**In practice, mainstreaming involves looking at development programmes through a counter narcotics prism:**

- **Developing policies and programmes that are informed by the potential impacts on illicit drug crop cultivation;**
- **Adjusting the focus of development programmes and projects so that they recognise and understand the potential impact they might have on illicit drug crop cultivation, and take steps to maximise positive impacts when conducting their activities;**
- **Promoting coordination and encouraging programmes to be complementary in their interventions, at national, province and district level;**
- **Ensuring programmes or projects do not inadvertently encourage illicit drug crop cultivation.**

Within this context alternative development does not exist as a sector as some analysts and politicians tend to think. Instead, alternative development interventions take on a more catalytic approach, aimed at generating new knowledge of 'what works' or engendering greater ownership of the counter narcotics issue by the development community.

#### **4.3 Mainstreaming: What is required at the analytical level?**

Development organisations, be they national, regional or international, can only mainstream illicit drug crop elimination into their policies and programmes if they are both convinced that illicit drugs is a development issue and that they have the technical capacity to do so. To date insufficient work has been done in both of these areas.

Typically research has focused on aggregate trends in opium poppy and coca cultivation at the national, regional and village level and not on the different motivations and factors that influence household cultivation and how these differ across socio-economic groups. As noted before, there has been a tendency to treat illicit drug crop producers as a homogenous group motivated simply by rationalist models of economic behaviour. The human (and indeed the development) element has been on the whole neglected. Whilst more recently there have been some attempts to improve the analytical base, the tendency has been to correlate measures of human development with levels of illicit drug crop cultivation rather than undertake more detailed causal analysis.

The exception to this is in Afghanistan where there is over nine years worth of research that has looked at the causes of opium poppy cultivation, as well as contextualise opium poppy cultivation as a development issue. This work has

shown that the returns on opium poppy cultivation differ considerably by socio economic group and that it is the inequitable distribution of assets (including land, labour and capital) that helps drive opium poppy cultivation even when the farmgate prices are low.<sup>58</sup> The language and the theoretical underpinnings (sustainable livelihoods analysis) have been pure development.

This body of work has not only helped broaden the ownership of the drugs issue amongst those development agencies who have traditionally been reluctant to engage but it has provided some of the analytical detail with which to drive forward mainstreaming at both a policy and operational level. For instance, based on the situation analysis derived from this research and other ongoing work on the role of opium poppy in rural livelihoods, the World Bank and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID) have already begun a process of mainstreaming in Afghanistan. DfID's work has reviewed the National Development Plans and identified how interventions might be targeted or timed so as to better impact on levels of illicit opium poppy cultivation.

The World Bank has also begun to operationalise its initial assessment of the overlap between development and counter narcotics agendas and determine how the national priority programmes implemented under its technical guidance might be adjusted to better address the production, consumption and trafficking of illicit drugs in Afghanistan. For example, the health and education programmes are currently being reviewed by Task Managers to assess not only how prevention might be integrated into the dialogue between health and education workers and communities but also how health and education services, possibly the only contact that some communities have with the state, might be better used to strengthen the

social contract between civil society and the central government and raise the opportunity costs associated with opium poppy cultivation.

The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and the Micro Finance and Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA), with a total expenditure of approximately US\$ 250 million over a two year period, are also under review to see whether they might better impact on opium poppy elimination not only as individual programmes but across programmes through better targeting and sequencing of interventions.

Other donors such as the European Commission have begun a process of mainstreaming whilst those agencies implementing in the field, in particular Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) have become actively engaged in the challenges of implementing development projects in areas in which opium poppy cultivation is concentrated, thereby developing a greater understanding of what interventions are most effective in promoting alternative livelihoods, as well as building greater ownership over the counter narcotics issue amongst key development agencies. Based on this work it is intended that operational guidelines on how to mainstream counter narcotics objectives, probably on a programme or project specific basis, may be developed in 2006.

Whilst clearly there is need for further work in Afghanistan to facilitate mainstreaming with some of the larger bilateral programmes, as well as to assess the impact of these initiatives on both human development and drug control indicators, there is also a need for more analytical work in other source countries as a basis for engaging the wider development community.

Primarily there is a very real need for quality research across a range of

different source countries aimed at identifying the drivers of illicit drug crop cultivation and subsequently document the processes by which households move from illicit to licit livelihoods, and how these differ by socio economic group. This work could form the basis for a comparative model of illicit drug crop cultivation that could inform both policy development and operational plans of drug control and development organisations.

There is also a need to develop the necessary analytical tools to support development organisations in their diagnostic work during the different stages of project/programme cycle management. This may be as simple as providing technical support on terms of reference for a Livelihoods Analysis to ensure the potential drivers of illicit drug crop cultivation are adequately covered and understood during appraisal and design, or it might involve advising on indicators that best capture the qualitative changes in lives and livelihoods that are associated with reductions in opium poppy or coca cultivation. As in Afghanistan Guidelines for Mainstreaming and perhaps tools such as decision trees would provide practical assistance to those in the field trying to shape their programmes so as to better address illicit drug crop elimination. GTZ's Development-orientated Drug Control Programme is already providing some of this type of technical support through its Drug Profile Analysis and advisory services. This needs work needs to be built upon.

#### **4.4 Mainstreaming: What is required at the institutional level?**

Developments in Afghanistan illustrate the need for institutional mechanisms for mainstreaming and sharing lessons learned amongst development organisations. In Kabul, an Alternative Livelihood Working Group (ALWG), consisting of the key development agencies and line ministries working in sustainable livelihoods in rural



Afghanistan, has already been established. This body is an important development as to date at both the national and international level discussions on the illicit drugs issue have been dominated by representatives from drug control agencies and foreign ministries.

Indeed, whilst more informal coordination groups operate in Laos and Bolivia, the ALWG in Afghanistan represents the only formal body of development organisations that meet to discuss the issue illicit drug crop cultivation and plan appropriate courses of action. Moreover, it is a body that contains a large number of development donors such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the European Commission, as well as a number of large bilateral donors, such as GTZ and international NGOs. National Ministries are represented by focal points from within ministries to act as catalysts to promote mainstreaming in the relevant programmes.

More recently a development forum has also been established in the province of Badakhshan to ensure development interventions are better coordinated so as to maximise both development and counter narcotics impact.

In other source countries these formal mechanisms for coordination and mainstreaming counter narcotics amongst development organisations do not exist. Establishing similar working groups in each of the major illicit drug crop producing countries (Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Pakistan and Afghanistan) is one way of achieving this. The membership of these working groups might vary by region and no doubt over time as ownership over the drugs issue broadens and as the group develops practicable tools for mainstreaming. Consideration could also be given to pooling these groups at a regional (Latin America, South

East Asia and South West Asia) and international level so that experience and mainstreaming tools can be shared.

At the international level there is no forum for international development organisations to meet and better coordinate their development efforts so as to maximise their impact on illicit drug crop elimination. Such a body could consist of some of the major multilateral and bilateral development organisations. Multilateral agencies might include the World Bank (relevant regional development banks, such as ADB and IADB), the Food and Agricultural Organisation, CICAD of the Organisation of American States and the United Nations Development Programme (responsible for the UNDAF). Bilateral agencies might include some of the major donors of sustainable rural livelihoods programmes and those already actively involved in funding development programmes in illicit drug crop producing countries, including USAID, JICA, DfID, and GTZ. The Chair of such a group could reside with UNODC who have the overall mandate for assisting national government in reducing illicit drug crop cultivation.



**UNODC has the mandate but needs to strengthen its capacity and strategic position**

However, to support the process of mainstreaming at national and international levels UNODC will need to refine the critical role it has to play in reducing illicit drug crop cultivation.



