Subject: Colombia: Drugs, Guerrillas and Us involvement
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Colombia:
Drugs, Guerrillas and US
involvement

By
Gabriela Aguero

In
the Valleys of sweetness

came
down the exterminators
in
the highest
peaks of the mountains

Of
your sons was the fog lost
but
they reached them
one
by one until they died
destroyed
in the torment
of
their earth tepid flowers
that
tried to escape beneath the plants

“Now they come for
Cuba”- Pablo Neruda

Any authoritative
formulation may be inadequate; new formulations are always needed. These new
formulations can no more contain or capture any physical bodily reality than did
the old. They are however the effect of lived experience as it presses against
constructed theories. The result is not a new theory that will now express
reality but the realization that every symbolic system is fragile, vulnerable,
and replaceable. (Nye 1987)

Follow
the seven sacred teachings of the Anishenabe people of Turtle Island and everything will be alright.
Love,
Respect, Humility, Honesty, Courage, Wisdom, and Truth.

Abstract

An
extremely complex protracted and bloody internal conflict has been ragging in
Colombia for the last 40 years.
Several theories regarding the origins of this intrastate war date back to La Violencia a violent period in
Colombian history that erupted in 1946 after the assassination of the
presidential candidate Gaiviria and which lasted for the next 20 years. Setting
the tone for what would set the record as the longest internal war in Latin America, the war is unfortunately far from over. The
factors influencing this complexity are related in part to Colombia’s geography, history,
economy and the internal political feuds that have supported one of the most
powerful Marxist guerrilla groups in the continent: the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia) recently renamed with the added suffix EP or
Popular Army (Ejercito Popular).

The prevailing state of lawlessness that is constantly associated with
this conflict creates a specific set of qualities that made Colombia a perfect breeding ground
for the traffic of illegal psychotropic drugs. Amongst them the Coca factor has had the most
relevant impact on the funding and continuation of this conflict. This paper
will analyze the diverse dynamics that have made illegal trafficking
indispensable to fund the war for all parties involved  trying to explain how the US involvement
in combating the drug traffic has fuelled, complicated, exacerbated and
politicized Colombia’s “drug problem”. To aim at a resolution or at least a set
of recommendations a model of multi-track diplomacy will be explored taking into
account how Colombia’s drug war affects other
conflicts on a world wide scale involving multiple actors. Caution and measure
in this respect are indispensable for any attempt at resolution to Colombia’s drug problem is bound to
elicit controversy. Not only has its reputation as a drug dealing country become
engrained in the culture of the nation, but its consequences have affected
neighbouring countries as well. Colombia’s drug fuelled economic
impact is responsible for funnelling international transactions involving
multimillion dollar exchanges of weapons and laundered money. Whose problem is
the drug problem remains to be seen. The chain from production to consumption is
complicated, arduous and above all it involves many players whose livelihoods
depend on it. The roles of the peasant and the land itself are the most
vulnerable. To this framework I will juxtapose images by the photographer Jason
Crowe who documented the conflict back in 2002. The black and white beauty of
the photographs will act as a contrast and a reality made visible with the words
of this paper. Art as photography will pull the reader into either contesting or
approving creating a tension and a dialogue. In the words of Susan Sontag in Regarding the Pain of
Others:

“It
is because a war doesn’t seem as if it can be stopped that people become less
responsive to the horrors. Compassion is an unstable emotion. It needs to be
translated into action, or it withers. The question is what to do with the
feelings that have been aroused, the knowledge that has been communicated. If
one feels that is nothing “we” can do, but who is that “we”? And nothing that
“they” can do either, and who are “they”? (Sontag, 2003)

The
Colombian Conflict at a glance

Most
historians coincide with the idea that the origins of the conflict in Colombia are retroactive to La Violencia. This process started a
downhill de-legitimization process that begun much earlier in Colombia than in any other Latin
American country creating a level of violence which transformed itself into a
cultural construct, a way of operating. Evolving from a traditional rural
society based on the haciendas it
tried to become a model of urban pre-capitalist society.  Colombia is, was and still is two
worlds in one.

La
Violencia originates with an internal feud between the two main parties that
have ruled the nation since the onset of their creation: the Liberals and the
Conservatives. While a Pan American conference was being held in Bogotá a
popular left wing leader called Elicier Gaitán
was assassinated in Bogotá.
The result of this assassination was an escalation in popular unrest that ended
with the killing of Gaitan’s assassin and ensuing riots that left several
thousand dead and the city destroyed. The
Bogotazo, as the episode came to be called, was an expression of mass social
frustration and grief by a people who had lost the man who represented their
only potential link to the decision-making process. This violence spread to
rural areas and continued unrelentlessly for the next eighteen years until 1958
claiming thousands of lives.
This
extremely complex phenomenon was characterized by both partisan political
rivalry and sheer rural banditry. The basic cause of this protracted period of
internal disorder, however, was the refusal of successive governments to give in
to the people's demands for socioeconomic change. After the Bogotazo, Ospina who
was in government became more repressive. In the 1949 presidential election, the
Liberals refused to present a candidate; as a result, Gómez, the only
Conservative candidate, took office in 1950. A neo-fascist constitution in 1953
gave more autonomy to the presidency, expanded the powers of departmental
governors, and strengthened the official role of the church in the political
system. Gómez directed his repression in particular against the Liberal
opposition, which he called communist. At the height of the violence, the number
of deaths reportedly reached 1,000 per month. Ospina was deposed and a Military
Junta took power through Rojas Pinilla in 1953 and finally elections were
allowed in 1959 with a reform of the constitution. This portion of history is
indispensable to understand what would happen after. When the frustrated
revolutionary efforts of the Colombian brooding insurgency fuelled by the Cuban
Revolution through the ELN, FARC and M19 Marxists guerrilla groups were not left
to bare fruit in plans for a frustrated revolution and remained underground for
the next forty years. A guerrilla insurgency war ensued. The successive creation
of a National Front that ended La
Violencia only perpetuated the power of the two elite parties that would
alternate in power in conjunction with the already powerful landowner’s elite.
To this threat followed the creation of autonomous armed groups such as the AUC
(Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) and other paramilitary insurgents that took
the fight into their own hands and became the 6th arm of the
Colombian army. The majority of human rights abuses are attributed to these
paramilitary groups who are able to carry out killings with great impunity.
Every single one of these groups has its own internal alliances and indirectly
profits from the drug trade in one way or another, controlling different
shifting territories around the country. This has created a “truly symbiotic
relationship…of groups that might not share ideological goals, but their
financial and political existence is dependent on the creation of an alliance".
(Steinberg, 2000)

Violence
Now and The Patriot Plan

A
government soldier wounded by an IED (Improvised Explosive Device) planted by
FARC rebels lies alongside his dead friend while medics attach splints to his
shattered legs. Paujil, Caqueta. (Jason Howe 2002).

According
to the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights and Americas Watch, there were more
political killings in Colombia last year than in the rest of the
Western Hemisphere combined. This statement
could be true of the present as the lives that are being lost to this conflict
count in the hundreds of thousands over the years in which the civil war in
Colombia has been ragging. The main
issue for the continuation of this protracted conflict is in direct correlation
to the availability of funds to fight this war. Several different issues are at
hand aiding the economy of the war in Colombia. First is the drug
trafficking that suddenly became a huge source of funds during the 1970s then
aided in part by a weak and inefficient government.

