COLOMBIA AT WAR: PEACE DIPLOMACIES

by JUAN GABRIEL TOKATLIAN*

La guerra sólo puede ser evitada si ambos eventuales adversarios la rechazan. No mediante el hecho de que “por lo menos” uno de ellos sea lo más pacífico posible

Bertolt Brecht, Escritos políticos

Brief introductory reflections 

For the past two decades Colombian diplomacy has been bound to peace (and to war). Current "peace diplomacy" currently being deployed by President Pastrana (1998-2002) constitutes further indication of the close linkages between domestic and foreign policies,; linkages which are particularly relevant nowadays due to the protracted and degraded nature of Colombia's civil strife.  Although "peace diplomacy" is not the exclusive and exclusionary element to have fashioned Colombia's foreign policy during the past 20 years, it has been a necessary and essential component of Colombia's interaction with the international community. 

The scope and limitations of this fresh attempt at relating international diplomacy and domestic peace can be better understood by examining these linkages within a theoretical framework, and from the perspective of current Colombian foreign policy[1].

Invariably, States which experience civil strife, irrespective of the nature of the regime[2], often refer to Peace to underscore the fact that their efforts abroad are geared towards resolving their domestic conflicts.  Never has any government at any given time thought of referring to its foreign policy  as "war diplomacy".  Colombia is no exception.  

In this sense, it is essential to state precisely what is meant in this essay by "peace diplomacy", that is, deliberately gearing a country's international relations towards the specific goal of seeking external support for eliminating internal conflict[3]. This definition does not necessarily mean that peace diplomacy is centered, domestically and at an international level, on terminating a country's civil strife through dialogue, negotiation, and agreement.  This diplomacy could as likely seek to legitimate greater use of force by State agents in order to attain political or military victory over armed opponents.  Peace diplomacy could also be focused on obtaining passive backing for internal peace efforts and keeping undesirable external factors out of the country's civil strife. 

The first alternative will be called "Negotiated Peace Diplomacy".  The second alternative, or that of resolving conflicts through greater use of State force to vanquish opponents politically and/or militarily, will be termed "Forced Pacification Diplomacy".  The third alternative of resolving the conflict by isolating external factors will be called "Neutralizing Diplomacy".   

Theory and practice

Theoretical approaches to international relations all presume a linkage between domestic and foreign affairs and, with greater or lesser emphasis, propose a certain level of interaction between domestic structures and the world system.  Nonetheless, there are very few studies detailing the relationship between national and international politics[4].

If diplomacy's typical realm is that of relations and politics among States, and achieving domestic peace is one of the State's fundamental responsibilities, then classical realism[5]  and structural realism[6] can be good starting points for assessing the Colombian case. Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry combine these schools of thought to explain States' internal and external behavior[7].

These authors perform their analyses within the framework of classical realism according to which, the international system, essentially conflictual,  is dominated by States competing for power in a unitary and rational pursuit of national self-interest. While classical realism does not thoroughly develop the following view, it holds that the chances of success of a country's domestic policies depend on the degree of correspondence between the nature of the State's domestic policies and its international objectives.   On the other hand, the theory of structural realism, also used by these authors, holds that unitary State activities are to be explained within the framework of an international system which lacks a higher authority, and where the dominant basic principle is anarchy.  Thus, structural realism puts the accent on international systemic changes and their impact on State actions.

Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry set forth their model as follows:

·        The ultimate goal of all States, irrespective of size, location, nature and capabilities, is survival.

·        The international goal of all States, central or peripheral, is the attainment of power and wealth.

·        The internal goal of all States, strong or weak, is controlling national resources and securing domestic legitimacy.

To these ends, States can:

·        At a domestic level, mobilize resources to boost economic growth and tap societal resources as a means of maximizing their relative power. Resource mobilization implies generating greater wealth and a long-term investment in power, whereas extracting resources means acquiring power and consuming wealth in the short-term.

·        At an international level, States can try to obtain international resources and endorsement. While the former refers to material goods, the latter means looking for political support abroad[8].

The authors propose three fundamental hypotheses:

The authors propose three fundamental hypotheses:

·        “As the long-term power of the nation-state declines, the state will increase its internal mobilization;”

·        “As external threat increase, the state will increase its internal extraction;” and

·        “As domestic political instability increase, the state will pursue external extraction and validation.”[9]

Thus, following Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry's third point, this study hypothesizes that as of the end of the 1970s, the need to counter mounting and widespreading political instability prompted the Colombian State, both through its Liberal and Conservative governments, to seek additional economic resources (further capabilities) and political backing (further endorsement).   A logical corollary of this hypothesis is that foreign resources and endorsement would help the Colombian State to:  a) overcome this critical situation; b) to enhance institutional stability;  and c) advance in the resolution of its domestic war.

Turbay and Forced Pacification Diplomacy

The first of Colombia's peace diplomacies, though not directly referred to as such by the government, was undertaken during President Julio Cesar Turbay's administration (1978-1982).   This Liberal politician believed that Colombia's armed conflict had become internationalized inasmuch as external actors, variables, and phenomena were adversely impinging on the country's institutional stability[10].