Whilst UNODC has the mandate, the global experience, and the oversight on the most effective interface between law enforcement and development interventions it needs to place itself more strategically so as to deliver on mainstreaming drug control objectives into wider national, bilateral and multilateral development programmes. This means it should focus less on the implementation of alternative development projects as it did in the past, and more on developing partnerships with those development organisations, who typically have the comparative advantage in implementation, operating in source areas.

Within this context UNODC's role is more one of 'policy development and knowledge management', generating a clear understanding of the motivations and factors that influence illicit drug crop cultivation and 'lessons learned' as the vehicles for advocacy with conventional development organisations. Ideally, UNODC would partner with projects/programs working in source areas undertaking the in-depth fieldwork required to provide a robust analysis of the overlap between conventional development (counter poverty) and alternative development (counter narcotics) objectives, as well as establishing 'what works' through effective impact monitoring.

Whilst a focus on 'policy development and knowledge management' would not rule out UNODC implementing some Alternative Development projects, these would need to be considered in relation to the strategic value of these interventions. For instance, where there is an absence of projects in a source area or no ownership of the drugs agenda by development organisations working in that area, UNODC or others might implement more process orientated pilot projects designed to generate new knowledge and engender buy-in by development actors. This knowledge would then be used for

advocacy by UNODC for encouraging development organisations to scale up. To fulfil this vital function UNODC will also need to strengthen its development capacity.

#### **4.5 Mainstreaming: What is required at the political level?**

It is worth recognising that mainstreaming counter narcotics into national development policies and programmes is not always attractive to national governments. Indeed, there has been a tendency to compartmentalise the drugs issue by both the governments of source countries and donors alike. For source countries, placing alternative development under the responsibility of one single ministry or department can just be bureaucratically easier. Implementation does not require coordination between ministries with all the concomitant budgetary and logistical problems that this often entails.

However, this approach can often lead to inconsistencies in both policy and practice that can undermine the government's efforts to absorb an area into the nation state as well as create perverse incentives. For instance, in Bolivia in the 1990s the Chapare fell under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. Other line ministries, including those from the social sector, were not responsible for implementation and some of the laws related to decentralisation and participation were not applied. Consequently, the Chapare became an exception an area of 'alternative development' where development assistance is negotiated for reductions in coca cultivation whilst neighbouring areas benefited from a more holistic development process. Whilst at one level the Chapare may have benefited from greater resources from external donors due to the presence of illicit drug crop cultivation at another it has been subject to a more top-down

model of development that did little to calm political tensions in the area.

The more focused counter narcotics approach can also be used by source countries as a way of leveraging further funding out of the international community, seeking to capitalise on the image of 'development' in order to negotiate greater overseas assistance.<sup>59</sup> This is not a new approach and has been common at both the project and the national level. In some areas it has even manifested in the political leadership encouraging a resurgence in illicit drug crop cultivation after low levels of opium or coca production have been met by reduced levels of international funding.

However, some donor country's budgetary provisions may also favour single agency-single issue structures. For instance, in the US funding for alternative development projects typically comes from a counter narcotics budget line. It is far easier to document the relevance of a development intervention to eliminating illicit drug crops if it is implemented by a specialist counter narcotics agency and even better if it is tied in with an explicit policy of conditionality and eradication. Of course the single agency option may also be more susceptible to influence than perhaps an inter-ministerial board that may undertake a wider review of donors' policies and programmes, assessing the implications these might have across a range of different development objectives and not just on the elimination of illicit drug crops.

It is essential that the responsibility for interventions aimed at eliminating opium poppy and coca cultivation are not the sole responsibility of one ministry or department but is included in the objectives and work plans of all those that can contribute to the development of alternative livelihoods for illicit drug crop producing households. Experience has shown

that in many source areas where the agricultural potential is limited (particularly given the high population densities that often prevail) it is those ministries responsible for the promotion of non farm income opportunities such as the Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Works and Ministry of Urban Development that can offer more viable alternatives to illicit drug crop cultivation. However, getting buy-in from these ministries is not always so obvious and certainly not easy without high-level political support driving the process.

In Thailand, this high level political support has come from the Narcotics Control Board, headed by the Prime Minister and on which a wide range of ministries are represented. This body, with technical support from its Secretariat the Office of the Narcotics Control Board, has been key to developing a coordinated response to illicit opium poppy cultivation bringing together some twenty-four line departments in the implementation of some of the alternative development projects.

At the international level there is also a need for greater shared responsibility and coordination amongst the various agencies involved in implementing programmes in source countries. Again this points to the need for greater dialogue at the international level and a strengthened more strategic role for UNODC.

#### **4.6 Mainstreaming: What is required at a policy level?**

There are two issues associated with interventions aimed at eliminating illicit drug crop cultivation that have systematically alienated the development community: eradication and conditionality. A failure to establish a clear and unequivocal evidence based position on these two issues is likely to constrain the process of mainstreaming amongst the wider development community.

Indeed, the relationship between eradication and those development interventions aimed at reducing illicit drug crop cultivation continues to be the most intractable problem for the development community. It is this area, more than any other, which has made many from the development community decidedly nervous. Whilst the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem indicated that eradication is not appropriate until '*alternative income opportunities [have been created]*'<sup>60</sup> eradication has been conducted prior to these conditions being met. Furthermore, applied work has raised questions over whether '*an income approach*' is appropriate given the integral role that illicit drug crops play improving access to natural, social, human, physical, and financial assets. Again, the lack of clarity over this important aspect of alternative development would seem to lie with a poor understanding of the different variables that influence household drug crop cultivation and what combination of actions might best affect them.<sup>61</sup>

Advocates of eradication (typically those without development experience) ahead of the provision of development assistance tend to assume that alternative livelihoods already exist or that development agencies can create them quickly. In practice neither assumption has proved true. As we have seen illicit drug crops are typically grown in a small number of unstable, high-risk places where there are few viable alternatives. Developing alternatives requires resources, time and the trust of households and local communities. Destroying the crops of those most dependent on them for their livelihood prior to them having a viable alternative does little to establish the firm foundations required for long term development nor does it help establish the social contract between state and community that is so critical to eliminating illicit drug crop cultivation.<sup>62</sup>

Yet, this should not be interpreted as ruling eradication out. Eradication can play an important role when carefully phased with other drug control measures.<sup>63</sup> However, it works where preceded by comprehensive development programmes to promote alternative, licit livelihoods. Where such alternatives exist, farmers who persist with drug cultivation can be pushed by eradication towards legal livelihoods. Where alternatives do not exist, eradication is rarely cost-effective<sup>64</sup> and can create perverse incentives for farmers to grow more drugs. Enforced eradication where alternatives do not exist can also fuel violence and insecurity,<sup>65</sup> hostility to national authorities and displace cultivation to less accessible locations<sup>66</sup> and ultimately undermine long-term efforts to change the conditions that promote drug crop cultivation.<sup>67</sup>

Making development assistance conditional on reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation also causes the development community concern in particular because most agencies have remits (some based on domestic legislation) focused on poverty reduction and are generally unable to withhold development assistance on the basis of communities continuing drug crop cultivation. There is also little evidence to suggest that conditionality works. In particular, crude community-based conditionality does not reflect the uneven nature of the development process and that the motivations and factors that influence opium poppy cultivation differ across socio-economic groups. Instead, it expects all farmers to reduce opium poppy and coca cultivation at the same pace regardless of how dependent they are on the crop for their livelihood. More importantly the limited duration and scope of the development interventions that have imposed this kind of conditionality have done little to address the causes of illicit drug crop cultivation nor provided the long-term donor

commitment required to obtain buy-in from farmers.<sup>68</sup>

Indeed, in the past, conditionality has led to a deterioration in the relationship between implementing agencies and local communities, with implementers complaining that communities have failed to meet drug control targets and either, closing projects early or ignoring the very conditions that they imposed in the first place,<sup>69</sup> and, on the other side, communities complaining of shortfalls in donor funds and that development assistance has not manifested in improvements in lives and livelihoods on the ground.<sup>70</sup> Moreover where assistance is tied too closely to elimination schedules there is evidence of communities threatening to grow poppy if development assistance does not continue or neighbouring villages starting to grow poppy to attract assistance.