The
concept of combating drugs in Colombia to eradicate coca-growing is
not new. US intervention in
Bolivia up until the election of Evo
Morales was based in complete eradication of the coca plantations together with
alternative methods of cultivation and offering alternative sources of
livelihood for the peasants in the coca plantations. In the film The Real Thing (Sanders, 2002) the
filmmaker Jim Sanders explores the world of the coca rebellion in Bolivia
well before Morales became president. What he discovers is that the peasant
population was the main target of the eradication campaign as they became
besieged by the military forces. The Human Rights abuses described in the film
by the peasants themselves make clear that the situation was getting out of
hand. The scapegotism of the Bolivian military forces involved in the drug
traffic had found a culprit. It is clear that very similar events are taking
place in Colombia according to Human Rights
organizations, for the ideological war that is going on between Marxist and
Right wing forces is also hurting the vulnerable peasant and the civilian
population. The efforts to curve these abuses are intrinsically outlined in the
demands from countries contributing to the drug war in Colombia. According to Human Rights
Watch in a recent report:

The United States remains the most influential
foreign actor in Colombia. In 2005 it provided close
to U.S. $800 million to the Colombian government, mostly in military aid.
Twenty-five percent of U.S. security assistance is formally
subject to human rights conditions, but the conditions have not been
consistently enforced. Certification of 12.5 percent of the assistance was
delayed in the first half of 2005 due to serious setbacks and lack of progress
in key investigations of military abuses, among other factors. Nonetheless, the
certification was ultimately granted, with the U.S. State Department citing late
progress in some specific cases.  In February 2005, the member countries of
the G-24 group of international donors to Colombia met in Cartagena to discuss continuing cooperation with Colombia. Members of Colombia’s human rights community
expressed disappointment over the resulting Cartagena Declaration, which, while
reaffirming the terms of the preceding London Declaration, was viewed as weaker
than the earlier document on various human rights issues. (Human Rights Watch,
2006)

This
disappointment has to do with the cultural approach to the war on drugs. The
Patriot Plan together with the Plan Colombia, pursued by the actual President of
Colombia Alvaro Uribe in his second mandate, is geared to establish the biggest
military effort in Colombian history.
In order to curve the drug-trafficking this project is specifically
targeting the FARC forces who due to the destruction of the two major drug
cartels in Medellin and Colombia have gained control of the
drug trafficking. The Plan Liberty One was the other major effort to curve the
influence of the guerrillas in the urban areas of Bogotá. The majority of the
insurgent war activity happens in the country-side specifically in the
departments along the coast. What is significant is the perception of this war
from two different points of view: for the Colombian government it is more a
case of the drug trade as an economic problem whereas for the US
administration this is a military operation that has now shifted to be labeled a
war on terrorism. Various sources
indicate that this economic drug problem represents 300 billion of dollars a
year placing the ‘enemy resources’ on the level of nations rather than
businesses budgets. “Such a wealthy, amorphous and flexible enterprise is not
easy or cheap to destroy” (Pearl, 1990)

The economic, social and political effects of the war on drugs in
Colombia have been dramatic. Through
thirty years of war the funding that the drug trade has originated has been one
of the most significant obstacles to peace (Thoumi, 2002). This profound crisis
has changed the nature of the institutions in Colombia to a degree unprecedented even
influencing Colombia’s policies. The Patriot Plan
was created in conjunction with US military and strategic assistance. Its main
objective is to destroy the guerrilla forces in a 116 square mile swath of
Southern Colombia and constitutes the most sophisticated and largest offensive
that has been carried through in Colombia with an investment of 30 million in
funding from the US going
to the Colombian Armed Forces (though much of it is also ending in Colombia’s
network of corruption). These operations started in 2003 in the Departments of
Cundinamarca (where Bogotá is located) as “Libertad 1”.  Then, in December 2003, under the name of
Operación Ano Nuevo, a second offensive was mounted in the Caqueta Dpt. against
the FARC. The Plan Patriota currently incorporates 18000 soldiers, with over 800
US military advisors and 600
US contractors responsible for
fumigation initiatives. Plan Colombia on the other hand is the other plan
which is funded by US aid and involves around $1.3
billion dollars. Since 1997 Colombia has absorbed $4.5 billion dollars in aid
since 1997 becoming a sinkhole of US foreign aid. For the next two
years the budget is around $700 million transforming Colombia the single biggest US recipient of international aid in the world
after Israel and Egypt.
Yet this conflict and the political implications of the hegemonic power behind
it have other ramifications. The recent plans of construction of a US military
base in Paraguay permitting the landing of large aircraft and capable of housing
16.000 troops is worrying Human Rights groups and military analysis in the
region for what this kind of  new
development could mean for the region. (El Deber, 2005)

Colombia’s economy is also rich in
oil. Its production is now being leased to Occidental Petroleum and it is also a
major target by the guerrillas. The Cano-Limon pipeline represents a strategic,
economic an environmental disaster when the attacks blow up the pipelines. This
disaster has literally spilled over to neighboring Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela
who are also receiving large numbers of internally displaced refugees from
Colombia and have thousands of troops stationed on their borders. Internally
Displaced refugees in Colombia constitute a third of the
population with an estimated 16000 children now fighting as soldiers in the
different armed groups. The Plan Patriota has but exacerbated this situation to
create a humanitarian crisis of which little is disclosed in the media. (Council
on Hemispheric Affairs, 200). The fight against Coca though  has other more deepening implications.

Coca,
the plant at the center of the storm...Human
rights leader Alfredo Vasquez Carrisoza argues that the discussion is out of
place...

...What
is important is not that there be new constitutions, but that they be
enforced...

...said
Clara L6pez Obreg6n, a progressive Liberal who was the UP's candidate for mayor
in Bogota...

...All
will be required to provide services previously funded by the central
government-from potable water to highways, schools, hospitals, transportation
and electricity...

...Increasingly
active over the last decade, civic movements have held strikes to obtain their
demands, one of which was the direct election of mayors...

...Since
the elections, the violence has taken on a new dimension, engendering absurd and
desperate legisla- tive measures which point to the government's inability to
control the situ- ation...

...Here,
constitutions are not enforced...

...Once
a Lib- eral stronghold of large cattle ranchers, the UP has made inroads,
winning four mayoralties in the last elections...

...As
in most Latin American countries, members of the military do not vote and are
prohibited from having party affiliations...

...Twelve
UP members have been killed in this hamlet in the last
year...

...While
the reforms did bring some of the guerrillas into the political process, the
armed forces remained outside of the "democratic
opening...

...And
in neighboring Pifialito, 14 people, including both UP and Liberal party
members, were massacred one night last February...

...As
of yet there has been no serious effort to renew peace talks with the
guerrillas...

...Now
I have learned that many problems can be solved by working with the police
chief...

...And
its southern jungle area, now under FARC guerrilla control, is a major center
for coca production...

