DRUG CONTROL POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES: WHAT WORKS AND
WHAT DOES NOT?
Dr. Bruce Bagley
Department of International Studies
University
of Miami
Coral Gables, Florida
April 23, 2008
This draft paper was prepared for the conference on “New Directions in Drug and
Crime Control Policies” sponsored by the Programme for Mexican Studies (Oxford
University), El Colegio de Mexico (COLMEX)and the Centro de Investigación y
Docencia Económicas (CIDE) held at the Colegio de México in Mexico City, DF on
April 28 and 29, 2008. It should not be quoted or cited without the express
permission of the author.
Introduction: Patterns, Prevalence and Problems of Drug Use in the
United States
The Bush administration (2001-2009) currently claims that it is “winning” America’s
decades-long War on Drugs. The latest reports from the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP) and the State Department point to record seizures of
cocaine and crop eradication in Colombia
and disruption of criminal smuggling networks in
Colombia
and Mexico
as signs of progress. “Overseas counter drug efforts have slowly constricted the
pipeline that brings cocaine to the United States,” the ONDCP stated in
the 2008 National Drug Control Strategy report. Similar pronouncements about
progress in the drug war have been issued repeatedly by virtually every U.S. government since the Nixon administration,
which in 1973 claimed the
U.S.
had “turned the corner” on addiction and drug use. In 1990, then-U.S drug Czar
William Bennett said that the
U.S.
was on the “road to victory” regarding drug abuse. In early 2007 the ONDCP
pointed to a short-term increase in cocaine prices as key evidence of major
“success” in the War on Drugs.
But Americans - just 4.5 percent of the world’s population in 2007 - consumed
some 60 percent of global illicit drug production. Moreover, illicit drugs –
including marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines and other synthetic
drugs such as ecstasy - are more readily available, more pure and cheaper in the
United States in 2007 than they were 25 years ago when in February 1982
then-President Ronald Reagan declared the contemporary phase of the modern U.S.
War on Drugs or in 1969 when then-President Richard Nixon launched Project
Intercept along the U.S-Mexican border to halt marijuana smuggling from Mexico
into the United States.
In fact, while there has been some decline in overall drug use in the United States
in recent years, especially among teenagers (from 11.6 to 9.8 percent since 2002
and a parallel decline in marijuana use from 8.2 to 6.7 percent), the long-term
trend is not positive. If the analysis broadened back another 15 years, to 1992
when the rate of teen illicit drug use was just 5.3 percent and marijuana use
was at 3.4 percent, it is clear that although use has edged down somewhat in the
last 5 years, teen drug use in the United States is actually almost
double what it was 15 years ago.
Nonetheless, American rates of drug use are not exceptionally high in comparison
with other advanced capitalist countries. About one in fifteen Americans 12
years of age or over currently uses some illicit drug. This is a much lower rate
of drug usage than, for example, that registered in
Great Britain and similar to that of Spain. By a considerable margin,
prevalence in the United States
– as in Europe – is highest among older
teenagers and young adults in their early twenties, peaking at about 40 percent
using within the last past twelve months for high school seniors. Most Americans
who do try drugs use them only a few times and then quit. The “typical”
continuing American user is usually a marijuana smoker who generally ceases to
use drugs at some point during his mid- to late twenties.
What such general survey data do not capture well are the negative behavior
patterns that often accompany drug usage and translate into high social costs in
the United States
– especially drug-related crime, adverse health effects, premature mortality,
and loss of economic productivity. These drug-related problems tend to be worse
in the United States than
they are in most other affluent nations because of the high numbers of U.S.
consumers who are dependent on highly addictive and expensive drugs such as
cocaine (particularly crack), heroin, and methamphetamines as opposed to
marijuana. Marijuana is far and away the most widely used illicit drug in the United States,
but it accounts for only about ten percent of the adverse social costs
associated with illegal drug use, in large part because marijuana costs are
relatively low and its distribution and purchase generate comparatively low
levels of drug-related crime and violence.
The compulsive, habitual use of relatively expensive and highly addictive drugs
in the United States
is the legacy of the four major drug “epidemics” that have swept the country
over the last five decades. The term “drug epidemic” is employed here to
underscore the fact that drug use is a learned behavior, transmitted from one
person to another. Indeed, the available evidence unequivocally indicates that
friends or family members, who use drugs, rather than aggressive drug “pushers”
or dealers, are primarily responsible for initiating new drug users into their
first drug experience. In a drug epidemic, rates of initiation in a given area
rise sharply as new and highly contagious users of a drug initiate other friends
and peers. At least with heroin, cocaine and crack, long-term addicts are not
especially contagious. Indeed, they are often socially isolated from new users
because they reveal the negative aspects or consequences of addiction. In the
subsequent stage of a drug epidemic, usually within a decade or less, initiation
declines rapidly as the susceptible population shrinks, either because there are
fewer non-users or because the drug’s reputation is tarnished as a result of
wider knowledge of the adverse consequences associated with prolonged use of a
given drug. In the third stage, the number of dependent users stabilizes and
then typically declines gradually over the ensuing years.