Ultimately it is not for the development community to withhold assistance to the rural population and, as is often the case in the absence of law enforcement presence, become a default law enforcement organisation. Instead, it is the role of development organisations to extend social contract to communities that have little contact with the state and feel little responsibility, or ability, to conform to its social and legal norms. Where a household has an alternative livelihood then law enforcement institutions can act to destroy the crop but by not providing assistance development organisations not only risk perpetuating the inequity that lies at the heart of illicit drug crop cultivation but also maintaining the socio-economic, political and legal vacuum in which the traffickers and traders of illicit drugs thrive.

In Afghanistan there has been a shift away from this kind of community based conditionality that is not only informed by what has worked but that is acceptable to the bulk of the

development community. Here, emphasis is being placed on identifying milestones by which the various stakeholders, and in particular the provincial authorities, involved in the delivery of provincial development plans, in which counter narcotics objectives are mainstreamed, can be judged. Indeed, within the context of mainstreaming, community level conditionality makes little sense as many of the interventions operate at a bigger scale, be that at a policy level in attempting to create an enabling environment for good governance and economic growth, or at an operational level where many interventions aimed at generating non farm income opportunities may not even be implemented within a specific rural community.

Even this provincial level 'conditionality' does not seek to hold a province to ransom each season over its level of opium poppy cultivation. Instead, it should seek to set clear progress indicators in areas such as corruption, disarmament, security, counter narcotics and administrative reform by which progress can be assessed. Where sufficient achievements have not been made the authorities and other stakeholders will be asked to explain. It is not intended that funding will automatically be curtailed but that a dialogue will ensue that will assess what more can be done, over what time frame and with what kind of technical support. Whilst the international community can reserve the sanction of withdrawing assistance were funding to be proven to be wasteful or counter productive, the intention is to establish the foundations for provincial development not to extract unsustainable reductions in opium poppy cultivation over a short time frame. To do so risks a resurgence in opium poppy cultivation and upsetting the fragile consensus with key development actors.

## 5 Conclusions

For many Alternative Development interventions have failed to meet expectations. Amongst those with a drug control remit it has failed to deliver reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation in a short enough time frame and over a significant enough area. For those in the development community there is the perception that alternative development has not targeted the poor nor complied with development best practice. The result is alternative development has become unpopular with both, rather disparate, camps.

Yet Alternative Development has been closely associated with both improvements in the lives and livelihoods of the rural poor and reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation.

Thailand and Pakistan, in particular, have highlighted what can be achieved over time. Opium poppy cultivation in Thailand is now at nominal levels after over 30 years of alternative development initiatives. And whilst there has been some resurgence in Pakistan in recent years, opium production fell from 800 metric tons in 1979 to almost zero in 2000, after the implementation of a series of alternative development projects in the North Western Frontier Province between 1976 and 2001. At the same time as these reductions occurred in Thailand and Pakistan household incomes of many of the primary stakeholders increased by at least double.

However, there are questions over whether these results could have been achieved in a more cost-effective manner and in particular with less negative consequences for the more vulnerable and the environment.<sup>71</sup> There are also questions of scale. For instance, USAID estimate they have only reached 33,000 families involved in coca cultivation in Colombia out of a

possible 136,600. They estimate that the total cost of such an initiative would be US\$ 4 billion over a three-year period.<sup>72</sup> In Afghanistan the extent of opium poppy cultivation and the severity of the problems that the country faces suggests a project response, or even a series of alternative development projects, does not match up to the scale of the task.

It is certainly time for those involved in alternative development to take stock. Whilst on the positive side alternative development projects have on the whole disproved the myth that the income earned from opium poppy and coca cultivation are insurmountable they have not presented their case very convincingly. Robust data documenting the impact of interventions, particularly on the rural poor, and explanations of causal factors have found to be seriously wanting. And whilst alternative development projects have served to increase the livelihood options of households by absorbing marginal areas into the wider nation state, not just physically through the provision of roads, but culturally, linguistically and legally through the provision of education and the application of civil law, it is not clear whether these achievements were more by default than by design.

It would certainly seem we are currently at a hiatus. Those involved in alternative development have much to learn from the development community and the strategic shifts that have taken place at both a policy and operational level over the last decade. The recognition that the more traditional project type intervention has its limitations and that a sectoral approach is required to affect more large-scale change has a real resonance with those currently involved in alternative development projects. As does the view that development interventions need to be strategic, producing demonstrable evidence of what works and sharing

this evidence base with partners so as to elicit the necessary technical, financial and political support for replication.



**Children in Afghanistan: the drug economy endangers the long term development and stability of their country**

All this is taking place at a time when development actors in Afghanistan are recognising the threat the production and trade in illicit drugs poses to the long term stability of the country and for the first time not only taking ownership over drugs as a development issue but driving aspects of counter narcotics policy and planning. So much so that the call to mainstream opium poppy elimination into the development programmes of national, multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental organisations in Afghanistan has almost become the accepted wisdom amongst development organisations themselves. The benefits of this approach are not just seen in terms of the extra funding it can bring to bear but the potential synergies that come from a more coordinated response to rural development, both in terms of impact on the lives and livelihoods of the poor, and on opium poppy elimination.

In Afghanistan, the comparative advantage of the different organisations involved in mainstreaming is becoming increasingly clear. The analytical and diagnostic work undertaken by

alternative development specialists have been instrumental in advising organisations with the experience and skills to deliver large-scale development programmes on how their interventions might be better tailored to contribute to reductions in opium poppy cultivation. The development specialists are now in the driving seat. This is a partnership that might prove effective in other source countries. Development practitioners have shown that with the right political imperative and technical support they have proven willing and able to integrate a counter narcotics agenda into their work. Alternative development specialists now need to ensure that their development colleagues have the evidence base to achieve this in other illicit drug crop producing countries.

## **6 Annex: List of publications by BMZ/ GTZ**

BMZ and GTZ have produced a number of papers that have served to highlight the overlap between alternative development and alternative development agendas. For instance see

Berg, Christoph: The Alternative Development Concept – potentials, successes and limits, in: Agriculture and Rural Development, Vol. 10, No. 1/2003, Frankfurt, 2002;

BMZ: Drug Control within the Scope of Development Cooperation. A Concept Paper, April 1995;

BMZ/ GTZ: Development-orientated Drug Control: Policy, Strategy, Experience, Intersectoral Solutions. March 2004;

DSE/ GTZ: The Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation. International Conference 07-12 January 2002, Feldafing (Munich), Germany 2002;

GTZ/ ADE: Drugs and Development in Asia – A background and discussion paper. Eschborn, 1998;

GTZ/ ADE: Gender and Alternative Development, December 2000;

GTZ/ ADE: Drugs and Development in Latin America: Strategies, experiences and project examples from the work of GTZ. Drugs and Development Program, Eschborn, September 2001;

GTZ/ ADE: Drugs and Conflict. Discussion Paper by the GTZ Drugs and Development Programme, September 2003;

GTZ/ADE/ Poverty Reduction: Drugs and Poverty: The Contribution of Development-orientated Drug Control to Poverty Alleviation. A Cooperative Study of the Drugs and Development Programme and the Poverty Reduction Project of GTZ, June 2003;

GTZ/ EOD: By the Way... where is my target group? The Art of Trouble Shooting in Peer-to-peer Drug abuse Prevention, Eschborn, 2003.