CoCo

It
is said that the Virgin Mary chewed on the coca as she lamented the loss of her
son leaving her teeth marks on the barks of the Coca. Coca the plant growing as
a bush in the lush slopes of Colombia has ancient meaning to the inhabitants
of the Andes. Revered by the Mayans and the
Incas this plant was used in ceremonies dating hundreds of years before
colonization. Used by shamans in religious ceremonies as well as an offering and
a tool to predict the future, coca is described in ethno botany as one of the
“wise plants”. Amongst other more powerful mind altering substances contained in
them wise plants are said to have
contained the essence of truth for
the people of the Americas before the conquest.

Coca
is a native plant that grows hardy in the warm and humid climates of
Colombia, Bolivia and Peru.
Infusions from the plant as well as the customary chewing of the leaves raises
blood pressure helping with the symptoms associated with high altitude or apunamiento. The stimulatory alkaloids
contained in the leaves were mixed with lime an agent that helps absorption.
Coca utensils have been found in archaeological sites dating more than 3000
years. Once the Spanish realised the chewing of the leave made Indians more
resilient and able to work long hours they allowed the “devils’ plant to be
chewed and used as currency. Coca has been conceptualized as malevolent from the
onset. Yet the powerful identity it shares with the Andean people has been at
the center of the controversy in the fight to destroy it and the source of all
tribulations.

The
demonization of coca is explained in Coca
in Colombia in the Ship of Fools by
Beatriz-Acevedo Olguin (Mama Coca 2002) a researcher in Drug Policy who
describes the approach to fighting the war on drugs as compared to Foucault’s
ideas on the treatment of madness. As regards Colombia specifically and especially
after September 11, this treatment presumes power relations, knowledge
construction between two world views. In this case its attacks are based on the
US War on Terrorism. Olguin’s thesis evaluates how this war is left in the hands
of the police and the military shunted from agency to agency (health, education,
hygiene) to finally transform it into a security issue. As with the extraction
of the Folly that promised the cure
for lunacy, the extraction and eradication of coca at the source will eliminate
the drug problem in the countries of consumption. The prohibitionist discourse
emanates from a social construction of this issue

Society
has certain ideas regarding drugs. These ideas influence drug policy. Based on a
sociological theory of William and Dorothy Swaine-Thomas, a determined image of
reality stated in a social group can be reproduced as a fact. In the case of a
drug system, the social construction that links drugs with crime, produce a
consequent reality. (Acevedo 2002)

This
relationship is what determines how the policies are established and mirror
public opinion. In this respect this relationship between the conceptual meaning
of coca as cocaine and its effects on society goes further to encompass an
overarching concept of illegality in direct opposition to its symbolic meaning
and the effects that cocaine has on the body when consumed. This concept in
itself creates a dependency to a substance that when inhaled elevates the levels
of serotonin in the body therefore creating the illusion of pleasure. Laboratory
animals subject to cocaine addiction have died of over dose due to heart attacks
since cocaine makes the body loose the ability to “tell” when enough is enough.
Dopamine is released into the body from the brain as a “reward” for life
enhancing behaviour (eating, having sex) sending messages to the body to engage
in those behaviours again. Cocaine artificially produces this chemical
therefore tricking the body into
experiencing the same chemistry that produces what can be labelled as ‘cocaine
psychoses’. This psychosis includes symptoms such as aggression and disturbing
hallucinations not to mention heart disorders. (Australian Better Health
Network). Curiously Arango and Child in their article on the subject (Arango and
Child 1987) argue that the technology to produce cocaine was invented in the mid
1960s by the members of the US Peace Corps. They state that the Peace Corps
personnel who enjoyed marijuana when they arrived in the early 1960s, soon
discovered coca-chewing. In their search for better “trips” they developed the
cocaine-refining technology in use today (Thoume 59)

The
number of addicts to cocaine and other drugs in the US is
staggering. This issue is in itself not at the center of the storm for the drug
in the shape of the plant where it originates is mainly persecuted at its
source. Drug treatment and awareness are very insignificant compared to the
billions of dollars spent on the War on Drugs in Colombia. The US approach to the fight on drugs has created an
escalating military conflict of unprecedented consequences to the already
complicated set of variables operating in Colombia. Not only is the War on Drugs but also on Terrorism,
which though outdated in the rest of the world, still continues in Colombia. Specifically this war is
fought against the left guerrilla groups of the ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion
Nacional) and the FARC-EP who though directly profiting from the traffic by
charging taxes and offering protection to the drug network, are also a target of
an ideology war by both the government of Colombia and the US
government. To and extent the ideological fight between right and left of the
Cold War is over in the rest of the world. Unfortunately in Colombia the characteristics of this intrastate
conflict have once more included the US as an old time player in the
search for hegemony in the region. This war though technologically superior is a
war against guerrilla insurgencies being reproduced in other parts of the world
right now. It has the feel of a black and white oldie replay of the Cold War and
it resembles the deterioration of the US involvement in Iraq.

The
International Drug cartel and Conflict

“The
umbrella organization known as the AUC has been long criticized for the brutal
methods its forces use, in particular against the civilian population. The
militias are also known to receive support from wealthy landowners and
Government forces”. (Jason Crowe, 2002) This is a powerful depiction of the
pride of this fighter yet his pose is fearful and ultimately deadly. These
fighters have a lot invested in their role in the war as they represent the
interests of the elite. It also portrays an individual who has chosen anonymity
and has fundamentally decided to remain hidden yet for the general public their
role has been as the 6th
division of the Colombian army. This function that the paramilitaries are
playing in the conflict fighting the Marxist guerrillas is contentious and
ridden with accusations by human rights’ groups. Their right wing ideology makes
them closer in aims to the side that the traffickers play in the conflict. They
have been found responsible by the highest number of human rights abuses in the
country. Though presently de-mobilized the paramilitaries still pose threats and
abuses to the population. (Human Rights Watch, 2005)

According
to Phil Williams in his article on crime and conflict Translational Criminal Enterprises,
Conflict and Instability (Williams, 1999) a number of very specific
characteristics must be present in a state for crime to occur. The weakness of
the state is the most prevalent one. The other is a judicial system under threat
in Colombia especially by the drug lords
who is frozen and ineffective. Ethnic tensions can be present or ideological
ones as in the case of Colombia, regional rivalries and
geographical strategic placement. The main tool of operation for these criminal
enterprises called cartels in
Colombia use corruption to operate
and de-stabilize the rule of law “corroding political behaviour and political
institutions, and weakening civil society” (Williams 97). Pablo Escobar, who
once ruled the Medellin Cartel in Colombia and was killed by the drug
counterinsurgency a few years ago, had become enthralled in his power and had
dreams of reaching public office. His ascendance to political power is unique
amongst other cases of drug or narco-states like Colombia where the drug barons had
acquired such power and notoriety that they aspired to validate it officially in
political seats of office. The drug cartels of Medellin and Colombia due partly to the inefficacy
of the state administration, have taken over tasks such as the construction of
infrastructures of education, leisure, real estates complexes, and other
enterprises that were once reserved to the state. This benefactor role of the
drug mafia has also worked in their favour creating political support from the
population. Such confidence was used when the drug cartels orchestrated the
killing of justice minister Lara Bonilla as a result of retaliation to tougher
government measures involving extradition of drug barons to the US.
Once Escobar was killed in 1993, the Cali Cartel, a more subtle and less violent
organization, rose to the top even funding Ernesto Samper’s presidency campaign
with millions of dollars.  As we
speak this two cartels are basically functionally dismantled though other
smaller and less public drug and trafficking organizations are doing the same
effective job now in conjunction with the FARC-EP. As an unrelenting force the
crime continues yet its origins and control are not that simple and the measures
to combat it not effective.