The first modern drug epidemic in the United States involved heroin. It
developed with rapid initiation in the late 1960s, mainly in a few big cities
and most heavily among poor, Black and Hispanic inner-city minority communities.
American soldiers returning from Vietnam, where heroin was widely
available, was apparently a contributing factor to this heroin epidemic as well.
The annual number of new heroin users in the United States peaked in the early
1970s and then dropped by some fifty percent by the end of the decade and
remained low until the mid-1990s when a new heroin epidemic began. For many
users, this first epidemic proved highly lethal: for those who survived their
addiction was long-lasting, severely detrimental to their health, and an almost
insurmountable impediment to productive employment.
Powder cocaine was the source of
America’s second drug epidemic. This epidemic
lasted longer and peaked more sharply than the prior heroin epidemic. Broadly
spread across racial and class lines, cocaine initiation to cocaine peaked in
the early 1980s and then fell sharply by almost eighty percent at the end of the
decade. Dependence always lags behind initiation, and cocaine use became more
prevalent in the mid-1980S as the pool of those who had experimented with the
drug expanded. The number of dependent users peaked around 1988 and declined
only moderately thereafter through the 1990s and early 2000s.
The third epidemic involved the use of crack. While clearly connected to the
powder cocaine epidemic, the crack (a smokable form of cocaine) epidemic was
more concentrated among minorities in inner-city communities. The epidemic’s
starting point varied by city. In Los Angeles
and New York,
for example, it began around 1982. In
Chicago, it began years later in 1988. Nonetheless, in
every American city during the 1980s where the crack epidemic hit initiation
seems to have peaked within about two years and to have again left population
with a chronic and devastating problem of addiction.
The fourth important drug epidemic to strike the United States involved
methamphetamine use. This epidemic gradually spread across the United States
from west to east over the 1990s and in the early 2000s had affected two-thirds
of the country, mainly in areas where cocaine use was less common. It had
already peaked and stabilized on the West Coast by the time rapid spread began
in the Mississippi and
Ohio River valleys in the mid1990s. As of 2007, it still had not
infected most of the East Coast.
There have been other epidemics (for example, ecstasy use), but heroin, cocaine
(including crack) and methamphetamines probably account for some ninety percent
of the social costs associated with illegal drug use in the United States over the last fifty
years. It is important to note that the steep declines in cocaine and heroin
street prices in the United
States since the late 1970s have not triggered
new epidemics involving these drugs. Initiation goes up when prices go down, but
once a drug has acquired a bad reputation, it is unlikely that new epidemic
outbreaks will take place, even if prices stay low. Information about the
negative consequences of use of a particular drug is a significant protective
factor against new explosions, at least for a number of years.
Twenty Five Years of U.S. Drug
Control Policies: An American Balance Sheet
The U. S; government spends billions of dollars every year on drug control. The
current American Drug Czar, John Walters, put U.S federal anti-drug expenditures
at $12.5 billion in 2006, but his total excluded key federal costs, such as the
expense of federal drug prosecutions and prisoner incarcerations, that most
analysts believe should be included. Leaving such costs out effectively permits
Washington to claim today that U.S.
anti-drug policies roughly balance supply reduction policies (mostly
enforcement) and demand reduction policies (mostly prevention and treatment).
Inclusion of federal government prosecutorial and prison-related costs does,
however, increase the annual
U.S.
federal antidrug budget to approximately $17 billion per year. State and local
governments in the United States
spend even more, so the total costs of the U.S. “War on Drugs” have probably
exceeded $40 billion annually in recent years. The total spent by all levels of
the U.S.
government in waging the “War on Drugs” over the last twenty five years is
rapidly approaching the astronomical sum of a trillion dollars;
Which kinds of drug control programs work, if any do? Which programs are most
cost-effective and which are the least? The following discussion reviews the
principal elements or aspects of U.S.
drug policies with primary emphasis on demand control within the United States.
To establish the context for this evaluation of American demand control
strategies, however, it is necessary to begin the review with a brief overview
and analysis of U.S.
supply-side control programs, including eradication, crop substitution and
interdiction.