At the time, Colombia's domestic context was marked by the proliferation of rural insurgencies, by the M-19 guerrilla group's growing expansion into urban centers, the passage of the National Security Statute (Estatuto de Seguridad Nacional), and by increased military autonomy in maintaining a disturbed public order.  As regards Colombia's neighboring international environment, the Caribbean Basin was defined by Cuba's militancy in the name and advancement of armed revolution[11], by a Sandinista Nicaragua[12], a Marxist Granada, an up-in-arms Salvador, and by the end of moderate Democrat Jimmy Carter's term, and the beginning of aggressive conservative Ronald Reagan's administration. 

Bogotá and Washington's converging anti-Communist views, and the generalized fear on the part of Colombia's political, economic and military elites of Soviet expansion into the Caribbean merged with the Colombian State's feeling of vulnerability as of Nicaragua's territorial claims and Havana's firm (though not decisive) backing to Colombia's armed insurgents (namely, the M-19 in its frustrated 1981 “Invasión del Sur”).  The conjunction of all these factors led Colombia to embark on a dynamic and proactive hemispheric diplomacy, particularly at a Carribean level[13]. An outstanding dynamism, if compared to Colombia's traditional low-profile standards in international politics[14].

According to Malcom Deas,

“... much of Colombia's former diplomacy was praiseworthy and much of it realist, however, by 1982 the country felt dangerously alone. Part of the danger came from Central America, and Nicaragua's territorial claims to the islands and keys was the least important issue. Colombia could become a target for the insurgency movement expanding from Central America.  Both the guerrilla and the armed forces watched Central American developments closely. A guerrilla victory in El Salvador would undoubtedly have a powerful effect on Colombia;  in this sense, Colombia was the biggest 'domino' but the least remarked upon in the region.”[15].

The Turbay administration conducted its foreign affairs through Forced Pacification Diplomacy, combining confrontation and submission: political confrontation with counterparts who might threaten to heighten Colombia's internal war, and ideological submission towards the United States in order to ensure continued domestic manu militari against the guerrilla with Washington's blessing;, and without any serious condemnation from the White House[16] and Congress.

No other moment offers more Forced Pacification Diplomacy initiatives, acts, gestures and pronouncements: Colombia's persistent obstruction in 1979[17] of Cuba's candidacy to the UN Security Council; severed diplomatic relations with that country as of 1981;  the decision to lend troops to the Sinai peacekeeping forces at a difficult moment in the Middle-East peace process, and when only Fiji had sent a contingent[18];  fiery criticism of the 1981 French-Mexican Declaration that recognized the FMLN-FDR as a representative force in the Salvadoran conflict;  the 1981 participation in Operation Ocean Venture (together with troops from the U.S., NATO, Argentina, Venezuela and Uruguay) —operation then considered a mock invasion of Granada (finally invaded in 1983)—;   meetings in 1982 between Colombian and U.S. military  establishments to discuss the possibility of  setting up a special base on the San Andrés island; Colombia's participation that same year (together with the U.S., Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras) in the Central American Democratic Community, which undertook the diplomatic defense of the Salvadoran government and attack of the Nicaraguan government.  These are all unerring signs of  Forced Pacification Diplomacy.[19]

During his presidency, Julio Cesar Turbay received political[20], military^[21] and material[22] backing from Washington;, especially from the Reagan administration. At the time, Colombia was not the object of pointed criticism regarding human rights violations[23]  neither by the United States nor Western Europe[24]. The country continued to receive U.S. federal funding, official development assistance from Europe, loans from private banks and multilateral institutions[25], and U.S. and European investment capital. 

Officially, external pressures towards a negotiated settlement to Colombia's internal conflict were apparently not powerful and determining enough alter the course of Colombia's Forced Pacification Diplomacy.  Nonetheless, towards the end of the Turbay administration, international isolation in all likelihood did not come came, not as the price for the country's increasingly besetting state of social and political violence, but as of the position assumed by this Liberal president in the Malvinas (Falkland) War[26].

            In conclusion, at a local level, President Turbay responded to the country's growing political instability with a series of coercive measures;, and, at an international level, he conducted the Colombian affairs through Forced Pacification Diplomacy.  Turbay sought and obtained sufficient foreign funding and political endorsement to perpetuate the domestic status quo and sustain an increasingly fragile State.  Even though his administration attained further foreign extraction and endorsement, it was unable to overcome institutional stability and, much less, to subdue the country's political violence and  armed conflict.

Betancur and Negotiated Peace Diplomacy

That which characterized President Belisario Betancur's administration (1982-1986), from the very beginning of his tenure was Negotiated Peace Diplomacy. His foreign policy was a relevant, and even necessary, if wanting, complement to his domestic search for dialogue and peace with the guerrilla factions.  Nonetheless, his foreign policy did not serve as a substitute for his initiatives to pacify the country.  Nor was it an instrument meant to legitimate his personal convictions, or to convey his attempts to achieve domestic peace to the international community.  

Betancur immediately rerouted Colombian foreign policy in an unforeseen manner. His simultaneous proposals at both the national and international level were audacious and unprecedented. At a local level, he sought to enter into peace talks and to grant a general amnesty, while embarking, at the international level, he embarked on a search for peace in Central America through the Contadora Group[27];. hHe affiliated Colombia to the Non-Aligned Movement (NOAL)[28] and became more detached from the United States^[29].

The linkages between Colombia's internal conflict and the external Central American conflict were obvious [30]. However, unlike Turbay's international diplomacy, Betancur's[31] underlying motives and spirit were the search for negotiated peace, both at home and abroad, as opposed to a military solution to Colombia's internal war and foreign diplomatic containment.