The
Colombian drug trade is not a simple story of South American supply and North
American demand. Within Colombia, the drug trade has
complicated pre-existing social origins in the conflict between the traditional
landowners and the landless. The success of the drug trade allowed
narcotraffickers to buy land, in a sense joining the ranks of traditional
landowners, but with different interests and goals. The traditional land
conflict continues but in the context of the armed protection of the haciendas
from the peasants. (Holmes et al., 167)

Economic
power is fundamental in reproducing conflict as is the ideological
counter-pining of the organizations that benefit from the trafficking. As stated
before the Cold War paradigm is still prevalent only that it also exists in the
forces fighting within the country. The Paramilitaries are ‘self-originated’
right-wing forces created to counteract the left wing guerrilla insurgency war.
While the drug-traffickers ally themselves ideologically with the paramilitaries
they have business with the guerrilla groups who charge them tax for protection
and transportation. These two issues are usually collapsed into one though the
relationship is far more complicated. Since the US destroyed the two large
cartels in Cali and Medellin the geographical shifting of the production has not
created narco-guerrillas but rather the guerrillas are extorting just a portion
of the commercial transaction for their use in weapon purchases (from Russia in
this case and in exchange for drugs). At the same time this increased
dislocation of the war on drugs (which mainly focuses on destroying the coca
plantations themselves) has affected the peasant’s livelihood itself. In a
backhanded unexpected way this measure has gained the FARC-EP renewed peasant
support.

As for the
paramilitaries especially the AUC (United Self-Defence Groups of Colombia) which
has an active force of fifty thousand and is funded by landowners, businesses
and drug dealers their mandate is: ‘coming together to protect the lives and
property of the citizens from the guerrillas because the Colombian sate was
unwilling to or unable to do so” (Holmes 168). The AUC has recently been
pressured into de-mobilization by the US in part due to the escalating
human rights abuses that involve massacres in several parts of the country. This
diminished presence has fuelled the guerrilla in turn to take over other parts
of the country and to profit from the trafficking even more.

Environmental
Dangers

This
network seems so simple to operate in a production of a product that is also
very easy to produce. The
process to transform coca into cocaine is very simple. Just a Google search on
the internet will provide several recipes that start with the coca paste
available. After the harvest the leaves are dried and then crushed then mixed
with kerosene into a paste that is then dried. This is the base of the product
that will be then commercialized to the first level and that traffickers will
produce into cocaine by adding a number of chemicals to produce the finished
product. “Cocaine is 2Beta-carbomethoxy-3Beta-benzoxytropane; C17H21N04. Cocaine
Hydrochloride USP is a crystalline, granular, or powder
substance, having a saline, slightly bitter
taste
that numbs tongue
and lips. Cocaine Hydrochloride is a local
anesthetic”. (The Internet Drug Index). In Colombia make shift laboratories
exist in the countryside as well as in homes where the cooking utensils can
serve for that simple purpose of transformation. Yet this simplicity and
availability has created a war against a plant.

A
young girl helps her mother pick coca leaves in the small cooperative of
Putumayo. (Jason Crowe, 2002)

The main focus
on the eradication of coca is by using fumigation. Planes stationed in different
areas of the country consistently kill the plants. Pilots risk their lives
routinely being shot down by the guerrillas and the population on the ground
suffers from the after effects of the poisons being sprayed. The issue is to
destroy the production at its source by spraying a compound called paraquat a highly toxic herbicide that
causes pulmonary fibrosis and was first used on the crops of Mexican marihuana.
Colombia is the only American country
where forced eradication strategies with aerial fumigation of Roundup (which is
the commercial name for the chemical) are used.

The commercial
brand Roundup covers a family of Monsanto herbicides, based on the active
ingredient glyphosate and the surfactant POEA. The
difference between the product formulas lies in the concentration of glyphosate
and/or of POEA, or in the proportion of amines. Other surfactants may even be included without
any warning, and are considered a business secret. (Mama
Coca)

Other
surfactants such as CosmoFlux and CosmoInD has been permitted, is the country
where crop cultivation has spread the most.

POEA
is the acronym for surfactant polyoxyethylamine, included in all formulas of
Roundup and other glyphosate-based herbicides. POEA is a mixture of etoxyled
amines derived from animal fat, with a toxicity five times greater than that of
glyphosate. (Mama Coca)

The side effects of these chemicals on
humans have largely been proven in developed countries though the technologies
for eradication that have been prohibited in the developed world are still being
used in developing countries. This has been considered by some analysts as an
outright invasion in the internal affairs of another country. They have urged
the Colombian legislature to resort to legal means to stop the spraying as
stated in the following statement:

The
Colombian Ombudsman's Office has declared that aerial eradication with chemicals
has not proven its effectiveness in the struggle against the production of
psychotropic substances.

The struggle
against said substances stresses criminal policies which contravene the
Colombian state's constitutional obligation to protect its citizens’ rights and
private property and fails to abide by the public policies which regulate the
state’s obligation to this end, namely:

a-
to provide,
as of the positive differentiation principle, special protection for the most
vulnerable of its peoples (minors, displaced populations, members of ethnic
groups and rural populations);

b-
to protect
its citizens’ right to health, food, public health and, consequently, to their
lives and a dignified life;

c-
to protect
its citizens’ right to not be displaced from their homes; and

d-
to provide
environmental protection and conservation, the protection of the nation's
natural resources and of ethnical, ecological, and culturally protected areas as
of the sustainable development principle.

All of the
aforementioned rights are decreed by the stated social-state-of-law objectives
whose guiding principles are solidarity and human dignity.  Within this framework of ideas, all of
the state's institutions should address their efforts to guaranteeing the
defense of human rights as stipulated by international treaties and the
Colombian constitution and legislation. That is to say that, the nation's
authorities cannot, when implementing public policies (in this case the war on
drugs), neglect or apply exceptional measures which disregard these rights.
(Mama Coca)

