

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGERS

**The U.S. Military and
the War on Drugs in the Andes**



Washington Office on Latin America

Founded in 1974 by a coalition of religious and civic leaders, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) has three central purposes: first, to monitor human rights practices, political developments and U.S. policies in Latin America and the Caribbean; second, to provide U.S. policymakers and the public with information and analysis about the region; and third, to foster thoughtful interchange among those who, from diverse perspectives, share WOLA's goals. WOLA focuses particularly on the relationship between U.S. policy and foreign assistance, and the human rights practices of recipient governments. WOLA aims to help shape a foreign policy that advances human rights, democracy and peace in the hemisphere.



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PREFACE

Since its creation in 1974, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) has been concerned about militarism in this hemisphere. Beginning in 1940s and 1950s, strong military-to-military relationships were developed between the U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom) in Panama and the national security forces in the region. These forces, including the police, were "modernized" under U.S. tutelage in many countries. During the period of the Alliance for Progress, announced in 1961, U.S. aid and training particularly emphasized counter-insurgency operations.

During the 1970s WOLA joined others in supporting congressionally-mandated human rights conditions on U.S. foreign assistance, including military aid. This legislation had the effect during the Carter administration of cutting such U.S. aid to the military dictatorships that then predominated in Latin America. When elected civilian governments replaced these dictatorships throughout the region during the 1980s, U.S. military aid, and military-to-military relationships, again increased -- first to Central America and then, at the end of the decade, to the Andean countries. The impact of LIC doctrine in Central America (including aid to the Nicaraguan "contras") is well known. The application of that doctrine to the Andes in the "war on drugs" is now underway -- in a multifaceted five-year \$2.2 billion program - - and that is the subject of this report.

The Andean Strategy encompasses a range of specific initiatives, including economic assistance, but its military component is crucial and central. WOLA has for several years analyzed different aspects of the "war on drugs," particularly its potential effects on human rights and political violence in the Andean region. This report presents some of that broader analysis in synthesis but focuses primarily on the unfolding military component, both on U.S. activities and on the incipient response from the national security forces of the Andean countries themselves. It does not attempt to provide a comprehensive examination of U.S. drug policy or of other efforts -- through the Organization of American States and the United Nations, for example -- to address the problems of international drug trafficking in the hemisphere. Rather, it aims to contribute to a vitally-needed public debate, in the Andes as well as in the United States, of the character and potential consequences of the militarized drug war.

The research and writing of this report was primarily carried out by Charles Call, a WOLA Associate. WOLA Senior Associate Coletta Youngers contributed to the research and the writing. Alex Wilde, Executive Director of WOLA, edited the report. Other WOLA staff provided much helpful

assistance in its preparation, particularly South American Team Assistant Susana Cárdenas.

This report would not have been possible without the help and cooperation of many other individuals and organizations. WOLA is grateful to the National Security Archive, and especially to analyst Kate Doyle, for use of the Archive's extensive materials. We want to express our particular gratitude to the human rights organizations of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia for their invaluable and courageous assistance in providing information which in some cases has placed them -- and continues to place them -- in danger.

The research for this report draws on interviews with numerous government officials in Washington, D.C., at U.S. Embassies in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, at the U.S. Southern Command in Panama, and at the Center for Low Intensity Conflict at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. Where possible, government officials and others have been identified by name and office. Where sources are not identified, it is always because such sources spoke on "background," i.e., on the condition that they not be identified by name or office.

WOLA wishes to thank all of the U.S. government officials who agreed to be interviewed (in some cases, several times) for this report: administration officials of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration; and staff members of the U.S. Congress.

Several people provided comments on initial drafts of this study: Peter Andreas, J. Samuel Fitch, Peter Hakim, Jo Ann Kawell, Rachel Neild, Tina Rosenberg, Peter Sollis, Senate staff member Hal Lippman, and a senior congressional staff member who has chosen to remain anonymous. The report is better for their timely and thoughtful criticisms, but none of them bears any responsibility for its final form or conclusions.