Publications available at [www.gtz.de/drogen](http://www.gtz.de/drogen)

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> *'The structure of food distribution networks in the area are such that it is clear that the expansion of opium production by households cannot and will not be undertaken, unless the basic food requirements of the household are first met.'* Additional Statement of David Feingold, Director for Research and Planning Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Philadelphia, PA From Proposal to Control Opium from the Golden Triangle and Terminate the Shan Opium trade' Hearings before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives. Ninety fourth Congress First Session April 22 and 23 1975. p. 238.

<sup>2</sup> *'Although there are indications that farmers would be willing to grow less remunerative crops than coca in exchange for adequate technical and financial support and security from repression, they are unable to stop producing coca and forego its cash income while they wait for profitable alternative production regimes to be developed and made available to them.'* Rural Development and Crop Substitution in Bolivia: USAID and the Chapare Regional Development Project by R Rasnake and M Painter October 1989. p. 33.

*'Various vegetables, fruits and livestock may generate bet returns (gross margins) which match the anticipated returns from opium. However, commercially attractive crops are often relatively perishable and susceptible to pests and diseases. They rely on high inputs and efficient marketing systems; their sustainability is often questionable. In addition their market price is subject to fluctuations. Hence although some crops have offered farmers income opportunities that are more attractive than opium cultivation, it has been widely observed that many farmers are exposed to higher risks of crop losses and/or inadequate marketing than in the past. Under such circumstances opium fulfils an insurance functions and farmers may (temporarily) revert to opium poppy cultivation. This pattern was observed in 1991 when crop failure and poor marketing, especially in some remote areas of Nam Lang, certainly had an impact on the upsurge of opium poppy cultivation during the opium cropping season of 1991/92'* TG-HDP Internal Paper No. 179: Impact Assessment Study: Nam Lang, June 1994. p. 96.

<sup>3</sup> Drugs and Poverty: The Contribution of Development-orientated Drug Control to Poverty Alleviation. A Cooperative Study of the Drugs and Development Programme and the Poverty Reduction Project of GTZ, June 2003

<sup>4</sup> UNODC Myanmar Survey 2004. p. 22; UNODC Laos Survey 2003. p. 9; UN Interagency Mission Alternative Development of Wa Special Region Myanmar, Preliminary Assessment of Opportunities for Sustainable Food Security and Agriculture Development Report of the FAO Team. July 2004. p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Research Study of the Vietnamese Experience of Opium Eradication by Do Van Hoa and Ha Dinh Tuan page 12

<sup>6</sup> Quaglia, Giovanni. (1986) The Buner Model (1976 - 1986), Buner Agricultural Development Project, PAK/81/D01. Islamabad: United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control; Mian, Nurul Islam. (1992) Proposal for Development of Green Sector (Draft Document). Dir District Development Project, Islamabad, Pakistan; Waddell, R. L. and P. Sillitoe. (1992) Report of the Mission on Sustainable Development Dir District Development Project - Phase II. Islamabad: United Nations Drug Control Programme; Kruseman, G. (1985) Socio-Economic Aspects of Opium Poppy Cultivation: Selected Farm Profiles: The Eastern Dir Valleys and Dir Kohistan. Peshawar: Government of N.W.F.P.

<sup>7</sup> Gtz PAL – Internal Document No. 2: Diversity and Dilemma: Understanding Rural Livelihoods and Addressing the Causes of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar and Laghman, Eastern Afghanistan by David Mansfield, December 2004.

<sup>8</sup> The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its statement on poverty, defined poverty as "a human condition characterized by the sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights." ([E/C.12/2001/10](#)).

<sup>9</sup> UNODC Colombia Coca Survey. June 2004, p. 33.

<sup>10</sup> A study in Caqueta in 1988 showed that almost 700 of the 2100 children under five years of age examined in one area were undernourished. An additional 560 were at risk of under nutrition, and cases were also noted of chronically undernourished children who were showing clear signs of stunted growth. Rios J, 1994 Los ninos de la Amazonia Colombiano. Santafe de Bogota, Colombia, TM editors.



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<sup>11</sup> UNDP/UNDCP Programme in Baalbeck –el Hermel, March/April 2000. p 18.

<sup>12</sup> In Xieng Khouang, Laos infant and child mortality was thought to range from 50% to 75%. United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control. (1990) Report of the in-depth evaluation mission carried out in June - July 1990 of the Dir District Development Project, Volume 1: Main Report AD/PAK/85/374. Vienna: United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control. National Commission for Drug Control and Supervision. (1991) Drug Control in 1991. Lao People's Democratic Republic.

<sup>13</sup> For example, in Dir, Pakistan only 25% of men and only 2% of women were considered literate.

<sup>14</sup> Creating and Economic Base to Support Colonisation – Integrated Development Study of the Chapare Region Bolivia. 1978. *'Agro production opportunities are limited by the transportation system. Although paved trunk roads connect Cochabamba to Villa Tunari and Puerto Villarroel, the secondary road network is poorly developed and 20% of the secondary roads are impassable part of the year. The small settlements connected by these roads are not functionally interconnected, and all lack basic services. The most immediate problem is poor health conditions. Mortality, morbidity and birth rates are higher than the already high national rates. Both infant and adult deaths have been linked to a lack of potable water and to poor sanitation. The shortage of medical personnel is exacerbated by a lack of sewerage systems, electrical power, telecommunications facilities and year round roads'* <http://www.oas.org/used/publications/unit/oea03e/cn10.htm> The Chapare Region Study, Bolivia. Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB). (1983) The Masterplan for Development of the Opium Poppy Cultivating Regions of Northern Thailand (Volume 1). Bangkok: ONCB. UNDCP. (1991) Report on the Terminal In-Depth Mission of Pae Por Highland Development Project. Bangkok, Thailand. UNDCP. (1994) Final Report: Sam Mun Highland Development project. Chiang Mai, Thailand Martinez, Javier. (1992) Personal Communication to Mukesh Kapila, ODA, from Martinez Javier, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine.

<sup>15</sup> *'In 2002, the local authority of KSR implemented a ban on poppy cultivation and opium production. The implementation of the ban in KSR has had serious, painful impacts on the welfare of the people of the KSR. With hardly sufficient alternative incomes in place, most poor opium farmers lost their primary revenue and are facing harsh times. In normal circumstances, over 50% of the population of KSR can secure food for 6 months of the year. The meagre US\$ 175 average income per household for opium helped mitigate most of this chronic food deficiency. With the ban on opium production many moved searching for income and food. From an estimated total population of 200,000 people in 2000 only 140, 000 remained in the Kokang in 2004. Two out of three private clinics and pharmacies closed and in the northern part of Kokang more than one out of three community schools had to close their doors. About 6,000 children left school, effectively halving the enrolment rate compared to the previous year'* UN Interagency Mission Alternative Development of Wa Special Region Myanmar. Preliminary Assessment of Opportunities for Sustainable Food Security and Agriculture Development Report of the FAO Team. July 2004. p. 5.