His references to the linkage between international politics and the domestic conflict were reiterative and forceful in tone.  In a message from the island of San Andrés on April 9, 1983, Betancur declared: “... at this juncture in Colombian history,  it is fitting to take note of the intricate union between the internal phase (which we continue to seek through a generous and encompassing amnesty), and the international peace we are striving to attain for this tormented region [Central America].”[32]  When addressing the National Defense University (Escuela Superior de Guerra) on May 6, 1983, the president maintained:

“... on occasions we have stayed away from the Caribbean decision -making scene, which is our just and natural environment ... we believe peace is indivisible, and we are aware that it is not attainable if acting only within national borders; peace is generally endangered outside of its domestic scene, in a perilously interconnected world.  We seek and will continue to seek peace, solidarity, and a peaceful solution in any scenario suitable for interrelationships between human beings and nations.”[33]

Additionally, this Conservative statesman actively addressed the Latin American foreign debt issue, which he closely linked to the search for a balanced economic development, the eradication of poverty, and the achievement of political and institutional stability. Towards this end, he put forth the idea of a sort of  "Marshall Plan" for developing nations which was, broadly speaking, to be financed from a minimal portion of arms-race resources, tourism, and world commerce.”[34]

Moreover, Betancur's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy did not limit itlsef to Colombia's foreign policy towards Central America.  On different occasions and in diverse contexts his “peace diplomacy” preferentially focused on other countries.  This was the case during the U.S. invasion of Granada in October 1983, where Colombia intervened on behalf of the Cuban contingent so that it be allowed to leave the invaded island. This, among other factors, led Fidel Castro to write two letters to the National Liberation Army (ELN) asking them to free the president's brother, Jaime Betancur, which they eventually did;, and to a mild withdrawal of belligerent Cuban support for the M-19[35].

In October 1983, Betancur strove to establish direct dialogue with the commanders of the M-19 in Madrid, and he later tried to personally contact the representatives of this armed movement in Mexico City in December 1984.  Eventually, the  Prosecutor General of Public Office Holders/Incumbents and Citizens' Interests Defender (Procurador General) Carlos Jiménez and the Colombian Ambassador in London, Bernardo Ramírez, held another unsuccessful meeting with the M-19 in Mexico in March 1985[36].

All the same, his presumptive “Cuban Ace” and “European Ace” did not help Betancur to achieve peace nor to keep Colombian affairs from gravitating towards the United States.  As political negotiations became diluted and the narcotics traffic's domestic power reasserted itself, Washington's specific weight in peace and drug concerns also increased. When in 1984 U.S. Ambassador, Lewis Tambs, coined the term “narcoguerrilla”[37] to define a type of transcendental alliance between narcotics traffickers and guerrilla groups, the limits to Betancur's internal and external peacebuilding strategies became obvious. In fact, the inescapable question was bound to rise:  is the government negotiating with  an armed group, is it doing so with a political insurgent group or with a criminal and Mafia organization? 

Despite attempts by the government to discriminate between guerrilla and narcotics traffic, this became increasingly difficult as of 1985.  Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara's assassination in 1984 moved Betancur to bow to U.S. pressure and to initiate extradition proceedings.  Colombia's economic crisis drove the Betancur administration towards the United States inasmuch as Washington was crucial to obtaining the billion dollar Jumbo loan in 1985[38]. Lastly, the M-19's storming of the Palace of Justice led the president to adopt the “heavy-handed” language so prized by U.S. officials. 

Indeed, the president referred to the M-19 as a a “terrorist movement”, bearer of a “terrorist project”, that opted for actions characterized by “a crescendo of delirium and terrorism which exceed all limits.”  He furthermore, underscored the fact that the narcotics traffic and terrorism are:

“... the most deleterious phenomena in contemporary society ... And although they are two different phenomena in genre, they often overlap and collaborate insofar as narcotics and weapons often cross paths ... It was not by chance, that the terrorist [Ivan Marino Ospina of the M-19] issued statements regarding the Bilateral [U.S.-Colombian] Extradition Treaty [U.S.-Colombian] and the legitimacy of attempts on American nationals. Nor was it by chance, that both terrorists and narcotics traffickers concurred in targeting the Supreme Court.”[39]

Towards the end of his term, Betancur's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy became blurred.  Without taking foreign policy to the extreme of adopting Forced Pacification Diplomacy, this Conservative president retained a tenuous “peace diplomacy”, particularly in Central America.  Abroad, Betancur's peace efforts were received coolly and with discomfort.  Meanwhile,  his domestic endeavors were regarded with disdain and mistrust by the United States. Secretary of State George P. Schultz's comments regarding Betancur are, without a doubt, revealing.  According to Schultz, the Colombian president had been exceedingly “condescending” with the guerrilla because he was hoping to “win the Nobel Prize for Peace Price”.[40]

Colombia's renewed repressive momentum in its official stance towards the narcotics traffic, a foreign profile on the downgrade, and the adoption of a hard-line military policy towards the guerrilla during 1985 and 1986 received Washington's full support. The U.S. never cast any doubts on the government's legitimacy in spite of growing signs of institutional crisis. It strongly supported the Colombian eExecutive's structural adjustment policies, procured further resources for the war on drugs and continued to sideline the humans rights issue[41]. Europe, in its turn, continued giving Colombia its political and economic backing and assistance[42]. Nonetheless, more and more member countries and official instances of the European Community voiced their uneasiness and objections to the growing flagrancy of human rights violations in Colombia.