Finally, WOLA is grateful to the J. Roderick MacArthur Foundation and the Ruth Mott Fund for specific support for research and publication of this report, as well as to the C.S. Fund, Ford Foundation, and the General Service Foundation for general support for WOLA's work on human rights in the Andes.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The drug war has replaced the Cold War as the central U.S. military mission in the hemisphere. As part of President Bush's "Andean strategy" --a multi-faceted effort to reduce the flow of cocaine into the United States -- the Pentagon has launched a massive anti-narcotics program which begins in the Andes and then moves to Central America and the rest of South America. In 1990, the Panama-based U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom) declared drugs its "number one priority," and its budget for anti-drug activities in Latin America had risen to \$100 million by FY 1991. The Pentagon is installing a sophisticated regional intelligence network which draws on satellites, air reconnaissance flights, and radar based in 18 countries.

Rather than using U.S. troops directly in operations, the Andean strategy depends on getting Latin American military and police forces more involved in the drug war and increasing their capabilities. In Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, all three services -- Army, Navy, and Air Force -- have now signed on to the drug war. Drug-related training of police forces is ongoing in all three countries, while training of army personnel is underway in Bolivia and Colombia and about to begin in Peru. U.S. plans include improving the intelligence-gathering capabilities of Andean militaries and police, providing them with millions of dollars of equipment, and giving them advice in planning and carrying out operations. Small teams of U.S. military specialists already select targets, plan raids, and coordinate operations carried out by U.S. DEA and Andean police and military forces. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency acknowledges having shifted its priorities to become more heavily involved in the drug war in Latin America.

Reflecting post-Cold War realities, the Andean region has supplanted Central America as the main locus of U.S. military activity in the hemisphere. Colombia, Bolivia and Peru are slated to receive more U.S. military assistance over the three-year period between FY 1990 and FY 1992 than all of Central America. Although little U.S. equipment has yet arrived, U.S. drug-related military assistance allocated to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru increased from less than \$5 million in FY 1988 to over \$140 million in FY 1990 -- a level which is likely to persist through 1992. In FY 1990, Colombia surpassed El Salvador as the hemisphere's top recipient of military aid including "drawdown" equipment. U.S. military assistance to Bolivia in FY 1990 represented a 41% increase in the Defense Ministry's budget.

U.S. military officials acknowledge that the counter-narcotics mission serves important interests of the U.S. military in Latin America at a critical

historical juncture. It gives the military a new mission in the hemisphere just as the Cold War has changed the nature of U.S. military strategy worldwide. It also converges with new post-Cold War opportunities to strengthen bilateral relations with the armed forces of Latin America. And, unlike new anti-drug roles on the domestic side such as logistical support for law enforcement agencies and border interdiction (which the military has resisted as detracting from its central mission), it converges with previous low-intensity conflict roles in Latin America. These institutional developments indicate that the military component of the drug war is not likely to be a quick, surgical operation, but rather a long-term, comprehensive effort. SouthCom is already seeking to expand the drug war throughout the hemisphere.

The military thrust of the U.S. strategy has been resisted by the Andean governments themselves. Although all three governments have now accepted military aid in exchange for U.S. economic assistance, they continue to assign quite different priority to the drug war than the United States. In Peru and Bolivia, armed forces personnel have fired on local police and DEA agents. Colombia strongly opposes a high-profile role for U.S. personnel, and Bolivian and Peruvian governments consistently claim that offering rural coca growers positive incentives of viable alternative crops will be more effective than militarized interdiction and eradication.

The "Drug War" as Low-Intensity Conflict

U.S. military documents, presented in Chapter 3, illustrate that the Pentagon views the counter-drug mission as the latest form of low-intensity conflict, one which consciously draws on the strategy and tactics of counter-insurgency. While the targets of the Andean programs include "new" enemies -- cocaine producers and traffickers -- the "old" enemies of Marxist insurgents are explicitly part of anti-narcotics programs in Peru and Colombia. Under what many call the "narco-guerrilla theory," administration officials insist that anti-narcotics monies be used to fight insurgents who are alleged to have "inextricable links" with drug traffickers.

Although administration officials assure Congress that anti-drug funds will only be used against insurgent activities which are tied to drug trafficking, realities in the region indicate otherwise. Top Peruvian and Colombian armed forces commanders have stated that they plan to utilize anti-narcotics monies for their top priority -- counter-insurgency -- and Congressional studies have found that effective mechanisms are lacking to monitor how U.S. military assistance is actually used.