<sup>16</sup> *'In the remoter parts of the three project areas the villagers subsistence is still precarious, with rice shortages still being an unfortunate act of life. As long as people continue to have rice shortages as long as marketing is a problem, there will be the pressure to produce opium as fallback. When the farmer in northern Laos has opium he or she can always exchange it for rice or for silver. The very precariousness of people's subsistence is in itself a serious constraint to their widespread or rapid giving up of opium poppy cultivation.'* Project Progress Review of the Lao German Project: Promotion of Drug Control. Berg et al 2001. p. 38.

<sup>17</sup> *'Women are actively involved in harvesting opium. Since there is no one at home to take care of the children, all of them even the newly born babies are carried to the poppy fields'*. See A. Akcasu, 'A survey of the factors preventing opium use by poppy growing peasants in Turkey' in the United Nations Bulletin on Narcotics Vol. 1, 1976, No. 1, p. 13-17. <sup>17</sup> *'In India [opium poppy cultivation] is a family affair – every member of the family is involved.'* Akhtar Hussain and J.R. Sharma, The Opium Poppy. (Luknow, Central Institute of Medicinal and Aromatic Plants, 1983, p. 6).

<sup>18</sup> A study conducted by CERES in the Chapare, Bolivia found that 87% of those households interviewed regularly used unremunerated family labour and 72% used reciprocal labour. Indeed, farmers stated that the costs of hired labour and the availability of unpaid family labour were the main constraints on coca cultivation. Michael Painter 1991, IDA p. 29.

<sup>19</sup> Women's role in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is highly regionalised. In the northern and eastern regions women are actively involved in all stages of opium poppy cultivation. However, in the southern region where the more conservative Durrani Pashtoons reside and land ownership is more concentrated, women's participation in opium poppy cultivation tends to be restricted to the arduous task of preparing food and drink for itinerant opium poppy harvesters. For more details see UNDCP, Strategic Study#6: The Role of Women in Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, (UNDCP, Islamabad, June 2000).

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<sup>20</sup> Annemieke Schoemaker. A Description of the Lives and Work of Some Women in Villages in Dir District. MSC Thesis for Sociology of Rural Development, Agricultural University Wageningen, The Netherlands, April- November 1991.

<sup>21</sup> *'Wealthier socio-economic groups (who were also most likely to have their children in school in the first place) were the least likely to withdraw their children from school for agricultural activities. For instance only 2% of those categorised as landlords removed their children from school during peak periods of agricultural activity, compared to 18% of owner cultivators and 25% of the landless'*. PAL – Internal Document No. 2: Diversity and Dilemma: Understanding Rural Livelihoods and Addressing the Causes of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar and Laghman, Eastern Afghanistan by David Mansfield, December 2004. p. 7. The same phenomenon is common in Burma as well: *'very few children in the hillside go to school; instead most of the children flee to the poppy field together with their parents. In the poppy field, children can do many jobs, especially when opium is ready for harvest. As old as five, you can collect opium as well. Furthermore, you need a lot of people when it is ready to take opium or it will dry very quickly, then you lose the opium. So parents even bring children who have school at that time (December to February).'* Luan and Manshuang. Two Farmers Perspectives on Opium Production in Burma. Paper presented at the TNI/BCN Conference Drug and Conflict in Burma (Myanmar): Dilemmas for Policy Responses, Amsterdam December 2003.

<sup>22</sup> In Laos women are thought to provide 63% of the labour required for opium poppy cultivation. See Lao National Commission for Drug Control/UNDCP (1998) National Opium Poppy Survey 1997/1998 Vientiane.

<sup>23</sup> *'The demographic profile of the household will often be a determining factor in the decision to specialise in opium rather than rice; The greater the percentage of women and children in the work force, the greater the tendency to emphasize opium production'* Additional Statement of David Feingold, Director for Research and Planning Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Philadelphia, PA From Proposal to Control opium form the Golden Triangle and Terminate the Shan opium trade' Hearings before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives Ninety fourth Congress First Session April 22 and 23 1975. p. 225'

<sup>24</sup> *'In Laos women suffer most from men's addiction – as they have to go and work to meet the shortfall in income and pay for opium'* Bruckmoser 1998 p. 24.

<sup>25</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that *'the cultivation of the coca plant alone has since its inception destroyed between 160,000 and 240,000 hectares of tropical jungle in the Orinoco and Amazon basins; and 30% of annual deforestation estimated in Colombia. In the Andean zone, the cultivation of opium poppy has destroyed approximately 60,000 – 100,000 hectares of Andean woodland and high Andean woodland of great ecological value, and these figures represent some 15 % of the deforestation rate mentioned.'* The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Mail for Peace, No. 8, 23 July 1999.

<sup>26</sup> UNDCP (1995) Desarrollo Alternativo del Valle del Rio Apurimac-Ene (Project AD/PER/95/939) Lima UNDCP 1995.

<sup>27</sup> *'Illicit crops are found in countries where the central state does not have control over its territory, where there are organised minority groups whose main loyalty is not toward the country but rather toward tribe, religion, race or political party; countries where the central state is weak or collapsed, or countries with open civil conflict'* See Francisco Thoumi The Profitability of Illicit Crops and Alternative Development in Latin America. Paper prepared for the International Conference on Alternative Development in Drug Control and Cooperation, Feldafing, January 8-12, 2002.

<sup>28</sup> In Colombia the relationship between armed conflict and illicit drug crop cultivation is clear. Of the 189 municipalities in which coca is grown, guerillas can be found in 162 and paramilitary groups in 86. See UNODC Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey June 2004. p. 39. In the 43 municipalities in which all three armed groups can be found coca is grown in each. High rates of displacement associated with areas of coca cultivation. 33,455 families per year have relocated between 1996 and 2003. Whilst some have relocated to cities others have simply moved to new areas to cultivate coca. UN Thematic Group on Displacement, 2001 UNHCR, March 2002.

<sup>29</sup> Drugs and Conflict. Discussion Paper by the GTZ Drugs and Development Programme, September 2003

<sup>30</sup> *'Forced eradication of mature coca complicated efforts to eliminate coca leaf production by alienating the farmers and promoting the growth of terrorism'*. USAID/Peru Alternative Development Project (527-0348) June 390 1995, p. 2.

<sup>31</sup> The study conducted by Accion Andina and the Transnational Institute 'Fumigacion y Conflicto – Politicas antidrogas y delegetimacion del Estado del Colombia' concludes that *'the practice of aerial*

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*spraying [has set] in motion a destructive cycle of chemical pollution, livelihood destruction, and migration into even more vulnerable areas.* 'In Lebanon, as in other source countries. Eradication in areas where viable alternative sources of livelihood do not exist has led to growing conflict between state and primary stakeholders. 'Although the situation is at present calm, underlying the surface there is still a great deal of instability, aggravated by increasing poverty and frustration with lack of tangible support and compensation for the loss in stable revenues following eradication of illicit crops'. UNDP/UNDCP Programme in Baalbeck –el Hermel, March/April 2000. p. 26.

<sup>32</sup> Quaglia, Giovanni. (1986) *The Buner Model (1976 - 1986)*, Buner Agricultural Development Project, PAK/81/D01. Islamabad: United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control.

<sup>33</sup> Alternative Development in Peru, UNODC presentation at Alternative Development: Removing Impediments to Growth, Doi Tung, 13-19 November 2004.

<sup>34</sup> United Nations Development Programme. (1991) World Development: Special Report, Vol 4(3).

<sup>35</sup> UNDP/UNDCP Programme in Baalbeck –el Hermel, March/April 2000. p 18.

<sup>36</sup> This section draws on the findings of a fact finding Mission to Dir in December 2000 as well as UNODC Mid Term Evaluation Dir District Development Project: AD/PAK/94/840 which states that *'[By] opening up communities to development, debate and modernisation [the project] has contributed to a fundamental shift from illicit poppy cultivation, and people's perception of a future that offers more choices and opportunities'*. Page 2.