Thus, the legacy of Betancur's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy proved to be ambiguous.  The independent stance he adopted at the beginning of his term boosted the credibility of his endeavor to hold peace talks, reconcile and pacify the country.  Mounting turbulence in the Caribbean Basin, however, threatened to  “Central-Americanize” the Colombian conflict during the mid 1980s.  Furthermore, his legacy was compounded by the implacable “narcotization” of Colombia's U.S. agenda, and by the bearing, which gradually became more and more relevant, of human rights issues on Colombia's relations with the European Community. 

            In short, Betancur's Government had to face an increasingly unstable domestic juncture and a highly critical international scenario. In order to deal with the situation, in contrast to his predecessor, this Conservative statesman embarked on a policy of Negotiated Peace Diplomacy. His strategy was operative insofar as, regardless of burgeoning doubts abroad regarding Colombia's critical narcotics traffic and human rights situation (which, respectively, caused greater unease in the United States and in Europe), he managed to procure foreign funding and political endorsement.  Colombia continued receiving foreign extraction and endorsement. Nevertheless, during these four years the country's institutional structure went even deeper into crisis while an answer to Colombia's political violence and armed conflict was once again postponed.   

Barco and Neutralizing Diplomacy

President Virgilio Barco's administration (1986-1990) initiated its activities abroad by developing a Neutralizing Diplomacy. Contadora had already withdrawn from Central America, and Central Americans themselves, with heavy influence from Washington, were promoting solutions to the subregional crisis.  Colombia, now a member of the Rio Group (made up of the four Contadora members and the four Support Group members), backed attempts at achieving peace in Central America, and detached its conflictual experience from that of this region[43]. Similarly, by creating the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Human Rights, President Barco joined attempts at showing the international community in general, and Western Europe in particular, the government's willingness to come to terms with the deplorable human rights situation and to try to put an end to abuses through cooperation, and not by imposing sanctions. Moreover,  by coinciding with the United States on the illicit drugs issue, paradoxically, Barco was able to differ on other political dimensions of the bilateral agenda[44].

In order to gauge Barco's Netralization Diplomacy, it is highly relevant to understand Cuba's place in Colombian foreign policy. The Barco administration maintained the contacts formerly established by Betancur and expanded  Colombia's good relations with the island, despite the fact that formal diplomatic ties had been suspended as of 1981. Bogota and Havana converged on series of issues and in different scenarios[45].

This was the case at the end of the 1980s with regional stability in the Carribbean Basin, which was basic to both countries. Accordingly, their respective foreign policies promoted a peaceful settlement to the conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and they both bitterly criticized the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989. Within the framework of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Colombia sought, by abstaining or voting against the United States, to prevent sanctions against the Cuban regime for the human rights situation on the island. Within the instance of the UN Security Council, where Cuba and Colombia coincided in 1990, both countries together with Yemen and Malaysia, formed the Group of Four, through which they harmonized their standpoints regarding the Gulf War after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Bogota and Havana's closeness proved to be decisive towards bringing about two phenomena which were to influence Colombia's domestic and foreign policies: it facilitated Cuba's role as an important moderator in negotiations with a highly weakened M-19, and it contributed to keeping Colombia from being severely criticized by the international community, in spite of its disastrous human rights record[46].

The peace talks and accord with the M-19 from 1989 to 1990, and the fact that any other party, apart from the Liberal and Conservative Parties, was to run in the 1990 elections, after the assassination of three presidential candidates, allowed for minimal institutional stability in the midst of the narcotics trade and the "dirty war" against the leftist movements. Western Europe viewed Colombia's plight sympathetically. It grasped that Colombia's delicate situation —in which multiple violences overlapped— gave the country an exceptional nature: even though, it was not an authoritarian regime, there were massive human rights abuses, unacceptable by any standard; and since the State was not powerful and did not have great coercive capability, nonpolitical violence was rampant. Barco's drastic counternarcotics policy and Western Europe's benevolent outlook account for European trade preferences in 1990[47].

The United States, in view of Barco's vigorous and abiding counter narcotics struggle, gave Colombia decisive political, military and economic backing.  Indeed, the first presidential counternarcotics summit held in Cartagena in 1990 and attended by the presidents of the United States, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia[48]; massive U.S. counternarcotics aid[49]; significant increases in military assistance[50]; and Washington's vital support towards obtaining for Bogota the one billion dollar Concorde loan in 1987 and 1988 and the US$1.6 million Challenger loan in 1989 and 1990 [51]; as well as the proposal to the U.S. Congress in 1990 of the Andean Trade Preferences Initiative (finally approved in 1991), were all signs of U.S. commitment to Colombia's fragile and eroded institutional legitimacy[52].

As opposed to Turbay's Forced Pacification Diplomacy, and Betancur's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy, Barco's Neutralizing Diplomacy was relatively functional insofar as a compromise was reached with the M-19 regarding arms decomissioning and political reinsertion, but it was wanting as concerns outlining sound and lasting peace initiatives for Colombia. 

The three types of “peace diplomacies” carried out by these administrations no doubt contributed to sustaining a precarious State, both politically and economically.  They were, however, unable to build it up. The State's continued ability to secure foreign extraction and validation did not translate into an increased ability to overcome internal institutional instability and to make some progress towards resolving an armed conflict which was increasingly becoming an irregular war.