The "narco-guerrilla" theory has been questioned by experts in the Andean countries and in the United States. The theory fits poorly in Colombia, where drug mafias have been more closely associated with right-wing paramilitary death squads than leftist insurgents, and where Colombian officials acknowledge that the military is marginal to anti-drug operations. Even in Peru, where Sendero Luminoso guerrillas have a powerful presence in the coca-producing Upper Huallaga Valley, Peruvian military leaders themselves have warned that it is impossible to fight guerrillas and traffickers at the same time. Peruvian analysts claim that, as peasants seek protection from coca repression programs, support for the Shining Path guerrillas has increased. According to Hernando de Soto, a key adviser to the Fujimori government, "our military tells us that militarizing the drug war will give Sendero an army of 250,000 [coca-growing] farmers."

Why the Strategy Cannot Work

There is widespread agreement that the Andean strategy has not met its objectives to date. Administration officials claim that progress is being made in cowing cartel leaders into surrender, in strengthening governmental law enforcement efforts, and in curbing coca cultivation. However, they also acknowledge that in the Andean region the United States has failed to achieve its chief two-year goal of reducing cocaine supply to the United States by 15%. In fact, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents report that production in South America increased in 1990 by 28%. And DEA agents estimate that coca production will increase in 1991 by another 10%, reaching record levels. Despite the fact that the Medellín cartel's violence against the state has been dramatically reduced, drug trafficking continues. The Cali cartel has become the largest in the world, and Colombian officials report that the Medellín cartels' top leaders continue to direct trafficking operations from their cells. Furthermore, Interpol and DEA officials say that cocaine processing and trafficking centers have expanded in Bolivia, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador.

In the face of these results, the administration is extending its drug war to other countries in the hemisphere and dedicating more resources to international anti-narcotics activities. U.S. military officials are pressing governments throughout Latin America to get their armed forces involved in anti-narcotics activities, and the United States has begun providing drug-related support to police and/or military forces in Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Venezuela. Yet there is overwhelming evidence that the strategy will not alleviate drug abuse and drug-related violence in U.S. cities. Because the source-country portion of the cocaine industry contributes less than 15% to the final street

price, experts say that a reduction of even 50% of cocaine shipments to the U.S. would raise the street price by only 3%. In addition, DEA officials acknowledge that successful repression efforts are likely to spread cocaine production to other countries, thus guaranteeing a steady supply of the drug to the U.S. market.

The Negative Consequences

Not only is the military component of the Andean strategy unlikely to work, but it may well have many of the same negative consequences of U.S.-sponsored counter-insurgency in countries such as El Salvador. In the Andes, the U.S. has allied itself with regimes whose armed forces and police engage in widespread and egregious human rights violations. In Colombia and Peru, these forces are involved routinely in extrajudicial executions, disappearances, torture, massacres, and other abuses. Despite the Bush administration's increased attention to human rights in U.S. military training programs, security assistance is going directly to counter-insurgency campaigns in advance of any meaningful reforms.

In addition, U.S. anti-narcotics policy could well weaken civilian leaders by increasing the resources and profile of armed forces in the region. In Bolivia and Peru, where militaries turned over power only a decade ago, academics and politicians alike fear that widening the internal security role of the armed forces may endanger civilian rule and increase the impunity with which they commit human rights abuse. Thirty years ago the United States pressed Latin American militaries to take on internal insurgencies as a national security mission. Now, as then, the U.S. may be playing a decisive role in legitimating a new military mission that will have destructive political and social ramifications in the region.

The extraordinary enhancement of intelligence-gathering could have particularly harmful consequences. During Latin America's military dictatorships of the 1960s and '70s, intelligence units were the source of the worst manifestations of state terror. The character of intelligence and the uses to which it is put depend on whether those in command answer to democratic civilian authority. Andean security forces are unaccountable to such authority -- and endemically unwilling to distinguish between armed rebellion and legal political opposition.

Finally, in Bolivia and Peru, where the bulk of coca leaf is produced, the Andean strategy may well fuel political violence by closing off economic alternatives to farmers who face a desperate situation. In Bolivia, sectors across the political spectrum, including all opposition parties and the Catholic church, have opposed the "militarization" of the

drug war. Some coca-growers federations have called for self-defense groups, and violent confrontations between anti-narcotics forces and local populations have already occurred in both Peru and Bolivia.

