Bruce M. Bagley
security in the
To grasp to what extent regional security in the Americas has become a common, collective policy among the states of the hemisphere, this paper undertakes to analyze the circumstances that have either encouraged or obstructed the progress of common security policies in the Americas and of the different instruments (such as international law, treaties or multilateral institutions) that have been developed to shape and channel regional security arrangements. The principal sources used in this paper are the primary historical documents themselves and the academic literature on the topic of hemispheric security.
To analyze security issues at either the regional or international levels, Realist thinkers posit that states are the principal actors, and assume that the primary role of international cooperation policies, arrangements and institutions is to facilitate the pursuit of their individual state interests: the safeguarding of either their strategic advantage and increase their relative power. Liberals and Constructivists recognize the possibility that adversaries could achieve security by coordinating policies, as long as they are sanctioned and enforced by the dominant power (Waltz 1986:46-69; Gilpin 1991:43; Glaser 1994: 50-94).
Neoliberal-institutionalism, specifically, complements the Realists’ basic assumption about the utility of collective security arrangements by emphasizing the advantages of predictability, communication, trust, cooperation, and coalition building that such collective arrangements can foster. Accordingly, regimes, multilateral institutions and treaties, emerge as the rational choice tools utilized by state actors under certain limited circumstances in pursuing the common goal of a long term partnership in security issues (Keohane 1984:135-181; Keohane 1986: 158-254; Keohane and Martin 1995; Keohane and Martin 2003). Constructivism complements the realist-neo-liberal rational-choice approaches by underscoring the fact that the international system is shaped by both material and social structures generated both inside and outside the state (Finnemore 1996: 22-23; Wendt 1999: 266-278; Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 24-29); hence, to fully understand the security policy priorities of both the U.S. and the Latin American states, as well as the behavior of their decision-making actors, Constructivists contend that consideration must be given to other important elements such as national identities and the conceptualization of national interests and to the role of ideas in shaping state policies (Finnemore 1996:128-149). To better understand the difficulties in developing collective hemispheric responses to regional security threats, it is important to probe the reasons behind the stances adopted by Latin American political elites, perceived by their constituencies to be defending their national interests’ vis-à-vis the interests of their neighbors and of Washington.
This paper adopts the position that to understand adequately the complex and multilayered regional security system in the Americas and its limitations, it is essential to recognize the fundamentally asymmetrical relationship among states in the hemisphere (realism) and the basic differences in perceptions between the U.S., the Caribbean and Latin American states regarding what constituted a security threat in the past and what constitutes a threat today (constructivism). States not only follow the Realist and Neoliberal-institutionalist logic of “rationality”, but also the Constructivist “logic of appropriateness” (Finnemore 1996:28-31; Buzan and de Wilde 1998: 146-147; Wendt 1999:246-312).
A survey of Latin American’s past shows that the development of a national defense policy has never been a high priority for its political elites, even when the region endured a long history of armed conflict and troubled civil military relations. The result of this lack of attention in developing a concerted and long-term defense policy was the failure to consolidate professional military establishments or civilian interest in national defense throughout the hemisphere (Pion-Berlin and Trikunas 2007:78-80). Latin American civilian elites have consistently turned away from developing an interest in national defense as an important field of public policy.
Security in the
The contemporary Inter-American security
system is the outcome of the often contradictory security policies undertaken
by the hegemonic
differences in security priorities, perceptions of threats and preferred
responses to threats explain why most Latin American and Caribbean states tend
to distrust and resist
The Origins of the Threats to Hemispheric Security; 1821-1889:
The roots of
contemporary discrepancies in perception between the
Territorial integrity threatened by inter-state conflict was a major security concern for most Latin American states throughout the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, by and large, the conflicts that the emerging Latin American states had to face were characterized by a series of low intensity wars that never lasted long enough for the new nations to be set firmly on the path toward strong state formation. Consequently, by the end of the nineteenth century, most of Latin America had developed only weak state apparatuses that permitted ongoing European meddling in their domestic affairs and, ultimately, enabled the United States to fill the power vacuum and consolidate a U. S.- sphere of influence in the hemisphere (Fenwick 1963; Smith 1996; Holden and Zolov 2000).