Gaviria and Neutralizing Diplomacy

President Cesar Gaviria's administration (1990-1994) continued his predecessor's Neutralizing Diplomacy, although at times he seemed to shift from Negotiated Peace Diplomacy to Forced Pacification Diplomacy. As a matter of fact, the beginning of his term, labelled “revolcón” (the "Shake Up");, the convening of the National Constituent Assembly;, and having initiated negotiations with the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) the PRT and the Quintin Lame indigenous armed movement, could have contributed to giving the impression that, in order to complement his domestic actions, Gaviria would undertake Negotiated Peace Diplomacy. Likewise, at the end of his four-year term,  when talkswith the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar —CGSB (made up of the FARC, the ELN and a splinter EPL group) were broken[53], when the counterinsurgency military offensive was launched[54], and when the different domestic violences reached unforeseen heights, one would imagine that the government would deploy a Forced Pacification Diplomacy[55]. However, this did not occur: Gaviria undertook a Neutralizing Diplomacy, which went through different stages, and varied in content.[56]

Gaviria's Neutralizing Diplomacy focused on demarcating the Colombian conflict from the conflict in the Caribbean Basin, and to contributing to peace in the area. Thus, Colombia, together with Mexico, Venezuela and Spain, formed —under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, and with U.S. approval—  the El Salvador Support Group, which contributed to the signing of a final accord in 1992.  Within the context of a broad initial agreement in January 1994 between the government of Guatemala and the UNRG guerrilla, the parties requested the presence of Colombia, together with that of the United States, Norway, Spain, Venezuela and Mexico, among the "Group of Friendly Nations" participating in Guatemala's peace process. The Colombian government, furthermore, turned to the OAS and the UN to restore to power Haiti's elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, who had been overthrown in September 1991. Lastly, the renewal of diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1994, strengthened recent political ties between Bogota and Havana, particularly with regards to domestic peace and human rights.

This Liberal government's Neutralizing Diplomacy was also evinced by peace talks with the guerrilla:  Caracas, Venezuela in 1991 and  Tlaxcala, Mexico in 1992,  were the scene of dialogues with the CGSB.  All the same, the Gaviria administration did not seek the active participation of Mexico and Venezuela as moderators,or mediators or their good offices in what was still considered solely a Colombian conflict[57].

As with its two predecessors, towards the end of its term, the Gaviria administration's foreign agenda became "renarcotized"  after Pablo Escobar escaped from prison.  Likewise, its image on the international scene was tarnished due to the dramatic human rights situation. While the former is clearly evidenced in Colombian-U.S. relations, the latter was manifest in Colombian-European relations.  Meanwhile, both at a worldwide and Latin American level, the Colombian case began to be viewed with growing concern: countries became extremely preoccupied lest they should reproduce the Colombian experience[58].

Although the government received official backing from the United States[59] and the European Union, there was growing concern regarding the factuality of the rule of law in Colombia.  And, notwithstanding official backing from the most industrialized countries, condemnations of human rights abuses were more and more frequent and increasingly forceful among government officials. This Liberal president's Neutralizng Diplomacy prevented open external intromission in Colombia's peace and war affairs but by 1994, the Colombian State's external room for maneuver were sorely limited.

In short, one could conclude that, even if in terms of foreign extraction and validation the tendency was towards a qualitative and quantitative reduction, the Colombian State was still considered fairly legitimate and received recognition from its own citizens and from the community of nations. Nevertheless, the State's evident inability to overcome what was already a mounting domestic war, signaled its potential collapse. Neutralizing Diplomacy thus manifested its drawbacks: it temporarily halted the internationalization of the war but was unable to effectively guarantee the nationalization of peace.

Samper and Negotiated Peace Diplomacy

President Ernesto Samper's Government (1994-1998) aspired to conduct  Negotiated Peace Diplomacy.[60]  From 1994 to 1995, his "peace diplomacy" was more closely linked to human rights issues than to negotiations with the guerrilla.  Hoping to make the conflict more humane, the eExecutive proposed the Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions to the Colombian Congress;, created an interagency commission to investigate and clear up the Trujillo massacres of 1988 and 1991;, acquiesced to opening an Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), among others.  Nevertheless, the human rights issue, as pointed out by Gustavo Gallon, soon wavered from cooperation to hesitation.[61]

In deed, while Colombia was establishing instances, agencies and bureaucracies dedicated to protecting human rights at home and promoting human rights abroad, violations were on the rise and sanctions were sorely lacking. As of this, demands from abroad for concrete actions increased requesting that Colombia ensure its credibility in this matter. Furthermore, the fact that the State was not promoting the protection of human rights as a matter of public policy was no longer acceptable as it was in the 1980s; it was now taken as a sign of a crumbling State. 

During the second half of his four-year term, Samper's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy focused on peace talks with the guerrilla. However, as his conciliatory and gestures of détente towards the FARC multiplied, the guerrilla appeared to be less interested in holding peace talks; and as he sought greater external support for his initiatives to establish contacts and bridge the gap with the FARC, this guerrilla group seemed unwilling to involve the community of nations[62]. Additionally, while the internal war intensified, there was still no true clarity as to whether the government aimed at providing the space required for the right-wing paramilitary groups to participate in future negotiations, or  whether the FARC was a narcoguerrilla with which it was impossible to talk[63]. As the government showed manifested a growing inclination to politicize the status of paramilitarism and criminalize the insurgency's behavior, inadvertently Colombia came to be considered a Gray Area Phenomenon. In other words, it represented a critical threat as of the fact that important swaths of its territory were in the hands of organizations which were “half criminal, half political” and that the national government's legitimacy was being eroded[64]. This places the country at the heart of a potential low-intensity conflict.