The clear and present dangers of the militarized Andean strategy have not yet been faced in a public debate that is now imperative, both in the United States and in the Andes. Nor has the U.S. Congress squarely faced the issue of military aid for Andean counter-insurgencies. Such aid must be debated in its own terms, not disguised as part of a different war, the war on drugs.

The choice is not between the current strategy and "doing nothing," but there are real limits to what the U.S. can -- and should -- do in the supplier countries. For the serious problems that Andean governments face from drug trafficking, the United States can offer assistance if it confronts those problems on their own terms. Such assistance, however, will only be useful to the degree that it reinforces the efforts Andean governments themselves make -- to address the deep inequities in their economies and achieve more stable and productive development, and to remedy the fundamental weaknesses of their justice systems in confronting widespread violence and impunity. Ultimately, however, U.S. drug-related problems are rooted in domestic conditions and will not be solved by strengthening Andean military or even police forces. Instead, as numerous experts and Pentagon officials have suggested, the United States should channel increasing resources to the demand side here at home.

II. THE "NARCO-GUERRILLA" THEORY

In U.S. policy, the relationship between anti-narcotics and counter-insurgency is more than just the use of the same training and support activities with national military and police forces. It is based on a set of linked assumptions about the character of international drug trafficking and of the threat it presents to U.S. national security. The "enemies," or targets, of U.S. anti-narcotics activities in the Andes illustrate those links.

On the one hand, administration officials generally think of drug trafficking organizations as the primary targets of drug-related military and paramilitary programs in Latin America, especially in Colombia and Bolivia. The objectives of the Andean strategy convey this emphasis, and hundreds of thousands of dollars have been spent by the Defense Department, the DEA, the National Security Agency, and the CIA to gather intelligence on known and suspected traffickers, their movements, their phone conversations, and their habits. SouthCom and the DEA are most enthusiastic about large-scale raids against numerous trafficker assets, and they have pointed to the raid on Santa Ana, Bolivia, in June 1991 as an example of a successful approach, despite problems with the raid.⁸

On the other hand, the Bush administration -- and the U.S. military -- view the "counter-narcotics mission" as inextricably linked to counter-insurgency in Latin America. The administration has consistently depicted drug traffickers as irrevocably tied to leftist insurgents, justifying the inclusion of "old" enemies in the drug war.⁹ In their joint report to the Congress in February 1991, the Departments of State and Defense refer explicitly to "narco-insurgents," explaining, "... we cannot lose sight of the fact that in Colombia and Peru the insurgents are involved in narcotics and, along with traffickers, have created a militarized situation."

Administration officials have been open about their inclusion of counter-insurgency in their anti-narcotics program. In 1990 Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters Melvyn Levitsky, said,

⁸ See WOLA International Drug Policy Brief #4, "A Fundamentally Flawed Policy: The U.S. 'War on Drugs' in Bolivia," September 18, 1991.

⁹ The phrase "narco-guerrilla" was first used publicly by U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Lewis Tambs in 1984, when he made the unprecedented claim that the Marxist guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), was working in alliance with the Colombian drug cartels. Although the phrase was widely viewed in Colombia as an attempt to discredit the guerrillas during their peace talks with the government at that time, the Reagan and Bush administrations have continued to stress alleged links between the cartels (especially the Medellín cartel) and leftist insurgent groups. The administration does not use the term "theory".

There is another role for the military in addition to the anti-narcotics role, and that has to do with anti-insurgency. We might as well speak of this frankly.

In the Upper Huallaga valley of Peru for example, you cannot have good counter-narcotics operations unless you have a secure situation in which they can take place. The national police cannot fight the Sendero Luminoso off while they are fighting against the traffickers, and there is this alliance between the Sendero Luminoso and the traffickers so that they mutually support each other, and the Sendero Luminoso profits from that relationship by getting funds to conduct its own struggle against the government. So we recognize that a certain amount of building up the military capabilities has to do with providing a secure environment within the valley, and the same could be said for Colombia, under which strong law enforcement, counter-drug operations can take place."¹⁰