By the outset of the Twentieth Century, the definitive
rout of European colonialism in the Western Hemisphere and the rise of the
United States to the status of regional hegemon allowed for a revival in the
Western Hemisphere – under U.S. leadership - of the ideals of cooperation and integration
that had first emerged at the time of the emancipation of the Latin American
states ( Scheman 1987). As early
as 1889, the First International Conference of American States took place in
The 1889 conference resulted in only very limited
accomplishments. While it did manage to establish a political forum in 1890,
initially called the Commercial Bureau of American Republics and later renamed
the Pan-American Union in 1910, it failed to gain general support for the
establishment of a Customs Union or an Inter-American Monetary Union. It
produced reciprocity treaties of experimental character, as, for example, the
recommendation to adopt the metric decimal system and the adoption of treaties
in favor of protection of trademarks and copyrights, but these agreements
remained partial and incomplete. The Latin American’s fears of
Consequently, between the first Washington Conference in
1889 and the second International Conference of American States held in
Following the Spanish-American War
Once the threat of European military and economic
intervention was eliminated in the first decade of the 20th Century,
however, President Woodrow Wilson did resume U.S. efforts to promote greater
hemispheric cooperation, democratization, regional integration and U.S.
economic investment ( Fenwick 1963;
Smith 1996). Notwithstanding
President Wilson’s initial goals for U.S. hemispheric policies, his subsequent
actions often openly contradicted his stated intentions (Carr 1981;
Scheman 1987). Indeed, repeated
Considering Latin America’s uncertainty about, and distrust of, U.S.
intentions, it is not surprising that neither the Fifth Santiago International
Conference in 1923 nor the 1928 Havana Conference succeeded in gaining support
for any form of continental security cooperation. Suspicions persisted even
after the proclamation of President Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy during the
Montevideo Convention in 1933, despite the evidence that a shift in
WWII and the Institutionalization of a Hemispheric Security Framework: 1936-1945:
The 1936 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of
In 1940, during second meeting of Foreign Ministers in
Havana the bases for a hemispheric security arrangement were finally
established with the approval of the Collective Security Resolution XV (Fenwick 1963;
Glaser 1994; Burrell and Shifter 2000; Pedersen 2002). Resolution XV set out a common
security framework for the hemisphere through the Declaration of Reciprocal
Assistance (Tratado Interamericano de
Asistencia Recíproca - TIAR). This new collective security framework was
first put to the test - with less than optimal results - during the Japanese
Hence, despite the initially lukewarm hemispheric support for the U.S. in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the Colombian, Mexican and Venezuela initiative served to drive home the point that a judicious combination of (and balance among) the principles of respect for national sovereignty, democracy, and collective security and defense against war would provide Washington with the regional base of support it sought. Early in 1942, the creation of the Inter-American Defense Board (Junta Interamericana de Defensa - JID), an institution lead by the United States and designed to coordinate military-to-military cooperation in the hemisphere, gave practical shape to the emerging consensus around collective security measures in the Western Hemisphere Fenwick 1963; Glaser 1994; Diamint 2000; Gilpin, 2001; Pedersen, 2002).
At the end of World War II, during the 1945 Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held in Mexico City, delegates representing Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, The United States, Uruguay and Venezuela; agreed to establish an International Organization of the American Republics for the purpose of promoting mutual security cooperation and reciprocal assistance in the Americas (Diamint, 2000:9-12; Holden and Zolov 2000: 175). This new arrangement, known as the Act of Chapultepec, was based upon the principles of mutual respect, cooperation and security first advanced at the Washington Conference in 1889. It encompassed both the Junta Interamericana de Defensa (JID) and the Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca (TIAR) and formally established the Inter-American Defense System ( Diamint 2000:3-8; Ramos Martino 123-151). Signatory countries agreed, first, on a resolution reorganizing, consolidating and strengthening the Inter-American System. Second, they agreed on the immediate need to delineate specific collective security agreements that built on the 1940 Havana resolution by including provisions for a common retaliatory response in case of an act of aggression against any American state. These new agreements provided not only for the establishment of a comprehensive regional security agreement but also for the creation of an international security organization for the Western Hemisphere (Scheman 1987; Ruíz Blanco 2003).
Cooperation and Consensus: 1945-1950.
The Act of Chapultepec committed the states of the Western
Hemisphere to negotiate a mutual security treaty that would include regional
security institutions for the first time in the history of the Western
Hemisphere (Act of Chapultepec
1945; Diamint, 2000; Ruiz Blanco, 2003; Shaw, 2004). This emergent Latin American
- involving both the JID inter-military cooperation mechanism and the TIAR
mutual security treaty - was possible because both U.S. and most Latin American
states’ definitions of what constituted “threats” to hemispheric security began
to converge in the wake of WWII, against the backdrop of America’s rise to
superpower status and the outbreak of the Cold War. In effect,
The realities of power in the post-World War II ushered in
a new era of
From 1948 through the early 1950s, an institutional
framework for the management of hemispheric affairs began to coalesce under the
OAS umbrella. In effect, a two-tier arrangement was created. One tier was
focused on security issues and involved primarily the JID and TIAR. A second
tier concentrated on democratic governance and economic development issues
through the OAS itself and the newly-created Inter-American Development Bank
The Cold War: 1950-1991.