<sup>37</sup> Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation. A Report for CND. Draft.

<sup>38</sup> Rerkasem, Kanok et al. TG-HDP Internal Paper No. 179: Impact Assessment Study: Nam Lang, June 1994.

<sup>39</sup> In the southern Wa region poppy cultivation has decreased from around 1,200 hectares in 1999 to 960 hectares in 2002, and 775 hectares in 2003 (the latter two figures before eradication). It is not possible however to attribute most of these reductions to alternative development activities sponsored by the Project as it has not achieved an overall reduction in the 28 villages in which it had had a higher level of activities than the other 300 some villages in Mong Pawk District. The project's own area figures show that these 28 villages had 150 hectares of poppy cultivation in 1999, 155 hectares in 2001-2002 and 150 hectares in 2002-3. (Wa 2003 page 31) *'It is a disturbing fact that as yet there is insufficient evidence to state positively that the programme of alternative development had made any reduction to opium production ... Projects undertaken in the provinces have been scattered and cannot be linked to any specific reduction.'* UNDCP, Assessment Strategy and Programming Mission to Afghanistan, May-July 1995, p. 23-24. *'Opium poppy reduction was significantly reduced in all project target districts in the 1999-2000 winter season, particularly in Qandahar. However, it is the severe drought in these areas which has been the major influence on the fall in planted area and yield.'* Sloane, 2000, p.3.

<sup>40</sup> Feldafing Declaration

<sup>41</sup> For instance, the Report of the First Phase Evaluation of the Drug Control and Development Project, Wa Region of the Shan State, Myanmar (AD/RAS/96/C25), April 2000 reported that *'However, it must be stated that at the moment the Project is at a critical point in terms of its future direction and the achievement of the overall objectives expected in the original project formulation. This critical juncture has been brought about by the inherent flaws in its design; a lack of guidance and direction at a level above the CTA; a propensity to do whatever appears contingent to assuage and cultivate the Wa authorities; and a deviation away from the original project phasing and workplan which looked upon the first year of the project as a planning, establishment and assessment period'* (p. 14). The Terminal Evaluation for the project in May 2003 commented that *'without effective monitoring no clear lessons learned, including an understanding of the processes which occurred in achieving positive or negative results, can be reached'* Terminal Evaluation Report AD/RAS/96/C25 UNODC Wa Project (Drug Control and Development in the Wa Region, Shan State) by Ronald Renard et al (p. 11). The Evaluation of the UNDP/UNDCP Programme in Baalbeck-el Hermel in Lebanon, March/April 2000, stated that *'The initial conception of the programme was vague and overly ambitious and lacked a single programme document for all activities. The lack of annual workplans has not facilitated a clear understanding of the programme goals and achievements'*. p. 6. *'the relative absence of real achievement indicators in the project document does not facilitate either monitoring or evaluation'* page 28

<sup>42</sup> For more details of the motivations and factors that influence household opium poppy cultivation, and how these differ by socio-economic group see UNDCP's Afghanistan Strategic Studies Series.

<sup>43</sup> The Report of the First Phase Evaluation of the Drug Control and Development Project, Wa Region of the Shan State, Myanmar (AD/RAS/96/C25), April 2000 reports that *'It appears that there is not yet a complete understanding of the economic survival strategies employed by the various*

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socio-economic groups which grown opium poppy, which knowledge should be fed back into the project's implementation strategy. Further analysis of this issue is needed'. p. 12.

<sup>44</sup> A fact finding mission to Dir District Development Project, Pakistan in December 2000 reported that '*...despite the important role that opium poppy plays in providing access to credit and off-farm income opportunities to the poor, the priorities of both phases of DDDP have been with improving on-farm income opportunities. Indeed, there is no provision for credit in the DDDP project and less than 1% of the total budget was allocated to vocational training for the poor. As such, it would seem that as with the cultivation of opium poppy, poorer households have derived fewer benefits from the interventions of DDDP and have in fact been further marginalised by the elimination of opium poppy.*' DFID Unpublished Report. Gebert (2000) commented that '*Poorer owner cultivators and sharecroppers have benefited from the project to a far lesser extent than the richer, even absentee landlords, with the former having no prospect of being able to substitute any other mix of crops and activities for opium poppy*' (p. 5). Sloane (2000) suggested that '*While orchard development can make a genuine contribution to the reduction of land committed to opium, it has little or no real impact on the households which produce more than half the opium*' (p. 17). UNODC reported in Peru that '*on selecting the farmers having a sufficient surface area to grow crops such as coffee and cocoa, which are perennial crops, there is a guarantee that they may have other food resources while the said crops are being replaced. On the other hand, a large proportion of the population with fewer resources is being excluded, the most unstable and mobile population*'.

<sup>45</sup> See '*Alternative Development: The Modern Thrust of Supply Side Policy*' by David Mansfield in the United Nations Bulletin on Narcotics, Vol. LI, Nos. 1 and 2, 1999. Footnote 35 and 36.

<sup>46</sup> In Myanmar, a UN mission to the eastern Shan state in 1991 stated that '*in the visited villages under the poppy eradication programme the mission got the impression that most households were facing extreme poverty and starvation. In the first year of the programme, they were able to survive with the relief grain distribution and by selling their livestock. In the second year they do not know how they will survive. This situation affects all households but especially the lower stratum of families. One of the consequences of the lack of income is that it makes more difficult the purchase of fertiliser for the rainy seasons food crops, accelerating the downward spiral of impoverishment*'. Cited in Gtz (1998) Drugs and Development in Asia: A background and discussion paper. Gtz:Eschborn.

<sup>47</sup> For instance, The Report on Guidelines for Best Practice on Gender Mainstreaming in Alternative Development by Evelyn Bazalgette et al (2000) states that '*Since the early 1990s, most of UNDCP Alternative Development Projects have included a gender component or women-related activities. In most projects gender aspects were mentioned under 'Special Considerations' and projects included special outputs and activities for women, such as income generation, health care and drug prevention activities. ....While the current policy environment advocates "involving women", it does not necessarily promote gender mainstreaming in policy development or programme and project planning and implementation*' (p. 7). See also Interim Reports on Bolivia (p. 7); Peru (p. 7 & 22); Pakistan (p. 17-18); and Laos (p. 21).

<sup>48</sup> In the UNODC Afghanistan programme in the late 1990s one donor, a drug control agency, questioned the need to include a 'Women In Development' (WID) component given that the programme was aimed at reducing opium poppy cultivation. Another donor, a development agency, questioned the rationale for inclusion of a WID component when those in the development mainstream had been taking a more gender integrated approach rather than targeting women per se. An explanation of the critical role unremunerated family labour play in opium poppy (and indeed coca) cultivation and therefore the importance of raising the opportunity cost of women's labour was not offered, as the conventional wisdom in the regional office at the time was that women were not involved in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.

<sup>49</sup> Mansfield, David and Colin Sage. (1997) *Drug Crop Producing Countries: A Development Perspective* in R. Coomber ed The Control of Drugs and Drug Users: Reasons or Reactions. London: Harwood Academic Press.