Other administration statements echo these sentiments. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South America Michael Skol said in early 1990, "We are just beginning in Peru. It is the same theory [as in Colombia], the theory that we and the Peruvians cannot fight with law enforcement alone in the Upper Huallaga valley unless the Peruvian military is there fighting the Sendero Luminoso."¹¹ Increasing host nation counter-insurgency capabilities is part of "counter-narcotics tasks" in the hemisphere, and SouthCom officials strongly object to the notion that insurgents and drug traffickers can be separated.¹²

In the face of congressional concerns that anti-narcotics monies not be spent on unrelated activities, the administration has emphasized that the Andean strategy funding will only be used for counter-insurgency which is in some way related to counter-narcotics. In the case of Peru, the administration has thus far interpreted this restriction geographically, limiting the use of U.S.-provided equipment to regions where coca and cocaine are produced. As Mr. Levitsky said in 1990 (using a double negative),

... we have an interest in helping them fight that insurgency that pertains in that narcotics situation. That does not mean we are

¹⁰ Testimony before the Task Force on International Narcotics Control, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Review of the President's Andean Initiative," November 7-8, 1989, p. 18.

¹¹ Testimony before Task Force on International Narcotics Control, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Review of the 1990 International Narcotics Control Strategy report," March 1990, p. 142.

¹² See U.S. Southern Command, "Southern Theater Strategy," February 12, 1991. Interviews with Gen. John Ellerson, SouthCom Head of Operations (J-3) and Col. Keith Nightingale, Head of Counter-narcotics, Quarry Heights, Panama, early 1991.

going to try to train...[sic] This does not mean that we are going to assist them in insurgency which not only takes place in the Upper Huallaga valley, but in other places.¹³

As coca and cocaine production shift within Peru and Colombia, the range of counter-insurgency programs considered to be justified under anti-narcotics activities will presumably shift as well.

III. THE NARCO-GUERRILLA THEORY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN THE ANDES

The "narco-guerrilla theory" is likely to be applied in different ways in each of the three Andean Initiative countries. To date there is little evidence by which to judge how U.S. equipment, intelligence, and advice is being utilized by Andean military forces. Hardly any of the main source of U.S. military aid, the Foreign Military Financing program, has been delivered to the Andean armed forces. And in Colombia, where under "drawdown" authority the majority of off-the-shelf U.S. military equipment has been delivered, the classified nature of anti-narcotics operations and the dearth of public monitoring of U.S. assistance make it difficult to reach a conclusive assessment of the relationship between anti-drug aid and counter-insurgency operations. Nevertheless statements by U.S., Colombian, and Peruvian officials provide an idea of how U.S. security assistance is being used in Colombia and is likely to be utilized in Peru.

Colombia

In Colombia, there is evidence that U.S. assistance earmarked for anti-narcotics efforts is going to counter-insurgency programs which appear to be unrelated to anti-narcotics activities. Dr. Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa, president of the non-governmental Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, claimed in mid-1991, "U.S. military assistance is not aimed at narco-trafficking; it is only for the guerrilla war."¹⁴ In an interview with congressional staff members of the House Government Operations Committee, Colombian Army Chief-of-Staff Gen. Luis Eduardo Roca and Army General José Nelson Mejía said that \$38.5 million of the \$40.3 million allocated to Colombia for anti-narcotics assistance in FY 1990 would be used for logistical support for "Operation Tri-Color." Operation Tri-Color, the officers explained, is a three-year counter-insurgency

¹³ Testimony before House Foreign Affairs Committee, "The Andean Initiative," June 6 and 20, 1990, p. 116.

¹⁴ Jochnick interviews, mid-1991, op cit.

operation concentrated in the northeastern part of the country. According to the subcommittee report,

"When asked by the subcommittee staff to explain how a major military operation in an area not known for its narcotics production could advance the anti-narcotics goals of either country, the military representatives stated that if processing facilities were located during the operation they would be destroyed."

Colombian military officials subsequently denied that the aid would be used in the way described.