During the 1950s, the Cold War arrived in Latin-America.
Perceiving the spread of Communism in the region as an imminent danger to
America’s national interests in the Western Hemisphere, Washington
progressively abandoned in practice its rhetorical embrace of the principles of
self-determination, democratic consolidation and sustained economic development
as U.S. priorities in Latin America and the Caribbean and concentrated,
instead, almost exclusively on the anti-Communist fight, often at the expense
of democracy and economic development in the region (Smith
1996:190-216; Klepak 2003: 239-263). As the Cold War intensified, the
U.S. treated the new hemispheric institutions such as TIAR and the OAS
primarily as mechanisms for the consolidation and maintenance of an
anti-Communist, U.S.-dominated sphere of influence in the Americas within the
bipolar international system (Waltz 1986;
Mearsheimer 1990; Glaser 1994; Mearsheimer 1994). In 1950 President Truman
approved a National Security Council memorandum on Inter-American Military
Collaboration that asserted that the Cold War was a “real” war in which the
survival of the free world was at stake (Smith 1996:126). It also asserted
that, through the OAS and TIAR, the American continent needed to adopt a
unified position against the threat of Communist aggression in the hemisphere (Shaw 2004: 9-22).
Once the Soviet threat was defined by
During the decades of Cold War from the 1950s through the
The Reagan administration’s invasion of Granada in 1981 to
oust the radical New Jewel movement (or its remnants) from power and its covert support for the “Contra” war against
Nicaragua’s leftist Sandinista regime during the 1980s, along with the George
H. W Bush administration’s invasion of Panama in 1989 to remove Manuel Noriega
from office and bring him to trial on drug trafficking charges in the United
States, marked the end of the modern era of U.S. intervention in Latin America
and the Caribbean that had spanned some four decades following WWII. In
Far-reaching transformations in the international arena
during the 1980s, such as the arrival in Latin America of the “third wave” of
democratization, the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the reunification of
Germany and the liberation of much of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination in
1990 were major signs of that the Cold War was winding down. The end of this
era of East-West conflict in global politics had profound implications for
The new international environment and the emergence of the
This new convergence of interests at the outset of the
post-Cold War period was reflected in the increased willingness by the
The Emergence of a New Security Community: The Hemispheric Security Committee (CHS): (1991- 2001):
With international Communism no longer considered to be an
imminent threat to hemispheric security, the
This broad security agenda, which included issues such as nation-building, democracy and the environment that previously had not been defined as security threats, required the construction of a more effective, multilateral institutional mechanism at the hemispheric level than was currently available. To this end in 1991 and under the auspices of the OAS, the Hemispheric Commission of Security, renamed in 1994 as the Hemispheric Security Committee (CHS) was created. The main goal of the CHS was to broaden the already existing common security issues and the JID’s concept of inter-state military cooperation to include not only evident security issues such as drug trafficking or inter-state conflict, but also issues such as confidence building, economic interdependence, social development, the defense of democracy and environmental protection (Domínguez 1998: 25-27; Cardona 2003: 199-223; Fontana 2003: 169-198).
The new CHS security doctrine called for: 1) Increased U.S. government collaboration with other Latin American states on security matters, including sharing resources and sensitive information with other military institutions in the region; 2) U.S. military subordination to and support for collaborative, regional decision making structures; and 3) Inclusion of a wider range of security concerns, such as poverty, democracy, and the environment, on the collective regional security agenda. The willingness of the Latin American states to engage the U.S. within the framework of the CHS and the OAS’s umbrella, thus, depended heavily on whether or not Washington would be willing to adopt an expanded security agenda and a more cooperative approach to hemispheric security problems (Horwitz 2007: 155-168).