<sup>50</sup> There is a litany of projects where evaluators comment on the weak nature of project design. The ones cited here are just a sample:

*'The problem analysis falls short, however, in that it only provides a general picture, while local realities vary substantially. It also gives little credit to local peoples innovation abilities, leaving the impression that highland people have not made any changes in their farming systems for decades. Overall the problem analysis should have indicated the need for different alternative development strategies in different parts of the project area'* Terminal Evaluation Report AD/RAS/96/C25 UNODC Wa Project 2003. Page 6

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*'In summary, the project Document sets out an ambitious programme for which inadequate financial and managerial resources are provided .....the analysis of the problem lacks clarity of definition between expectations at the national level and those in Ky Son district at the local level.'* Alternative Socio-Economics Development for the Replacement of Opium Poppy Cultivation, Ky Son Pilot Project AD/VE/95/B09. Report of the Mid Term Evaluation. Page 4

*'The problem was not sufficiently dimensioned in terms of the target population nor in proportion to the total area'* UNDCP/FA)/FONADAL Support for the Management, Conservation and Exploitation of the Natural Resources in the Tropic of Cochabamba (AD/BOL/92/582) Report on the Mission of the Evaluation 28 March – 20 April 1996. April 1996.

*'Insufficient attention has been paid to the needs of opium-poppy cultivators and the prolonged interventions which are necessary to ensure a gradual introduction of alternative, sustainable farming systems'* LAO/UNDCP/IFAD Xieng Khouang Highland Development Programme (AD/LAO/91/551, 552 and 553) Project Evaluation Abstract 1995.

<sup>51</sup> *'In November 1997, within four months of project commencement a Programme Appraisal Mission was fielded by UNDCP. The Mission team included six representatives of donors and nine UNDCP staff members. In respect of Project C28, the mission Aide Memoire made four recommendations, being to: (i) ensure that activities reflected the complexity of the livelihood stems, rather than purely technical interventions (ii) view the project as an opportunity to experiment and learn lessons (iii) revise the time frame and phasing to take account of the long-term nature of the desired changes; and (iv) produce realistic, phased district work planes which include targets, indicators and monitoring methods for establishing viable and sustainable alternatives to poppy. These were sound recommendations which remain entirely valid with the benefit of hindsight. Unfortunately none of them were ever followed'.* Sloane, 2000, p. 27.

<sup>52</sup> *'The overall quality of the project has been disappointing. In the difficult administrative, not to mention development context, in which the project was implemented the size and complexity proved too much for the implementation team to manage adequately. ....lack of direction from project management who also lack a vision of how to achieve the drug control aim'* LAO/UNDCP/IFAD Xieng Khouang Highland Development Programme (AD/LAO/91/551, 552 and 553). Project Evaluation Abstract 1995.

*'The result is a process of shooting from the hip in which large poorly considered projects are thrown at complex situations. The approach of the agro-industrial projects (Chapare), particularly is evocative of the 1960s development thinking, where it was felt we had all the answers and simply had to 'transfer' them to the grateful peasantry. In short, the drug control imperative is being used to justify the worst features of naive top down development'.* Dudley, Eric. (1991) Report prepared for the Overseas Development Administration, UK..

*'The project has complex, at times confusing, and overly ambitious design that is still working to fit well with the prevailing conditions in the area....The project has so far not been able to live up to its name as a pilot alternative development project. With the skewed balance towards infrastructure and free input distribution rather than low cost village development (livelihoods and capacities) it has not yet found a way forward which is replicable. This risks sending the message to the Wa and the Government that alternative development means infrastructure and free inputs. This means also high costs and de-emphasizes the strong orientation towards different types of capacity building that is required for sustainable alternative development.'* Terminal Evaluation Report AD/RAS/96/C25 UNODC Wa Project 2003. Page 34

<sup>53</sup> *'The project should start monitoring achievement indicators for each output and the immediate objectives to make sure that the alternative development strategy is giving the expected results. More attention should be paid to accessing the reliability of opium survey data and checking the correctness of data. Moreover, the project should acquire data from other sources for comparison. Finally the project should improve recording and analysis of implementation progress, problems and factors contributing to success and/or failures to enable it to identify lesson learned.'* Beng Alternative Development Micro Project AD/LAO/98/C85 Report of the Mid Term Evaluation August 2000

*'It has done little on either process or impact monitoring. Project management may well be aware of the types of activities which have failed, but there is not enough awareness as to the reasons why, thus depriving it of the chance to make adjustments for future implementation'* Terminal Evaluation Report AD/RAS/96/C25 UNODC Wa Project 2003. Page 14.

<sup>54</sup> See UNODC Thematic Evaluation of UNODC's Alternative Development Initiatives. A Report by the Independent Evaluation Unit, November 2005.

[http://www.pa-chouvy.org/Thematic\\_Evaluation\\_UNODC\\_Alternative\\_Development\\_Initiatives.pdf](http://www.pa-chouvy.org/Thematic_Evaluation_UNODC_Alternative_Development_Initiatives.pdf)

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<sup>55</sup> 'UNDCP should make a greater effort to ensure that relevant alternative development experience from the region and less where is shared among projects to increase the effectiveness and to encourage the spread of innovation. There is a widespread tendency for projects to reinvent the wheel – sometimes repeatedly – which results in the chronic misallocation of scarce resources in Alternative Socio-Economic Development for the Replacement of Opium Poppy Cultivation, Ky Son Pilot Project AD/VIE/95/B09. Report of the Mid Term Evaluation.

'The lack of technical expertise relevant to the project in the UNDCP country office may have contributed to some inappropriate technical decisions at the project level.....The UNDCP country office has made efforts to monitor and backstop the project but the shortage of staff and AD technical experience relevant in the country office has resulted in sometimes less than appropriate levels of monitoring and direction needed to ensure efficiency and quality control of project inputs and outputs.... The fact that there is no AD regional adviser to provide technical backup and access to regional experience is regrettable. Mid Term Evaluation report UN Nonghet AD project AD/LAO/98/C99 by Lek Boonwat et al., June 2001. Page 16-23.

<sup>56</sup> A fact finding mission to Dir District Development Project (DDDP), Pakistan in December 2000 reported that *'The elimination of opium poppy has left the poor with a considerable resource gap. With improved infrastructure and linkages to markets in other parts of the country, traders are now offering advances on other crops, in particular onion. However, onion requires irrigation and, given the bulky nature of the final crop, improved roads and transportation links. For those households on more marginal land in the higher valleys onion is not an alternative source of credit. The impact of the elimination of opium poppy on the poor has been aggravated by the reduction of off-farm income opportunities within the district. As a labour intensive crop, particularly during the harvest period, opium poppy provided an important source of income for agricultural labourers within the area and in neighbouring districts. The shift to less labour intensive crops and the absence of non-farm income opportunities within the district would appear to have increased the rate of seasonal migration, particularly amongst poorer households who would not seem to have access to more permanent and remunerative opportunities in the Gulf states. Much of the seasonal work obtained by the poor is reported to be insecure and low waged, such as labouring in the construction, sugar cane and timber industries in other parts of Pakistan. Migration would also seem to have increased the burden of women both in agricultural production and within the household.'* Department for International Development (DFID). Unpublished Report.

<sup>57</sup> But what can realistically be expected from such a project approach. For instance USAID estimates that a comprehensive alternative development program in Colombia could involve assisting as many as 136,00 families and cost up to US\$ 4 billion over 3 years. General Accountability Office. US Non Military Assistance to Colombia is Beginning to Show Intended Results but Programs are not Readily Sustainable. GAO-04-726: Page 14.