However, the interview with the Colombian military officials illustrates the most fundamental reality which shapes U.S. anti-drug programs in that country: The Colombian armed forces' highest priority is not the drug war, but the guerrilla war. For almost thirty years the military has fought leftist insurgent groups. Through peace negotiations with the government, four guerrilla groups have disarmed and reintegrated into civilian political life in the past two years.¹⁵ But the two largest and most powerful insurgent movements, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), continue actively to engage government forces and to attack economic infrastructure. Following the December 1990 government attack on the FARC headquarters in La Uribe, and coinciding with the beginning of the Constituent Assembly in February 1991, the FARC and the ELN launched their biggest offensive in years.¹⁶

In early 1991, then-U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Thomas McNamara, stated that U.S. anti-drug monies are going to counter-insurgency in Colombia: "on occasion a part of the aid has been used against the guerrillas."¹⁷ More importantly, the Ambassador was quoted in a leading Colombian newspaper as acknowledging that funds from the Andean strategy are going to support "other objectives" than anti-narcotics:

I don't see the utilization of the arms against the guerrillas as a deviation. The arms are given to the government in order that it may use them in the anti-narcotics struggle, **but also they may be**

¹⁵ These groups include the April 19 Movement (M-19), the largest sector of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT), and Quintín Lame (an indigenous-based insurgent group).

¹⁶ "At Least 40 Killed in New Guerrilla Offensive," *Madrid EFE*, Feb. 5, 1991, and "More on 'Unprecedented Offensive'," *Bogotá Inravisión Television*, Feb. 6, 1991, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, February 6, 1991, pp. 34-35.

¹⁷ *El Espectador*, January 28, 1991, cited and translated by Chris af Jochnick, Jochnick interviews, *op cit.* McNamara remained the ambassador through the Summer of 1991.

used for other objectives. The aid has been used primarily in the offensive against narco-trafficking. Nevertheless, in the [U.S.] Congress from time to time some Senators or Representatives say that **they would prefer that the arms not be utilized in objectives different from the struggle against drugs; but this is not a requirement of the United States.**¹⁸

The Ambassador's comments appear to directly contradict the International Narcotics Control Act of 1990, and his comments raise questions about the U.S. Embassy's commitment to ensuring that U.S. anti-narcotics assistance be destined only for drug-related activities.

The \$65 million "drawdown" in August 1989 is the largest single aid package delivered to date for anti-narcotics in Colombia, and its composition illustrates the institutional interests and mechanisms by which much anti-drug aid is channeled to counter-insurgency programs. President Bush's announcement of the \$65 million of equipment from existing Defense Department stocks following the assassination of Senator Luis Carlos Galán was unexpected by the Colombians. According to Colombian and U.S. government officials, U.S. military representatives reviewed a list of needed equipment prepared by the Colombian armed forces and told the Colombians what was available and what the U.S. was willing to provide. Previously the director of the Colombian police Directorate for Anti-Narcotics (DAN) was asked to prepare a list and forward it to the Defense Ministry. According to the director of the DAN, his superiors in the Colombian military made changes to his list and added their own requests.¹⁹

The resulting list heavily favored conventional military equipment -- useful primarily for counter-insurgency -- not that requested by the police. The armed forces received about 77% of the total emergency aid package, while the police received only 16% (see Table 3.D). This breakdown surprised the Colombian National Police, since it is responsible for between 80-90% of all anti-narcotics seizures and raids on airstrips.²⁰ Of the equipment, the Colombian Air Force received more than any other service, and much of that total was covered by eight Cessna A-37B "Dragonfly" airplanes. The A-37B is known in armaments literature as a "Counter-insurgency (COIN)" aircraft, and one SouthCom official told WOLA that the

¹⁸ *El Espectador*, August 4, 1991, cited and translated by Chris af Jochnick, Jochnick interviews. Emphasis added.

¹⁹ House Committee on Government Operations, "Stopping the Flood of Cocaine with Operation Snowcap: Is it Working?," House Report No. 101-673, August 14, 1990, pp. 78-80.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

TABLE 3.D

**EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA: \$65 MILLION
AUGUST 1989**

Breakdown by Recipient of \$65 million Emergency Assistance provided to Colombia under Section 506(a). "Drawdown" activity begun August 28, 1989, finished February 1990.