At the same time, during his last year in office, this Liberal president attempted to enlist the aid of as many countries a possible towards his peace efforts: Venezuela, Mexico, Cuba, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Spain, and Germany, among others. At a rhetoric level, or that of formal and generic declarations, it was easy to accompany Colombia.  However considering the fact that there was still no clarity as to the guerrilla willingness to accept the good offices of these counterparts, and no precision as to the role that Bogota intended these friendly nations to play[65], the international component of an eventual peace process became vague.

The failure of Samper's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy was not so much due to Colombia's publicly known, decades-old tragic human rights situation, nor was it due to the obvious inconsistencies in Colombian diplomacy towards those countries interested in contributing to bringing peace to the country; it was more due to the fact that, for the first time in three decades of internal war, the United States deliberately opted for delegitimizing a Colombian government.

The constant reminder and presence of narcotics funding in Samper's presidential campaign opened the way for Washington's “disciplinary diplomacy”^[66] towards Bogota. Stigmatizing statements by North American officials and legislators who referred to Colombia as a narcodemocracy; the fact that the U.S. canceled the entry visas of Ernesto Samper and several other Colombian civilians and officers; the nasty, disqualifying, and aggressive terms used by U.S. diplomats to refer to Colombian legislators, judges, businessmen, prominent persons, police and army personnel; the refusal to fully certify Colombia for four consecutive years^[67] due to alleged insufficient counter-narcotics cooperation; the disrepute of Colombian institutions and authorities in the eyes of their North American colleagues —among many other signs and facts— go to show that, the problem of legitimacy in Colombia, as perceived by the United States, was not necessarily a personal and circumstantial issue, but more likely a collective and structural phenomenon.

Support in the form of foreign assistance and credit was maintained, though to a smaller degree when compared to former times and to that appropriated for other countries in the region during the 1990s.  Already scant, political endorsement from the United States became even more remote, while in Europe those who championed the Colombian cause, both at a State and non-governmental level, became scarcer. The resounding deterioration of human rights increasingly alarmed both the European Union and the United States.  Extended corruption and the enormous growth of organized narcocriminality now not only worried Washington; the European capitals also became concerned.  In such a manner, Colombia's domestic war ended up making North Americans, Europeans and Latin Americans uneasy.

This Liberal president's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy —full of gestures and with little substance— barely contributed to preserving dwindling foreign extraction and validation. Institutional instability became even more pronounced, and the possibility of overcoming the country's civil strife became even more remote.  What is more, Colombia began to suffer a genuinely devastating large-scale humanitarian emergency.  Abuses of human rights and of international humanitarian law by State agents and para-instutitional groups constituted the predominant mark of an irregular war. All of this has  generated a human tragedy out of all proportion to any other on the American continent during the 1990s,  and barely equaled in the world at the beginning of the year 2000.

Pastrana and  Negotiated Peace Diplomacy

President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) initiated his administration by conducting a high-profile Negotiated Peace Diplomacy[68]. Neutralizing Diplomacy was not applicable since, by 1998, it was impossible to bar the incidence of external factors, actors and variables on Colombia's armed conflicts.  In fact, Colombia could not contain the internationalization of its domestic conflict; at most, it could attempt an internationalization which favored peace instead of a negative internationalization of its internal war[69]. Moreover, Forced Pacification Diplomacy was not a practicable option since Pastrana's October 1997 "Peace Mandate", together with high voter turnout for the 1998 presidential elections, made peaceful settlement to the conflict a public must.

Pastrana's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy was formally announced within his peace proposal of June 8, 1998.  Points 6, 10 and 15 of his peace plan hold that:

“... I consider the international community's participation in all of the stages of the process of crucial importance: as facilitators of prenegotiation conditions, as proponents of formulae for reaching mutual agreements to clear the way for formal negotiations, as witnesses of the accords reached, and to monitor compliance of commitments. However, this cooperation with the international community, which should be autonomous and sovereign in nature, must be the result of an accord reached among the disputants, that which presupposes a clear willingness to come to terms since only the conflicting parties can make peace, not the international community... As elected president, I will visit the heads of state of the industrialized nations who have indicated their willingness to come to our aid, especially the United States, to establish with them the way in which they are going to cooperate with us to initiate the economic and social redemption of those zones most affected by the conflict ... Intimately tied to the social problem and to that of violence is the illicit crops issue ... Developed countries should help us to execute a type of ‘Plan Marshall Plan ’ for Colombia, which should allow us to carry out large investments in the social and agrarian sectors, and in regional infrastructure ...”[70]

In summary, this strategy integrates two fundamental tenets: the uttermost participation of the international community in an eventual peace process, and the need for the guerrilla's proactive concurrence in the search for foreign cooperation.  It founds a presidential diplomacy whose main emphasis is on the United States, and which links peace to drugs.  Lastly, it seeks the procurement of massive foreign funds to attack the social and economic underpinnings which allow for the development of illicit crops.