<sup>58</sup> *'[F]or the resource rich, opium poppy can generate a relatively high income. Access to cheap labour through the inequitable land tenure system has ensured that landowners have accrued a disproportionate share of the final opium crop. Those with sufficient financial assets have further increased their profit margins on opium poppy by purchasing opium as a 'distress sale', through the provision of advance payments on the crop prior to its harvest. Finally, by retaining their opium crop and selling it some months after the harvest when prices have risen, those households who are least dependent on opium poppy as their sole source of income are most able to benefit. Yet, the income that the resource rich derive from opium poppy is at the cost of the resource poor. After all, it is the poor that provide the low paid labour; it is the poor that are compelled to sell their opium at low prices prior to the harvest; and it is the poor that are most dependent on opium poppy due to limited on-farm, off farm and non-farm income opportunities.'* The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and Reality, Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan' by David Mansfield. A paper prepared for the International Conference on Alternative Development in Drug Control and Cooperation, Feldafing, January 5-12, 2002. Page 12.

<sup>59</sup> Painter, James. (1995) Bolivia and Coca: A Study in Dependency. London: Lynne Rienner.

<sup>60</sup> Resolutions Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem, New York 8-10 June 1998. Measures to Enhance International Cooperation to Counter the World Drug Problem, (E) Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and Alternative Development, para. 31.

<sup>61</sup> 'In particular, there is disagreement over the timing and interface between alternative development and eradication efforts. Consequently, in some countries, such as Bolivia and Peru eradication has been a pre-requisite for development assistance during the early 1990's. In others, such as Laos, eradication is only just being considered after some areas have received almost ten years of assistance. In Pakistan, eradication was scheduled on a valley basis, taking little account of the benefits households have received from alternative development interventions and how these differ by socio-economic group, gender, and location'.

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<sup>62</sup> By displacing drug cultivation to more remote areas and increasing support for insurgents, forced eradication can directly undermine the alternative livelihood initiatives that are necessary to achieve sustainable reductions in drug production. In Thailand, the initial emphasis on eradication in the 1970s increased support for the Communist Party. Following a review, policy changed to allow a minimum of three years of development assistance before eradication was undertaken. In Pakistan, the death of 13 people during an eradication campaign in Gadoon Amazai in 1987 resulted in a more cautious approach. USAID reported that its most successful projects in the area were those that combined development with law enforcement and permitted eradication to occur gradually in conjunction with the emergence of new income opportunities.

<sup>63</sup> *An appropriate path of dealing with this issue has been practised in the TG-HDP where farmers were given a four to five year period of grace, during which development work was pursued before enforcement would begin. In fact in the Nam Lang project area, law enforcement measures were not applied for almost eight years because opium poppy cultivation was on a continuing decline. Only during the last two years has opium cutting taken place in areas where the planting of opium poppies had risen again. A law enforcement deterrent seems justified in areas where particularly industrious farmers would like to benefit from both the development work of the project as well as narcotics production.* Rerkasem, Kanok et al. TG-HDP Internal Paper No. 179: Impact Assessment Study: Nam Lang, June 1994. p. 96.

<sup>64</sup> *'The average amount of land dedicated to opium poppy reported by those households who had their crop eradicated last year doubled from 4 jeribs in the 2002/3 growing season to 8 jeribs in 2003/4. For those households that did not have their crop eradicated the average amount of land dedicated to opium poppy increased from an average of 3 jeribs to 4.5 jeribs.'* Mansfield, David 'What is Driving Opium Poppy Cultivation? Decision Making Amongst Opium Poppy Cultivators in Afghanistan in the 2003/4 Growing Season'. Paper for the UNODC/ONDCP Second Technical Conference on Drug Control Research, 19-21 July 2004.

<sup>65</sup> In Peru enforced eradication led to increasing support for Shining Path in the mid-1980s and the subsequent curtailment of both alternative livelihoods and eradication projects. In Bolivia, in 2001, violent unrest (including the deaths of coca growers and law enforcement officials) led the Government to reverse its policy on eradication in the Yungas and to slow eradication operations in the Chapare region. In Colombia eradication has prompted violent action by coca growers and increased support for FARC and other armed groups.

<sup>66</sup> In Thailand farmers used land in other villages to get round eradication. In Peru in the 1990s, an apparently natural outbreak of *fusarium oxysporum* in the Upper Huallaga Valley led to the displacement of coca to the Aguaytia basin, Apurimac and San Martin Valley. In Afghanistan during the Taliban ban some farmers with multiple land holdings planted poppy in remote areas instead of in their most fertile, but more accessible, land.

<sup>67</sup> In Colombia in 2001, USAID was able to spend only \$5.6 million of a total available of US\$52.5 million for alternative livelihoods because of problems in gaining access to coca growing areas. USAID's requirement that communities enter into an agreement to eliminate coca cultivation after only one year of development assistance and subsequent fumigation of the areas in which agreements were reached led to the curtailment of programmes. In Putamayo, fumigation led to a breakdown in trust between communities and suspension of a number of alternative livelihoods projects, including those implemented by the national agency PLANTE, UNDCP and the German development agency GTZ. In Afghanistan in 2002, a number of NGOs suspended their operations due to security problems that arose during the Afghanistan Transitional Authority's eradication campaign. In Peru the association of a USAID project with the Government's eradication campaign led to the suspension of project activities in 1989 after the murder of staff and destruction of aid materials. Later in 2000, problems of co-ordination and the time lag between eradication and the delivery of aid resulted in the curtailment of the Upper Huallaga Area Development Project and the development of a 'safety net' assistance programme by USAID. In 1997 UNDCP recommended the absence of forced eradication within project areas as a minimum requirement for developing alternative livelihoods.

<sup>68</sup> For a full review of conditionality policy in Afghanistan see David Mansfield 'Alternative Development in Afghanistan: the Failure of Quid Pro Quo'. A Paper prepared for the International Conference on Alternative Development in drug control and cooperation, Feldafing, January 7-12, 2002

<sup>69</sup> In a review of UNODC's Poppy Reduction project of 1997-200 Gebert concluded that *'Poppy conditionality clauses which are not based on livelihood analyses and which are not based on the reality of the most opium dependent socio-economic groups, cause more harm than good. They are observed in breach'* An Assessment of Social Impact and Community Development, October 2000 by Rita Gebert, (p. 27).

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<sup>70</sup> *'Making social contracts with farmers to reduce opium production in exchange for project assistance and raising farmers expectations risks the credibility of the project unless timely and adequate responses can be provide'*. Mid Term Evaluation report UN Nonghet AD project AD/LAO/98/C99 by Lek Boonwat et al., June 2001. Page 4. Include GRADE Report

<sup>71</sup> A fact finding mission to Dir District Development Project (DDDP), Pakistan in December 2000 reported that *'The elimination of opium poppy has left the poor with a considerable resource gap. With improved infrastructure and linkages to markets in other parts of the country, traders are now offering advances on other crops, in particular onion. However, onion requires irrigation and, given the bulky nature of the final crop, improved roads and transportation links. For those households on more marginal land in the higher valleys onion is not an alternative source of credit. The impact of the elimination of opium poppy on the poor has been aggravated by the reduction of off-farm income opportunities within the district. As a labour intensive crop, particularly during the harvest period, opium poppy provided an important source of income for agricultural labourers within the area and in neighbouring districts. The shift to less labour intensive crops and the absence of non-farm income opportunities within the district would appear to have increased the rate of seasonal migration, particularly amongst poorer households who would not seem to have access to more permanent and remunerative opportunities in the Gulf states. Much of the seasonal work obtained by the poor is reported to be insecure and low waged, such as labouring in the construction, sugar cane and timber industries in other parts of Pakistan. Migration would also seem to have increased the burden of women both in agricultural production and within the household.'* Department for International Development (DFID). Unpublished Report.

<sup>72</sup> General Accountability Office. US Non Military Assistance to Colombia is Beginning to Show Intended Results but Programs are not Readily Sustainable. GAO-04-726: Page 14.