RECIPIENT	AMOUNT	% OF TOTAL
Colombian Air Force	\$20,515,743	31.6%
- 3 C-130B Aircraft (from air guard)		
- 8 A-37B Aircraft	- 35 M60 Machine Guns	
- 12 Miniguns	- 60 M16A2 Rifles	
- 5 M79 Grenade Launchers	- 3 Fuel Trucks	
- 3,500 2.75" Rockets	- 36 Radios	
- Ammunition and Explosives		
Colombian Army	17,211,993	26.5
- 125 M60 Machine Guns	- 290 9MM Pistols	
- 260 M79 Grenade Launchers	- 400 M16A2 Rifles	
- 50 M-19 60MM Mortars	- 80 Vehicles	
- 25 Inflatables Assault Boats	- 160 Radios	
- 50 Night Vision Goggles	- Ammunition, Explosives	
Colombian Navy	6,929,115	10.7
- 10,000 M14 Rifles	- 80 radios	
- 25 M60 Machine Guns	- 30 Vehicles	
- 5 Patrol Boats, 31 ft.	- 2 Patrol Boats, 65 ft.	
- 110 M79 Grenade Launchers	- Ammunition, Explosives	
Colombian Marines	5,178,131	8.0
Colombian Military Intelligence	7,060	0.0
Colombian National Police	10,461,025	16.1
- 12 UH-1H Helicopters w/spare parts plus Miniguns/M60s		
- 65 M-79 Grenade Launchers	- 200 .38 Cal Pistols	
- Ammunition and Explosives	- 75 M-60 Machine Guns	
Directorate of Administrative Security	466,827	0.7
- 290 9MM Pistols	- 10 M14 Rifles	
- 300 .38 Cal Pistols	- 20 Night Vision Goggles	
- Ammunition and Explosives		
Ministry of Justice	170,115	0.3
Shipping and Handling Costs	<u>4,059,991</u>	<u>6.2</u>
TOTAL, SECTION 506(A) ASSISTANCE	\$65,000,000	100.0%

Source: Defense Security Assistance Agency, U.S. Department of Defense.

Dragonfly is "not a counter-narcotics capable aircraft."²¹ Colombian research organizations have collected evidence of the use of the A-37B (of which Colombia owns a total of 33, including 25 purchased from the U.S. government since 1978) in counter-insurgency bombardments of civilian populations.²² In addition, the aid package included 440 grenade launchers, 50 mortars, and 260 M60 machine guns, most of which went to the armed forces (see Table 3.D).

Particularly disturbing, Congress has continued to approve huge amounts of military aid to the Colombian government without any information on the use of equipment provided or its effects in that country. Because U.S. law requires that "drawdown" equipment be delivered within 120 days, most of this equipment has been delivered promptly.²³ However, congressional sources report that virtually none of the Foreign Military Financing funds allocated for FY 1990 and FY 1991 has been delivered to Colombia.²⁴ The FY 1990-FY 1991 total for military assistance already approved by Congress for Colombia is \$125 million. Although the use and effectiveness of this aid is not yet known, the House and the Senate has approved military aid to the Andes for FY 1992. The bulk of all approved military aid is destined for the armed forces rather than the anti-narcotics units of the police. The Colombian military appears to be proceeding with plans to use that aid for counter-insurgency efforts, without any apparent dissent from the administration. Indeed, when queried by congressional staff members in March 1990 about the use of U.S. narcotics-related assistance for counter-insurgency, the U.S. military attaché in Bogotá replied that it is generally understood that the aid is to be used to control both drug trafficking and insurgent activity and that it is not U.S. policy to tell the Colombians how to use U.S. assistance.²⁵

Peru

The United States has already been providing training to the Peruvian military for what appear to be counter-insurgency programs, although on a small scale. Since 1987, eighty-one Peruvian military personnel have been trained at the U.S. Army School of the Americas in Ft. Benning, Georgia. Almost half of these received training in psychological warfare, a key

²¹ WOLA interview in early 1991.

²² Accounts by witnesses were collected by CINEP, a Colombian research center, and by the Congregación Intercongregacional de Justicia y Paz.

²³ See Sec. 551, Public law 01-167, 1990.

²⁴ Statements by staff member for the House Foreign Affairs Committee at "Symposium on Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict, and Drug Interdiction," May 1991, Washington, DC, and conversations with congressional staff members, mid-1991. While contracts have been issued for equipment with FY 1990 and some FY 1991 appropriations, the content is not yet known.

²⁵ "Stopping the Flood...", *op cit.*, p. 81.