Supply-side Control and Interdiction Programs
Most U.S anti-drug programs focus on enforcing American drug laws, predominantly
against drug dealers or trafficker. Interestingly, a similar emphasis is also
commonly found in the anti-drug campaigns of countries with less prohibitionist
and punitive policy approaches to drug issues, including the Netherlands. While eradication and
crop substitution programs in source countries outside the U.S. territorial boundaries, especially in the
Andean republics of Colombia,
Peru and Bolivia, receive the lion’s share of media
coverage, in fact they account for a relatively limited share of the U.S.
federal government’s drug budget – approximately one billion dollars per year in
2006. Interdiction efforts – the seizure of drug shipments and the arrest of
drug “mules” or couriers on the way into the United States – receive
substantially more funds – approximately three billion dollars per year in 2006.
In practice, neither source-country eradication and crop substitution programs
nor interdiction efforts have demonstrated over the past twenty five years any
real capacity to bring about more than transitory reductions in drug consumption
in the United States (or Europe, for that matter). Nor do they hold promise for
greater effectiveness in the foreseeable future. Such policies concentrate on
disrupting the initial phases of the production and distribution chains in which
illicit drugs are still relatively cheap and easily replaced because there are
plenty of land, labor, and alternative routes available to allow for trafficker
adaptations to state-directed anti-drug policies and tactics. In effect, such
disruptions cause only marginal increases in the costs of cultivation, refining
and smuggling of illicit drugs and, hence, do not make drug production and
trafficking sufficiently less profitable to discourage the transnational
criminal organizations involved in drug smuggling activities.
Law Enforcement and Incarceration
The bulk of all U.S. drug
control resources go into the enforcement of America’s prohibitionist drug laws.
Between 1980 and 1990, dependent drug use and violent drug markets and
trafficking organizations expanded rapidly while the number drug-related
incarcerations rose by 210,000.Between 1990 and 2000 drug-related problems began
to ease, but drug imprisonments increased by another 200,000. Since 2000 drug
arrests and incarcerations have continued to rise in the United States despite further
declines in rates of drug use, drug addiction and drug-related violent crime. As
of 2007, the total U.S.
prison population stood at some 2.2 million inmates with almost half jailed for
some sort of drug related (mostly non-violent) offences.
The basic justification for aggressive punishment of drug-related crimes is that
high rates of incarceration will reduce drug use and associated problems. The
theory is that tough enforcement raises the risks of drug trafficking and, thus,
will lead some traffickers to drop out of the business and prompt the remainder
to demand higher prices for taking higher risks. In this logic, the price of
illicit drugs should go up accordingly. In fact, however, the general price
trends over the last twenty five years have gone in the opposite direction –
down. Of course, it is possible that prices may have fallen even further had it
not been for the massive expansion in U.S.
drug law enforcement, as many
U.S.
drug officials have tended to argue. Nonetheless, even granting this
counterfactual hypothesis, in light of the huge costs involved in incarcerating
so many Americans for drug related, non-violent crimes (between 30 and 40
thousand dollars per inmate per year, depending on the state where they are
imprisoned) it is abundantly clear to most analysts that expanded incarceration
was not a cost-effective policy for controlling drug use in the United States.
Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence to support the idea that tougher
enforcement has made cocaine or any other illicit drug harder for Americans to
obtain. The fraction of high-school seniors who reported that cocaine is
available or readily available has remained steady at fifty percent for the past
twenty five years. Eighty five percent of high-school respondents have
consistently said the same about the availability of marijuana. Why then, in the
face of overwhelming evidence that heavy emphasis on law enforcement, especially
imprisonment of non-violent drug offenders, does not work well and is not
cost-effective have U.S.
federal government authorities consistently pursued such a policy strategy? Any
adequate explanation of this policy puzzle requires the analyst to delve into
the “intermestic” dynamics of drug policy-making in the contemporary United States.
Summarized briefly, at least four different levels of explanation inevitably
come into play.
First, it is obvious that there is a high degree of “path-dependency” present in
U.S; drug policy; that is, decisions made in the past clearly shape present
policy and make modifications or deviations from the current prohibitionist and
punitive strategy and tactics difficult, if not impossible, in American
governmental decision-making circles.
While quite possibly valid, the “path dependency” explanation nonetheless,
effectively begs the questions of why the U.S. government got started down
this particular path in the first place and why it is so hard to change now in
the face of considerable empirical evidence that current policy is not
succeeding in the goal of preventing or substantially reducing drug use and
abuse in American society. A first approximation to a more comprehensive
explanation involves understanding the “puritan” and religious backdrop to
American rejection of drug use; The U.S. remains a highly religious society; All
Protestant sects, especially the born-again Christian Evangelical groups, the
Catholics, the Jews, and the Muslims unanimously condemn and reject drug use.