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)
After the collapse of the
In fulfillment of these ambitious goals, in 1991 the OAS
General Assembly voted to establish the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission (CICAD) as a semi-autonomous agency within the umbrella of the OAS
and adopted the Declaration and Program of Action of Ixtapa. CICAD was created to promote region-wide drug
control programs and to facilitate the sharing of information about illicit
drug abuse and drug trafficking in the hemisphere. In 1992, the OAS’s General
Assembly approved new legislation for the common prevention of money laundering
and the flow of illegal funds. As a result in 1993, CICAD undertook a new project
designed to increase the flow of information, and to strengthen local
governments so that they might better combat drug trafficking and illegal arms
sales across borders. Under President Bill Clinton, Washington’s active support
for CICAD’s efforts in 1993 and beyond led to the first regional Anti-Drugs
Strategy Forum in 1996 and, ultimately, to CICAD’s implementation of the
Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) in 1999 (Herz 2003).
By supporting CICAD and the MEM, the
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
brought the construction of this new, more comprehensive regional security
agenda to an abrupt halt. Forced to recognize heightened
immediate post-9/11 period, the Bush administration insisted that the
hemispheric security agenda should focus narrowly on the immediate threat of
global terrorism and closely related security issues rather than on the broader
gamut of regional security concerns that had emerged as part of the collective
security agenda over the 1990s.
regional solidarity for
From the standpoint of
While the 1995
In September 2002 the newly released
“National Security Strategy of the United States of America made official the
doctrine that the country was engaged in a war of global reach against terrorism
and, when necessary, against nations that harbored them. As part of the “War on
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
The New Security Community: Unilateralism or Cooperation: 2001-2005
lack of an imminent threat to the
During the XXXII OAS General Assembly celebrated in Barbados in 2002 the Bridgetown Declaration stated that common security challenges such as terrorism, drug-trafficking, organized crime, illegal traffic of arms, disaster preparations, and environmental degradation were priorities. During the subsequent 2002 meeting in Monterrey, Mexico, held later in the same year however, instead of disaster preparation, democracy, good governance or the environment – security priorities emphasized by many Latin American leaders -, the issues that occupied center stage were the ratification of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) and the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) along with reform of TIAR to better deal with terrorism and related issues (Bermudez Torres 2003: 91-102; Hayes 2007:76-77; Mares 2007: 107).
2003 the OAS adopted a revised concept of hemispheric security via approval of
the Declaration of Security in the
Many critics have pointed out that such a laundry-list approach to defining security threats made the notion of hemispheric security so vague and amorphous that it became little more than a residual or catch-all category basically incapable of providing any practical guidance to policy makers regarding the security priorities that should be pursued in practice. In effect, when conceptual consensus is elusive or non-existent, then effective cooperation and decisive collective action are unattainable. A well though out defense policy needs to consider the development of a comprehensive national security agenda able of setting long term policies to confront the civil control of the military apparatus and the structure of long term civil-military relations. Furthermore, Latin American elites need to develop national institutional frameworks of civil-military cooperation capable of an effective defense of their territorial integrity and sovereignty (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007).
one hand, this broad approach to security left the Bush administration essentially
free to prioritize
further to the confused security panorama in the America in the post-9/11
period, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the negative reactions to
it throughout the hemisphere highlighted the emergence of basic disagreements
between the U.S. and most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
regarding which are the most pressing hemispheric security threats and how such
threats should be handled. In the post-Iraq environment, like it or not,
governing elites throughout the Americas have been and remain constrained in
their national and regional security strategies by their need to build
relations, programs and institutions (including international institutions)
that do not diverge unacceptably from their U.S.-imposed obligations in the
Washington–led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) or risk running afoul of the
hegemonic United States. In pursuit of American security priorities, since 9/11
the Bush administration has systematically linked U.S. security policies in the
Americas (especially in the areas of military assistance, foreign aid and
trade) to cooperation and compliance with Washington’s global and regional
security strategies (Soriano and Mackay 2005:5-7). As during the Cold War, in
the aftermath of 9/11once again unilateralism has become the preferred option
American and Caribbean governments would like
administration’s post-9/11 unilateral foreign and defense policies, its focus
on Afghanistan and Iraq at the expense of Latin America and the Caribbean, and
its insistence that the governments of the region give first priority to the
threat of global terrorism over their own national and sub-regional concern
combined to severely limit progress on collective security issues through 2007.