This
legal document is just one example of the vulnerability of the situation as it
relates to the relationship of two states with an apparent shared agenda. The
fight to curve the production of a plant originating a substance that is
affecting the lives of the chain of production and the human beings connected to
it is problematic. From the peasants who plant coca to the consumers at the end
of the chain they are all affected. A different safer approach must be found.
While
the concept of using herbicides against weeds and camouflaging foliage (such as
Agent Orange in
Vietnam) is not new, using them against crops is. A
new development in this area and due in part to the controversy of the chemicals
involved, has been the idea of using a fungus that would “eat up” the plant.
This
project has been handed over to the United Nations which has already produced
extensive quantitative and qualitative documents on the production of coca in
Colombia. (United Nations Office of
Drugs and Crime, 2006) Their report on the situation is alarming especially if
we consider that the ruggedness of the terrain makes for the plantation of coca
only to be visible from the air. By
getting the UN to take on the fungus project, the US government
not only gets political cover, but makes it harder to release information about
the program. Unlike the US government, the UN has no Freedom
of Information Act guaranteeing
outsiders access to official documents. Biological Weapons Convention and
morphing it from "biocontrol" into "biowarfare." While both
the US and UN will not recognize these terms, the secrecy surrounding the
project and the lack of independent monitoring of the US fungus development, the
lack of media exposure to the project, and the classified nature of the
development program in its early years leave serious questions
unanswered. Ironically, the great majority of research on Fusarium
focuses on combating it as a major food-crop killer. The soil-borne mold
infects crops by secreting toxins into their roots, which then putrefy and
dissolve the plant's cells, often eventually killing them, or worse, poisoning
humans or animals who feed on contaminated plants or plant products. The fungus
can survive in the soil for years. The idea of using a fungal herbicide to kill
drug plants began in the 1970s after a fungus,
later identified as EN-4, began to kill off the coca at a soft drink research
plantation in Kauai,
Hawaii. In 1986, the ARS began a
full-blown research project, classified for a time, to find a biological agent
to kill coca. By 1991, the government had invested at least $14 million in it.
Congress has now given the State Department $23 million originally slated for
mycoherbicide development in the US, which State plans to pass on to
the UN. (Massey, 2001)

Aaerial
eradication has seriously affected weak and marginalized communities of poor
farmers, Indigenous Peoples, and settlers. Hundreds of complaints from these
communities were registered with local and national offices of the Colombian
Human Rights Ombudsman. Aerial spraying of the herbicide has caused eye,
respiratory, skin and digestive ailments; destroyed subsistence crops; sickened
domestic animals and contaminated water supplies. Children are starting to be born with
severe life debilitating illnesses that have not yet fully been tied to the
spraying. Birth defects in some cases are lethal as the aftereffects of the
chemicals in the soil surrounding the sprayed areas remain in the soil for many
years. The US State Department denies that there are human health effects from
spraying glysophate in Colombia. Medical reports on the
other hand link exposure to glysophate herbicides with short term symptoms
including blurred vision, skin problems, heart palpitations, and nausea. Studies
have also found associations with increased risk of miscarriages, premature
birth, and non-Hodgkins lymphoma. Monsanto as quoted in Rachel’s Massey’s
Echoes of Vietnam (2001) article makes a comparison of the environmental
situation of Colombia with that of Vietnam and states that the company producing
the chemical was finally forced in court and challenged not to advertise the
product as “safe, non-toxic, harmless or free from risk” (Massey
2001)

As we all know the after effects of Agent
Orange in Vietnam are still affecting its
population even years after the war stopped. This toxic war is destroying
another countries ecosystems and the health of innocent civilians. Thanks to a
FOIA (Freedom of Information Act)
request, there is a list of US-funded base construction projects paid for in
2005 with Defense Department counter narcotics funds and it can be found
available on the internet but nothing is made available of the studies relating
to the effects of intervention in this ecological war. These reports were
produced as required by Congress in the 2006 Defense Authorization Law that was
supposed to give explanations for total Defense-budget counter-drug aid to every
country in the world. For some reason, the report only includes Defense-budget
counter-drug construction aid, which is only a fraction of what most
countries' militaries get through the Pentagon's budget. We must not forget that
Colombia is the third largest
beneficiary of US aid in the world. This is not only
related to the war on drugs or the Patriot Plan but has much deeper political
explanations. Colombia is
strategically located in Latin America.
Conversely, the US political
interest in Colombia might
prove another downhill disaster as the one being experienced in Iraq
right now. Counter-insurgency guerrilla warfare seems to be a war that produces
no winner or losers rather it seems to escalate out of control until someone (in
this case the US) realizes the loses are too big and creates an artificially
produced stalemate. Considering that there is such little news about Colombia in the media, the blanket of
anonymity gives the Pentagon ample if not wider scope of action. Though not
proved, human rights groups are protesting against the idea that the
US is presently “testing” new
warfare technology, ideology and that the philosophy of School of the
Americas training is alive
and flourishing in Colombia. What is troubling is the
millions of dollars spent also include beneficial aid to much needed programs in
economic and social development. If this aid had no political implications and
did not represent a ‘carrot’ to be granted as a prize for following another
countries agenda perhaps there could be some hope here. When the US was about to
invade Iraq to destroy that countries alleged biological arsenal Senator John
Mica from Florida was instrumental in pushing the “green war” in Colombia by
lobbying Congress to accept the use of biological agents to destroy coca
plantations (fungus and spraying included). (Sunshine Project 2002)

An
attempt to resolve the impossible

Relationships
develop between FARC recruits living in the camps but can only continue with
approval from a commander.

Near
San Vicente del Caguan, Caqueta. (Jason
Crowe, 2002)

If
love
can be possible in times of war anything can. Perhaps it is the inability to see
the future, the tunnel vision of conflict that forces human beings to continue
with the daily chores of living that make that possible. Even to fall in love
during war there is a need for approval. How do Colombians bear the brunt of a
war that has long left them behind? How did these two young Colombians become
convinced to join the FARC guerrilla’s insurgency in a country that has been
fighting for 40 years and what are the solutions to this conflict? How can a
model of conflict resolution be applied to this complex situation without
falling short of utopian? First Colombia has to get the United States
Patriot Plan off their backs but how does it continue with an ingrained attitude
to the drug problem as a war? If a
country has been fighting for this long against and between itself basic notions
of peace are pieces that are missing in a puzzle.

Such
hopeful efforts of communities of peace like those of the rural municipality of
Carare where the peasants
have decidedly left the violent system must be studied and reproduced training
other communities in passive resistance methods. Fear is paramount to this
effort to resist violence without using it. How did Rosa Parks overcome the fear
of not giving up that seat? She was surrounded by a community of people who
supported her efforts. Peace can not be achieved alone or in isolation. The
model of Multitrack diplomacy is but a re-call to consider community as an
option.(Diamond and Mc Donald, 1996)  A country with this level of violence
escalating daily in rural and city areas alike which erupts unannounced and
affects all citizens’ makes for an interesting case to try and plant a seed of peace. What has been lost is so
much that nothing else could be lost.
No amount of grass root efforts from the middle tier elites as Lederach proposes
can create peace effectively if the big power players do not follow through. How
is that created? The utopian societies that exist in Colombia need to become educational
centers that would deter the lovers in the picture to kiss while holding a
weapon. This image is a dichotomy of the utopian love in the ruins of Colombia where life must go on
regardless.