Their moral condemnation of drugs weighs heavily against changes away from the
currently dominant policy approach rooted in prohibition and punishment.
Second, the past almost five decades of cyclical drug epidemics have strongly
reinforce
middle America’s religiously-based rejection of
drugs; Middle class voting patterns in American politics have continually
reflected and reinforced rigidly prohibitionist attitudes and policy preferences
among the majority of U.S. voters. In short, middle class
parents in the United States
fear that their children will be caught up in the next U.S. drug
epidemic and their use their vote to support prohibitionist policies in the hope
that their families can be insulated from such dangers.
Third, and finally, the institutional-electoral arrangements in the American
political system, in which the entirety of the U.S. House of Representatives
(435 members) must stand for election (or re-election) every two years makes
experimentation with alternatives to current prohibitionist and punitive U.S.
policies all but impossible. Any U.S. Representative who publicly calls for
non-punitive policies is virtually guaranteed to lose his or her next election,
thereby truncating any real possibility to obtain and incorporate policy
feedback into the congressional policy-making process. The fact that one third
of the U.S. Senate (one hundred members, each serving a six year term) must
stand for election is similarly, although slightly less, limiting. The end
result is that drug policy innovation at the federal or national level in the United States
is virtually frozen in place and largely impervious to empirically-based
evaluations that conclude that current policies are not working.
In contrast, drug policy at the state level of government in the United States is presently far more
inclined toward innovation; This is due largely to the fact that the states,
rather than the federal government, mist bear most of the administrative burdens
and costs of executing current federal anti-drug laws, such as imprisonment. The
upshot is that states like California,
New York and Florida have begun to experiment with
harm-reduction rather than more punitive policies, especially with regard to
youthful and non-violent offenders. The relatively new youth drug courts that
have emerged in several states over the last decade or so and California’s Proposition 36 (imposing
treatment rather than jail time for non-violent drug crimes) seem to promise
drug policy reform at the state rather than the national level in coming years.
Some of these newer state programs are discussed briefly in the following
section.
Prevention and Education
Rand Corporation studies of prevention programs in the United States have found
consistently that prevention programs are at least twelve times more cost
effective per dollar spent than supply-side or interdiction programs in reducing
drug use among American primary and secondary students. Despite that positive
finding, however, it is nonetheless true that the most widely used prevention
programs in American schools (e.g., the DARE program) have never been proven in
empirical evaluations to have significant, long-term impacts on lowering drug
use among American youth. Indeed, even the most sophisticated model prevention
programs appear to produce only modest and largely temporary reductions in drug
use among adolescents that tend to dissipate by the end of secondary school or
soon after high school graduation.
Given that most such school-based prevention programs involve only some thirty
or so contact hours with students, it is not surprising that they are relative
ineffective in countering the pro-drug use effects of ongoing socialization from
with relatives, friends and peers, movies, and television that are known to
stimulate initiation. Even when the inherent limitations of such programs are
recognized, however, the budgetary costs per pupil involved in classroom
prevention programs are so reduced that they still appear to be modestly
cost-effective.
To improve the overall effectiveness of school-based prevention, many experts
argue that it is necessary that they begin at very early ages in primary school
and continue throughout secondary school, that they be dynamic and interactive
rather than simply preachy and passive, and that the number of contact hours be
increased substantially. In addition, many experts maintain that such programs
should be extended beyond high-school as continuing public education programs
for young adults.
Such beyond-school recommendations in favor of continuing drug prevention
education notwithstanding, in practice media-centered anti-drug campaigns have
never been shown through empirical research to have any effect on American
patterns of drug use at all. Empirical or data-based assessments of mass media
campaigns against drug use are, of course, inherently difficult and problematic,
because it is virtually impossible to isolate a control group unaffected by
other factors against which the impacts of such campaigns might be measured
accurately. Even so, the evaluations of mass media campaigns that have been done
(e.g., the Westat and the Annenberg School of Communications studies of the U.S.
federal government’s expensive and widely-viewed anti-drug television campaign)
indicate that such advertising efforts have no discernable effects whatsoever on
drug use in America.