Even prior to taking office, this Conservative president was already conducting "peace diplomacy" on his trips abroad;  and, as of taking oath on August 7,  he provided his "peace diplomacy " with new impetus. In a speech delivered to the UN General Assembly on September 23, 1998, Pastrana underscored the following: 

“On the path to peace, the international community's concurrence will complement our domestic efforts. We will provide for the defense of fundamental rights ... We will take into consideration valuable experiences in conflict resolution elsewhere ...  Peace in Colombia will require vast investments ... To this end, we will create a "Peace Fund" ... We will also seek contributions from the international community ... All of these actions will constitute what we have termed peace diplomacy.  It will be a diplomacy with social and economic content ...”[71] 

In this sense, the Foreign Ministry has been entrusted with the administration's "peace diplomacy"[72]. Aside from being in charge of securing foreign political support for the peace process, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is also to mobilize the international community's financial backing.  This is due to the fact that the government's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy “is based on the concept that peace should have social and economic content.”[73].

With regards to the United States —principal point of reference for this Negotiated Peace Diplomacy— this Conservative leader has managed to mend Colombian-U.S. relations which had steadily deteriorated during the Samper administration.  The relationship between the two executives improved noticeably.  Be that as it may, it is essential to state precisely the type of structure which prevails in the current relationship between the two countries. 

Briefly speaking, one could mention two typical models.  On the one hand, there is the "honeymoon" schema, which supposes a total turnabout in the existing relationship at both State and governmental levels, a significantly harmonious management of bilateral and multilateral issues, a noteworthy emphasis on cooperation as a means of resolving the numerous problems which exist between the two countries,  the fostering of greater commercial and financial opportunities for both countries,  and unlimited U.S. military backing  for the Colombian armed forces. 

On the other hand, there is the schema of  "putting things on hold", which can be characterized by two simultaneous phenomena.  Firstly,  the United States offers Colombia a reprieve or trial period during which it expects to fathom the genuineness and depth of the new .... (determine just how genuine and profound is the new) administration's domestic change with regards to drug matters (applying extradition, increasing eradication through aerial spraying, further disarticulating narcotics networks, etc.). Washington is backing Bogota's peace initiatives but it is holding judgment on their relevance, effectiveness and scope.  After eighteen months into Pastrana's term, everything seems to indicate that the latter schema has prevailed.

Rumors and speculations which occasionally arise regarding greater U.S. intervention in Colombia's internal affairs do not contradict, however, the above assessment.  Routine diplomacy between the two countries came to an end years ago. In other word, the circumstances whereby Colombian affairs were traditionally addressed by mid-level officials and a few politicians interested in the country, with the U.S. Congress playing a fairly marginal role, no longer holds. In this latter stage, strategists, have become increasingly important: high-ranking government officials and officers in the executive branch, and the "hawks" in Congress.  These attempts at confining Bogota did not just begin with Pastrana, they date back a while. Under this policy the country is subjected to close scrutiny while Washington gauges the different scenarios and contingency plans for an eventual turbulent political transition in Colombia. Formally, Bogota is free to act, under monitoring by Washington.  In this context, if confronted with an uncontrolled internal implosion, the United States would not discard a manipulated external intervention[74].

Thus, the framework within which Pastrana's "peace diplomacy" is conducted is characterized by appropriate backing from the united States. This endorsement, although already made explicit, is still relatively cautious.  Scant internal progress in the dialogue and negotiation process tends to generate further skepticism on Washington's part, both among moderates and hard-liners.  U.S. backing is mostly expressed in military terms (personnel, training, information and resources), not economic (funding for what has been called the Peace Fund): Washington's contribution is the "stick" component in the peace talks with the guerrilla groups, while Colombia's decision to offer the FARC a “clear-out” zone is the "carrot" component.  Colombia is the third-largest recipient of U.S. security assistance, after Israel and Egypt; aid for Colombia in 1999 stood at $289 million[75]. 

At the same time, Latin America and Europe have increased their formal support for peace in Colombia. Nonetheless, the country's current situation is perceived as a threat to the region (an even the world)[76]. Hence, there is no certainty as to whether Colombia's counterparts are considering the option of participating dynamically in the peace process or intervening forcefully in the country's domestic war[77].

As of this, and during the period already covered by the Pastrana administration, it is highly unlikely  —both due to Colombia's domestic conditions and to diverse international circumstances— that Colombia will have access to greater economic resources from abroad. Meanwhile, everything seems to indicate that the State will continue receiving elemental and uncertain foreign backing and more U.S. military aid[78]. Current Negotiated Peace Diplomacy can hope to procure a certain degree of foreign endorsement (political) and extraction (economic). Furthermore, Colombia cannot continue mobilizing this rhetoric at an international level, if at a national level a peaceful settlement is not seen to make genuine progress.

Lastly, escalating indirect U.S. intervention in Colombia,  continued Latin American diplomatic silence on Colombia's civil strife and on foreign interference, greater military than economic foreign support for the government greater at the military than at the economic level, widespread armed conflict in Colombia and stalled political negotiations with the guerrilla groups could lead Pastrana's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy to relive the process undergone by the Betancur and Samper pacification diplomacies: although these two presidents sincerely sought peace, they were unable to resolve the country's profound institutional crisis.