Much
has been written on the value of dialogue despite differences. Dialogue can only
exist if the ground is fertile and the environment feels safe. For Colombians to
start feeling safe the drug-traffickers need to be accounted for as a separate
entity once the other issues of violence are controlled. By demobilizing the AUC
the US effort has but shifted the power
to other actors like the FARC allowing them to gain control of the drug-traffic
commerce in taxes and benefits. The recent peace treaties to exchange FARC
prisoners for hostages collapsed in part due to the attitude of the present
administration of Uribe’s government which is escalating the conflict to
unprecedented heights. His plan Convivir has now involved civilians in a
network of informants that are rewarded on television while wearing masks in
order to remain anonymous. Due to protests by Human Rights groups the plan was
abandoned. The other plan in place is the creation of an army of peasants that
would carry their guns home at night while on duty putting them in danger to
become targets of the armed groups. How do this people know who is going to
attack them is a complicated issue. When violence has spread and becomes
obliterated, darkened and blurred the only option is peace. Peace does not come
as a result of institutions being created for that purpose as a rule. In Latin
America the ingrained animosity with the United
States as the patronizing and destructive power
it has unfortunately become through its failed foreign policies, is the first
hurdle to overcome. In Colombia that is validated by presence of US troops on
the ground which even if they only account for 800 at present represent the
infamous School of the Americas political approach to Latin America as a
training ground for what can’t be done somewhere else in terms of warfare.

The
involvement of the different actors in a Multi-track effort has to be consistent
in this case. This would involve NGOs that could coordinate action across
continents. The first series of activist protests have to occur in the
US pressuring the government to
modify their policies on the drug on war and terrorism. Needless to say the fear
of 9/11 pervades the minds of those who are left to carry the flags of peace but
a concerted non-violent series of demonstrations could be put together piecing
together different actors. The US citizenry is presently worried with the events
taking place in Iraq and
Afghanistan so this calls for the
actions of the Diaspora perhaps to intervene.

In
the film Maria Full of Grace we
observe how this community of Colombians living abroad reproduces the societal
failures of their native Colombia not fully integrated but
rather escaping a system that haunts them even abroad. To feel secure a network
of players has to be established that can have religious organizations as main
actors. Colombians are in their majority Catholic and the church has
international connections that can be used to create peace communities in the
US composed of Colombians interested
in returning home to teach non-violent methodology. The sources of funding are
always problematic for peacemakers as the rule is to consider the capitalist
model as exploitative and the stiffness of funders necessitates of the input of
specialists in grant writing. Priority has to be placed in those organizations
in the US that are specializing in Latin American Issues such a WOLA (Washington
Office in Latin America) who routinely analyzes the situation in Colombia and
tries often unsuccessfully to influence the politicians offering forums for
activists to create papers and recommendations on different issues concerning
Latin America. These offices efforts have to be disseminated in the countries
they benefit to slowly resolve the biggest gap of trust between Latin America
and the US. In its latest report on Drug War
Monitor WOLA suggests that

A serious
evaluation of present policies and open-minded debate on drug control
alternatives are sorely needed if we hope to make any progress. A more effective
and more humane policy should be based on the recognition that, while
controlling illicit drug abuse is a legitimate and important goal, drugs will be
produced as long as there is demand for them. (Yongers an Rosin Ed.
2004)

This puts into
perspective the main issue at hand in the US
policy against the war production that perpetuates the blame on drug consumption
on the “other” that produces it. The sticks that have been mentioned through
this paper have brought carrots of the military type but very little in the use
of US expertise in other areas than the
military. Thanks to a FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) in the US one can find a list of
US-funded base construction projects paid for in 2005 with Defense Department
counter-narcotics funds that comes from a report, required by Congress in the
2006 Defense Authorization law that was supposed to total Defense-budget
counter-drug aid to every country in the world though that for some reason only
includes Defense-budget counter-drug construction aid, which is only a
fraction of what most countries' militaries get through the Pentagon's
budget.

It is not that the information is not available is that the information
in the media is selectively disseminated. Peace reporters that tell this story
creating avenues and options or at least raising awareness of the issues can
surely raise a case with the economic side of the conflict. Colombia after all is the third country in the
world receiving America aid
after Israel and Egypt.
(Drugs
and Democracy in Latin America -The Impact of
U.S. Policy

Coletta
A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, Editors)

In her article on Grassroots efforts to build peace in Colombia Maria
Lucia Zapata (Beyond Intractability 2006) discusses Lederach’s concept of the
construction of Sustainable Peace as an effort that starts with the concept of
peace developed by all players.

Community
justice in Colombia is an interesting cultural
resource for conflict transformation that can contribute to long-term
peacebuilding. According to Edgar Ardilla from the National University in Bogotá, “community justice”
can be defined as those initiatives and mechanisms for the administration of
justice based on the traditions and customs of a specific community. There are
different manifestations of community justice in Colombia. Some of the most important
are equity conciliation (Conciliacion en Equidad), peace justice (Justicia de
Paz) and indigenous jurisdiction (Jurisdiccion Indigena). Although there is
difference amongst them, they share the following characteristics: They have
constitutional and legal recognition; traditions, custom and common sense are at
the core of the mechanisms. Especially in the case of equity conciliators and
judges of peace, they are people from the community who volunteer their time.
They do not need to have a specific professional legal background. Finally, the
agreements they facilitate have the same legal standing as the decision of
judge. (Lederach 2002)

The
agents of this transformation are the actors themselves who desperately need the
development aid and humanitarian relief in order to concentrate on peace. As
previously discussed US
investments in Colombia through the Patriot Plan
have been concentrating on the war on drugs and the military assistance needed
to end it. Structural reconstruction is indispensable if peace will take shape.
Colombia does not fall under the
category of a post-conflict society therefore efforts at rebuilding
institutional and political structures need to be done while the fighting
continues. That in itself is a real challenge. The demobilization of the AUC
paramilitaries for example is a perfect opportunity to put into play concepts of
reconciliation, forgiveness, trust-building and future imagining. For this it is
fundamental that the state understands that the role of community equity
conciliators who are developing these alternative methods must be protected.
Most of the population does not participate out of fear. In Cartagena some of these
models are starting to create a different culture one based on community rather
than personal efforts to peacebuilding. According to Jaime
Benavidez:

Initially, criminal
bands ruled the community. There we robberies at any time. But as we were
creating norms the situation got better. Currently we have security zones, frentes de seguridad, and we have
monitoring system. We haven’t created a paramilitary group, no! We have
monitoring groups of volunteers who want to protect the neighbourhood. The
weapons they have are a whistle and a phone. Currently, the community has the control. The
government has not fulfilled its promises to the communit. So if the
municipality comes to impose something, the community will reject it. But if
they (the local authorities) look for the way to contact the leaders people will
accept. People do not believe in the government and its authorities. (Zapata,
2206)

The
efforts the conciliators are making have overarching consequences. According to
Zapata conciliators believe that the most fundamental method to make these
techniques for peace, equity conciliation and community initiatives effective is
to teach youth and children to resolve conflict in a peaceful way in order to
help them become agents of their own transformation. In the absence of trust for
the government the guerrillas and paramilitaries have often taken on the role of
judiciary. The role of conciliator emanating from the community is therefore
essential but they need both the support of the community and the state.
Justices of the peace who practice equity conciliation have the potential to
balance the influence of the guerrillas. In Colombia the culture of violence is
pervasive. Drug-traffickers who exist outside paradigms do not accept any form
of justice. They exist outside any model of control because their main interest
in fuelled by profit. In that respect what needs to happen is that the peasants
involved in coca plantations, the workers who run the labs and control the
process of production are offered alternatives to their livelihood. No peace
could be reached before this happens. As Lederach puts it: “Violence is known:
peace is the mistery”. If basic needs are fulfilled perhaps the imagination can
start to operate again.