In light of what is known about past cycles of drug epidemics in the United States,
especially with regard to the dynamics of initiation, stabilization and gradual
decline in use, there is little question that information about the negative
consequences of drug abuse is of fundamental importance to effective reduction
of drug use in American society. Armed with that knowledge and awareness, it
would seem that permanent, widely distributed, public informational campaigns
(not the expensive, high-profile, thirty second TV spot advertisements
apparently preferred by U.S.
authorities) might be more effective over time. Reaching diverse ethnic, racial,
age and class groupings with appropriate anti-drug messages tailored to
communicate accurate, factual information to specific segments of the American
population (in a language and vocabulary they will understand and relate to)
promises, at very least, to shorten the time frame of future drug epidemic
cycles in the United States
(and probably in other countries too). Given that the learning curve of each
succeeding generation (or sub-generation) of new drug users poses different and
complex problems of effective communication, anti-drug campaigns must not only
be permanent and ongoing, but they must also be constantly updated and modified
to deal with new drugs and patterns of youth drug use.
Treatment and Rehabilitation
Treatment programs have been subjected to extensive, data-based evaluations over
the last two decade or more in the
United States. In 2004, for example, some 1.1
million American drug users underwent some type of drug treatment. U.S.
federal government expenditures on such treatment programs totaled $ 2.4 billion
and the fifty state-level governments in the country spent at least as much for
an overall treatment budget of almost 6 billion dollars. American heroin addicts
usually receive methadone (a synthetic heroin substitute). All other drug users
in treatment programs in the United States get some form of
counseling. The majority of drug users in such programs quit the program before
finishing their treatment. Among the minority who do complete their treatment
programs, more than half relapse into drug usage within five years or less.
Nonetheless, drug treatment programs are consistently evaluated as
cost-effective. This is because most who enter such programs, especially for
heroin or cocaine use, are serious criminal offenders. At least while they are
enrolled in treatment, their rates of drug use tend to decline along with their
proclivity to engage in criminal activities. These crime reduction benefits of
treatment programs help the communities in which they live as well as the drug
patients themselves.
In view of the positive, cost-effective results of treatment programs, it is
notable that there is only limited availability of treatment programs in the United States.
In an average year only some 850,000 to one million American drug users gain
access to treatment programs out of the three to four million who are dependent
on heroin, cocaine or methamphetamines.
Even more perplexing and worrisome, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, the Bush
administration, after two decades of consistent increases, reduced total federal
resources for prevention from $1.86 billion in FY 2007 to $1. 57 billion in FY
2008, a $283.9 million decrease. Since FY 2002, total federal resources for drug
prevention programs have declined by twenty one percent or some $421.3 million
dollars. Since FY 2002, total federal government resources for demand reduction
have declined by $163.2 million. Over the same period, resources intended to
halt drugs from entering the United States and to disrupt local
drug markets abroad increased by a total of $2.48 billion. Since 2002,
interdiction expenditures alone increased the most to the tune of $1.38 billion.
Interdiction resources now comprise twenty five percent of the total U.S.
federal drug budgets for FY 2008.
Drug treatment as an alternative to incarceration has become a standard
response, more talked about than actually implemented. Drug courts that use
judges to persuade and legally compel drug offenders to enter and remain in
treatment programs do offer some promise of greater compliance, but they offer
only modest and incremental solutions because the screening criteria for
entering such programs are restrictive and often exclude violent and repeat
offenders. Proposition “- in
California, which allowed most of those arrested on drug
possession charges (not trafficking) for the first time would not be
incarcerated (but rather sent to treatment) has achieved some success,
particularly in reducing the number of first-time drug offender sent to jail
without a parallel rise in crime rates. But such programs only deal with the
least serious, non-violent offenders, and, thus, only address a limited spectrum
of drug-related crimes.
Some analysts in the United
States presently advocate shorter sentences and
the imposition of what has been termed “coerced abstinence” from drugs via drug
testing imposed and monitored by the courts once drug offenders are release from
prison on parole. Sanctions, including a return to prison, would flow whenever a
probationer or parolee tested positive. Such programs, however, if they were
expanded significantly might be both difficult and expensive to administer and
to monitor.
Conclusions
Initial promises made by then-candidate George W. Bush – as yet unfulfilled and
unlikely to be fulfilled in the final year of his second presidential term –
bring America to ineffective net result in the nation’s so-called War on Drugs;
The current U.S. government drug policy priorities are similar to those that
prevailed two decades ago during the Reagan administration (1981-1989), when the
key U.S. strategy was to limit drug supply. No matter how the FY 2008 federal
drug budget is interpreted or “spun3, the current U.S; Drug Czar clearly
continues to emphasize interdiction and international programs to control supply
as the chief tools to address the nation’s drug problems. Nonetheless, no
federal drug budget, from either party, can afford to ignore the overwhelming
body of research that shows that only a balanced approach between supply- and
demand-reduction programs will have any real effect on America’s drug
consumption patterns and the attendant societal costs.