Assessment and Suggestions

            In this paper, my starting point for discerning Colombian “peace diplomacy” was Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry's realist notion according to which, the ultimate goal of all States, irrespective of size, location, nature and capabilities, is survival.  I also focused my analysis as of their realist hypothesis which holds that “al aumentar la inestabilidad política interna, el Estado buscará más extracción y validación externas.”  I furthermore pointed out the logical corollary to this hypothesis, namely that foreign resources and endorsement would help the Colombian State to:  a) overcome this critical situation; b) to enhance institutional stability;  and c) advance in the resolution of its domestic war.  This seems the only plausible interpretation of Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry's hypothesis, since it would not be realistic to suppose that continued instability can actually allow for the State's long-term survival.

In this sense, it was noted that the Colombian State was fairly successful in terms of procuring the foreign resource extraction and political endorsement needed to enhance its chances of survival.  For two decades both Liberal and Conservative administrations conducted different types of “peace diplomacies”, whose results, while not thorough, were nevertheless operative insofar as preserving power at home and recognition abroad. Even so, the original situation  —national instability— was not settled.  Quite the opposite, public order disturbances became even more pressing and the country's civil strife more widespread than ever.  The different administrations had fragmentary achievements and failures as regards the linkages between internal and external politics.  Nevertheless, the country suffered an overwhelming exacerbation of its diverse violences.  Thus, although on the international scene the Colombian State managed to preserve some sort of fragile legitimacy, internally, and in spite of enacting the 1991 Constitution,  it achieved no legitimacy.

Essentially, the failure of “peace diplomacy” —which languished out of its inability to contribute the elements required to settle the war— lies in two primary factors. Firstly, the State neglected to comply with the demand for substantial changes required to found solid peace efforts abroad (and at home). Attempts at peacebuilding not accompanied by changes in the existing social and political conditions and by a redistribution of economic power have been highly hazardous and costly.  Colombian diplomacy has always projected the ruling class'  unwillingness to share power and reformulate the system's rules of the game.  Foreign policy as regards internal pacification seemed geared towards showing that, in the case of Colombia, simple adjustments would suffice to improve the regime. Those foreign interlocutors of greater relevancy, however, think that the Colombian system requires a thorough overhaul.  Thus, the breach between the way the Colombian ruling class perceives what is required to build domestic peace, and the way the international community sees it, is becoming wider than ever.  Likewise, while the instances and instruments required by the State to channel international contributions towards peace are petering out, the influenced exerted by external phenomena and forces is becoming notorious. In spite of its “peace diplomacy”, the Colombian State has been losing autonomy on the international arena and in the management of the internal variables which have a bearing on the war.

The second element which has led to the failure of Colombian “peace diplomacies” is related to the fact that foreign policies linked to peace were primarily the reflection of governmental policies, and not the result of an international strategy on the part of the State. What did prevail were countermarches, turnabouts and inconsistencies as well as an isolated, personalistic, and  capricious handling of the issues as opposed to an endeavor to conduct a coherent policy based on a solid consensus capable of incorporating overall national interests.  Even if it is not sensible to assume the existence of a monolithic State which expresses itself in unison on all issues and fields, it does appear that the propagation of multifarious voices, on an issue as crucial as is peace for Colombian national security and well-being, is an unsustainable and self-defeating conduct. These three models of “peace diplomacy” indicate that, rather than a global policy towards resolving the country's armed conflict, what was carried out were initiatives for securing survival.  However necessary these survival-securing initiatives might seem from a realist point of view,  they nonetheless do not suffice to guarantee the long-term continuity of the State and true domestic pacification.

What should be done towards the future so that the Colombian nation might benefit from a coherent “peace diplomacy”  whose true specific goal is to attain foreign support in order to terminate the country's civil strife?  I suggest two complementary options:  firstly, designing a renewed State diplomacy wholly centered on the search for peace and secondly, a citizens' diplomacy designed with the same purpose in mind,: peace. 

In the first instance, what would be required is a real national consensus on foreign policy; Statal, and not governmental strategies on the international scene; a diplomacy conscientiously guided by the will to promote democracy[79], human rights, institutional revamping, and trueveritable transparency, accountability, and integrity in all of these processes; clear-cut precisions regarding the scope of foreign participation in the domestic war; and a conduct abroad consistent with defending the national interests of the majority, of Colombians.

In the second case, I have assumed Cathryn Thorup's conceptual definition of citizen diplomacy according to which:   

“... the actions of the citizens of one country —and those of the non-governmental groups which they conform— regarding a third country imply the usurpation of those roles considered the sole domain of government actors. Comparatively, while domestic interest groups traditionally operate within a specific national context, citizen diplomacy acts at an international or transnational level.”[80]

The principal components of this diplomacy could be focused on turning abroad and: conveying a more detailed and unbiased view of Colombia's delicate situation; seeking social and political allies for a peaceful settlement to the country's armed struggle; exploring contacts with those groups or movements which might exert positive pressure on the guerrilla groups inciting them to initiate genuine peace talks; carrying out activities which give top priority to defending, indistinctly, the human rights of all Colombians; mobilizing prominent persons in all spheres, the arts, culture, science, education and humanities, with the intent of evincing the fact that the search for peace in Colombia is heartfelt and resolute. These are some among the many endeavors which are urgently required.

Colombia can still avoid the catastrophe of a widespread armed conflict. Although foreign policy cannot attain that which domestic policy is incapable of achieving, a reformulated "peace diplomacy" may contribute to the advancement of democracy, human rights and reconciliation.

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