Amongst
the efforts to bring awareness to the issues of violence in Colombia is the performance group Rayuela who puts together events in
which thousands of participants create art actions on the streets of Bogotá. In
their last effort four thousand women sat on chairs holding umbrellas on the
streets of Bogotá to denounce human rights abuses and to call to an end of the
violence. This type of performances can create ripples of peace as it decodes
meaning from what the media or the political messages are telling the population
on the need continue fighting. It is only when one is asked to stop and think or
imagine that an alternative is possible and changes can occur. The women ask for
reconciliation and reparation and an end to the hostilities. Dressed in black
and sitting in the chairs they are waiting for reality to change yet their power
resides in their passive resistance which becomes active as they inhabit the
space of the city. As a living sculpture to be contended with their actions
exert non-violent power of resistance.

This
type of participatory art activism has the potential to initiate change at the
grassroots making visible what has been hidden in the imagination of a peaceful
tomorrow. If individuals are not allowed to grieve first and become aware of the
pain they are suffering healing will not happen. This repression of the fear and
pain of years of violence has spread to all of society who co-exists in a new state of affairs becoming part of the
culture. The reproduction of cultural concepts of violence can’t change until
the concept of violence transforms into peace. As a society grieves the next
stages can bring construction but denouncing human rights and asking for ‘a stop to violence’ has to come as a
stage previous to the dialogue. Feelings must be validated before the difficult
discussion about peace starts. By creating consensus in the creation of this
art-performance action Rayuela is calling into action all citizens from every
walk of life, to participate as it promises the ‘sweetness of peace’ that has
been forgotten by the pain of war.

Their
efforts and those of the inhabitants of Carare are similar in
intention:

In
1965 guerrillas established a presence in the Carare region. In 1973, when the
army came in to evict the guerrilla groups, violence from both armed groups
against the peasants started. This was later exacerbated by the presence of
paramilitary groups. By 1987 over 500 peasants had been killed and, in a fateful
meeting the military and the paramilitary offered the peasant leader’s four
options: side with the military, side with the guerrillas, leave the region or
die. The peasants, who had sought to stay independent of the violence, chose a
fifth option: to organize non-violently for peace and development, and thus the
association of peasant workers (ATCC) was born, with the slogan for the right to
life, peace and work. The ATCC's tactics were simple: constant dialogue with all
parties (military, paramilitary, guerrillas, government) and an unshakeable
commitment to non-violence.

The
war between the paramilitary forces and the guerrillas is now history in the
region. Nevertheless, the town needs social programs contributing to the
well-being of the community. Today, the community of El Corregimiento has 27
sectors: a police station, 5000 inhabitants, with 100 living in the inner city,
28 kms. from the municipality of Cimitarra connected by good roads. The
community has four churches, three schools, an agricultural college, a community
action group, a telecommunications site, a medical station, the first phase of a
wharf, and two women's groups, an agroforestry and enterprise cooperative
association which promotes health and of course the association of peasant farm
workers of Carare (ATCC). The ATCC is the ultimate expression of peaceful
co-existence in this area, its strong point is saying "No" to violence and "Yes"
to life, peace and livelihood through the use of only dialogue and
understanding. As Ms. Maria Medina commented "If someone arrives in town
who is armed, we talk with him and tell him he cannot use firearms here.
Everyone who comes in a manner of peace is well received". In El Corregimiento
de la India the white flag is the only weapon of the town!

In
1990, the ATCC received the Nobel Peace Alternative prize, the 32 million pesos
they received as the monetary prize was used; to purchase a piece of land for
cultivation programs, to build a mill and to put up a medical post. In 1990 ATCC
also received the Right Livelihood Award, from which this description of their
work is drawn. (Asociacion de Trabajadores Campesinos de
Carare)

These
efforts are admirable yet they do not transcend the news. Victoria Sanford
(2002) in her paper The Moral Imagination
of Survival: Displacement and Child Soldiers in Guatemala and Colombia
describes the efforts of youth who have been de-mobilized from several armed
groups in Colombia and have created youth
centers for Peace. Abject suffering has fuelled their determination to
non-violence against forced recruitment in these utopian groups for peace.
Alvin in the
community of Costo de Oro explains: “A weapon resolves nothing, weapons destroy
the soul. I have seen this happen since my childhood” (Sanford, 75)

Civilians
caught in the crossfire look desperately for a chance to flee. Puerto Rico, Caqueta (Jason Crowe, 2002)

Other
regional diplomacy solutions

For
these peace efforts to succeed the focus to the peace process can’t become
fruitful if the funding to continue the struggle is present. The
Main issue is coca trafficking. All
the other drug trafficking dwindles in comparison to the network of consumption
that this drug has created in the criminal network. Morales
who
started off as a leader of the MAS (Movement towards Socialism) and is now the
President of Bolivia has said that he wishes to legalise coca cultivation,
whilst stressing that this would not mean legalizing the manufacture of cocaine.
The problem is that Bolivia grows much more coca than it can consume itself, and
most production goes into making cocaine. By
international law, Bolivia is prevented from exporting
products made of coca to other countries. Since
the early 1980s, the United States has used all available leverage to coax
successive Bolivian governments to eradicate coca. It
was the eradication program in
Morales's
native
Chapare that first gave him a leg-up in local politics, and Morales can ill
afford to lose his local support through a policy of eradication.

Connecting these activists efforts to US
intervention, drug-trafficking and war is complex as the pieces of the puzzle
that will eventually become peace will fall into place when these communities
reproduce into more cohesive groups around the country. According to the
International Crisis Group in a paper with a series of recommendations to the
Uribe government, the main issue to be dealt with is very pragmatic yet these
can operate in conjunction with the resistance to violence. First  the efforts to
strengthen the interediction of shipments of drug and chemical precursors that
must be destroyed controlling as well the stop the money laundering efforts.
Developing and alternative infrastructure of farming that is not depending on
the planting of coca or poppies in land that will be confiscated to the
narcotraffickers and ceased by the government. Suspend fumigation of coca fields
unless absolutely necessary but not until the environmental impact study has
determined that is viable and if so to eradicate human inhabitants from the
area. To create consensus with producing countries as for the strategies to be
utilized and create conference groups and international forums especially
involving the United Nations General Assembly. Guarantee the de-mobilization of
paramilitary forces making sure that all ties with the narcotraffick have been
broken. To recognize that the FARC and ELN are not simply involved in traffick
of drugs but that they hold an ideology that motivates them politically into
armed insurgency. Programs to create
dialogue and awareness in the population must deal with the land problem as well
as with social programs to create alternatives to joining the guerrillas in
rural populations. A full investigation into human rights abuses is fundamental
as is the confiscation of illicitly acquired land and property by the guerrilla
groups. The mandate to cut all connections with traffickers would also become
part of a deal to demobilize paramilitaries in order to start conversations with
the two guerrilla insurgent groups. As regards the US the ICG it recommends that
the assistance to Colombia to re-establish the rule of law is fundamental by
offering expertise to train police and the military as well as the forces
dealing with interdiction of droga shipments and lawful arrest of traffickers,
money laundering networks in the US and Colombia. That the assistance in dollars
becomes more equitable between security issues and economic rural development
considering that the creation of sustainable institutional systems is
indispensable.

Alter the balance so there is an even division
between security assistance on the one hand and rural economic assistance,
governance help and social funding on the other, including by increasing
substantially aid for alternative and rural development programs.Encourage the
National Academy of Science, the Institute of Health and the National Research
Council to join in a comprehensive study of the range, benefits, implications
and consequences of harm reduction measures in tackling drug demand in the U.S.,
including abstinence-oriented medically administered drug consumption
experiments that have been conducted in Europe or elsewhere. Consult widely on
possible implications for cutting demand of harm reduction measures and
mechanisms for incorporating them in both source and consumption countries; if a
consensus is reached that they would indeed reduce demand and so cut into profit
margins that affect both supply and armed conflicts, work to amend the
international drug policy framework in UN conventions accordingly. (ICG
2002)

To
the European Union and its Member States the ICG recommends
an increase scientific
study of harm reduction measures as well as assistance to Colombia for
alternative development programs with a view to reducing aerial spraying to a
minimum, .To provide more logistical and technical assistance to Colombia for
interdiction of drug and chemical precursor shipments and to the surrounding
countries who are coca growers as well to aid in all this respect by lending
expertise and allying themselves in a group effort. And in particular this two
recommendations make it feasible to happen:

To
the United Nations General Assembly:

Consider seriously first steps toward
introducing harm reduction measures in source and consumption countries into the
international drug policy framework before the 2008 UNGASS evaluation deadline,
including by integrating the concept into the Guiding Principles of Drug Demand
Reduction and to the International
Financial Institutions (IFIs):Assist Colombia to design and
implement a broad rural development strategy, including alternative development
programs in coca and poppy growing regions, and resettlement of populations
where necessary. (ICG 2002)

In
the question of a bilateral effort to fight the drug traffic these
recommendations recognize that it is not only a US-Colombia affair.  Yet if the concept of the illegal
traffic of drugs is put in an international relations framework there is
possibilities to broaden and control it if not monitor the ideological concepts
behind this war fought against drugs.
Between the two countries a reproduction of political and ideological
relationships is still present. As previously stated this relationship has
historical connotations that presuppose a philosophy of intervention and
approach to Latin American-US relations based on the idea that strategically
Latin America is part of the ideological background of US
foreign policy and therefore fertile ground for reproduction (The Iran-Contra
Affair is one example).

FUDRA,
the militaries rapid reaction force use US made Blackhawck helicopter gunships
on search and destroy missions against the rebel groups (Jason Crowe,
2002)

If we consider as analysts say that the
Cold War is over we could very easily dismiss this previous statement however
observing the shift of Latin American politics to the left or to more socialist
oriented administrations, the case is not so impossible to carry through. Chavez
in Venezuela recently re-elected is
consistently trying to create alliances between Latin American countries based
on economic, social, political and cultural cooperation and exchange. The
Contadora Group though not presently active in influencing the Colombian peace
efforts, was instrumental in the writing the Guatemalan Esquipulas Peace Accord
in 1986. Although not recognized by the US due to its recognition of the
Sandinista government in Nicaragua this accord initiated by the work of  Oscar Arias recently re-elected
President of Costa Rica and Nobel Prize winner is a hopeful Latin American
effort that could be recreated in the case of Colombia. Further Esquipulas II defined a number of measures to promote
national reconciliation, an end to hostilities, democratization,
free
elections,
the termination of all assistance to irregular
forces,
negotiations on arms controls, and assistance to refugees. It also laid the
ground for international verification procedures and provided a timetable for
implementation. These measures are desperately needed in Colombia. As discussed in a Third
Party Intervention paper for this class Oscar Arias could become a very
important player in infusing hope to the Colombian peace future.
The
Colombian organisation, the Permanent Civil Society Assembly for Peace presented
such a peace plan already. The plan suggests that the regional elections
scheduled for October 2007 be used as a “plebiscite for a ceasefire”; that Latin
American governments form a “Contadora Group” as has happened in Central America
be reproduced and that the UN Secretary General play a mediating role, and that
the EU and the US modify their cooperation policies towards Colombia so as to
strengthen democracy and human rights. (Center for International Policy Program,
2006)

Beyond
these efforts the present tepid efforts of the Cuban government to help peace
talks with the ELN in particular could become significant if we consider that
the government of Colombia has willingly released
prisoners to attend the peace talks in the island. Not publicized as it should
be around the world, these talks stress the need to work in conjunction with
several facets of diplomacy beyond ideology to foster peace in the region.
Cuba is a major crossing
point of drug traffic due to its proximity to Florida and the US. The embargo still in place is one
fundamental piece of ideological blocking stone in creating collaboration
between the protracted Cold War actions of the two countries. Perhaps discussion
on more than the political level are necessary to face the underlying US-Latin
American relationship confrontation that must become more respectful and less
patronizing in all areas of contact. The concept of the other as different is
still prevalent even at the regional level. Stereotypes that presume inherent
qualities about each other must change. Perhaps the groups that are calling for
dialogue will prevail within governments, civil society and the community at
large. Artists, peasants, workers, and the people of Colombia will eventually make their
voices heard.

Colombia
is clamouring for peace and we need to listen.

A
young
boy standing inside a Red Cross food and clothing store is watched by other
displaced children through a barred window. Territorial
fighting between Government forces, FARC rebels and rightwing militias have
displaced more than 2 million Colombians. Many of these now live in camps and
shanty towns throughout the country. A
young boy standing inside a Red Cross food and clothing store is watched by
other displaced children through a barred window.

La
Hormiga, Putumayo (Jason Howe, 2002)

Keeping
Quiet

Pablo
Neruda

Now
we will count to twelve

and
we will all keep still.

This
one time upon the earth,

let's
not speak any language,

let's
stop for one second,

and
not move our arms so much.

It
would be a delicious moment,

without
hurry, without locomotives,

all
of us would be together

in
a sudden uneasiness.

The
fishermen in the cold sea

would
do no harm to the whales

and
the peasant gathering salt

would
look at his torn hands.

Those
who prepare green wars,

wars
of gas, wars of fire,

victories
without survivors,

would
put on clean clothing

and
would walk alongside their brothers

in
the shade, without doing a thing.

What
I want shouldn't be confused

with
final inactivity:

life
alone is what matters,

I
want nothing to do with death.

If
we weren't unanimous

about
keeping our lives so much in motion,

if
we could do nothing for once,

perhaps
a great silence would

interrupt
this sadness,

this
never understanding ourselves

and
threatening ourselves with death,

perhaps
the earth is teaching us

when
everything seems to be dead

and
then everything is alive.

Now
I will count to twelve

and
you keep quiet and I'll go.

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