The October 2003 Mexico City declaration on hemispheric security put forward
such a broad security agenda that it provided no blueprint for action and
effectively left each country, especially the United States, to pursue its own
security agenda without coordinating in practice with other states. Furthermore,
the 2006 DMA Declaration of Managua emphasized bilateral and sub-regional
agreements and ignored the CHS comprehensive hemispheric agenda. In grouping
together terrorism with all forms of transnational crime, drug-trafficking,
corruption, trafficking in persons and money laundering, the Defense
Ministerial of the
The JID is
seen as little more that a tool of
9/11/01 attacks, the perception in
The protracted history of Inter-American cooperation and integration has developed a wide range of regional institutions with diverging interests, unrelated development institutions, inarticulate development priorities and a chronic lack of funding. More than a unified polity like the EU, the current inter-American system is a complex network of institutions, organizations, commissions, councils, treaties, conventions and agreements. This lack of a clear, integrated design and dichotomy between robustness and effectiveness, further exacerbate the level of hemispheric economic and military asymmetry thus complicating any effort put forth toward cooperation (Abbott 2007:260-265). Since 2005 the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) initiative has languished and shows no signs of advancing toward completion during the remainder of the second Bush administration. The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) was the last sub-regional agreement ratified by U.S. Congress (by the narrow margin of two votes) in July of 2005. Since then, the Democratic Party-dominated U.S. Congress has been reluctant to ratify any additional sub-regional or bilateral trade agreements with Latin American allies such as Colombia, Peru or even Panama (LeoGrande 2007:37).
related to hemispheric drug trafficking, the recent progress achieved by the
OAS’ CICAD reveals important, however narrowly focused, ability of the
At present, there is an increasing
bifurcation between the perceived security priorities of the
administration has been consumed by an almost messianic vision of the need to
promote and even impose democracy worldwide. Preventing terrorism in the
Western Hemisphere has clearly been the priority
has always been a contested concept in the hemisphere and beyond. But in the
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 David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas point out that the boundaries of Latin American states were settled relatively early while ambitions to build large regional states like Gran Colombia were dashed by separatist movements. These post-independence development paths consistently deemphasized the role of the military in inter-state conflict, rendering small national armies with low capabilities that were a threat only when used in internal conflicts between caudillos, political party bosses and other power brokers to seize power illegally. Furthermore, diplomatic and legal Inter-American institutional innovations, the most important of which is utipossidetis juri, which established that a modern state’s boundaries should match those of its colonial predecessor and favors the territorial integrity of states, promoted the development of a region characterized by the absence of significant existential, international and inter-state military threats (Pion Berlin and Trinkunas 2007:76-100).
 Buzan, Waever and de Wilde identify the process of securitization as an extreme version of politicization that allows for a powerful actor like the
to define what constitutes a threat to the hemisphere meriting a concerted response (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998:27-42). But even if in today’s world the U.S. U.S.and Latin American security concerns have become increasingly interlinked, U.S.efforts to achieve and maintain regional preponderance tend to time and again conflict with the Latin American and Caribbeanstates’ aspirations to secure their national sovereignty and self-determination. This fundamental difference in objectives helps explain why, even today, Latin American states tend to distrust and resist U.S. leadership as well as the full authority of a supra-national entity over national security issues.
 The writings of the
propose a distinctive approach to cooperation in the international system (Bull 1984; Buzan 2004; Hurrell 2005; Linklater and Suganami 2006)). They argue that to reduce all statecraft to strategic actions aimed at the narrow goals of achieving self-help and relative gains (Waltz 1979; Morgenthau 1993) or the reduction of uncertainty in political decisions trough institutional means (Keohane 1984), neglects the extent to which overtime states have learned to create and preserve order and hierarchy in anarchical societies. For the most part to stay in power, political authorities aim to achieve national and international legitimacy. To do so, they generally tend to avoid violent confrontation by acquiescing to some constrains of the use of force, adopting a moderate behavior in foreign policy, and recognizing at least to some degree the importance of reciprocity and adherence to diplomacy, international institutions and norms. So without diminishing the importance of power politics or rational choice, this approach pays special attention to the existence and relevance of an increasing number of rules, norms, common understandings and mutual expectations in international politics (Linklater and Suganami 2006:82-116). Coercion and calculation still matter a great deal, but the contemporary English School stresses the increased importance of the historical development of agreed arrangements concerning expected behavior among states, and the importance of the historical evolution of the institutions of international society and international law that help constitute the contemporary international arena ( Bull 1984; Herz 2003; Buzan 2004; Hurrell 2005; Linklater and Suganami 2006) English School
 For more information on the history of Latin American integration efforts during the nineteenth century please see Betty Horwitz, (2007) The Role of the Organization of American States in the Promotion of a Multilateral Framework for Regional Governance. Ph D Dissertation,
. Chapter 2. Universityof Miami
 After achieving independence from
Portugaland Spain, Latin American countries developed links to the world economies through the Industrial Revolution and colonial expansion taking place mainly in Europe. During the second half of the twentieth century, the European strong demand for foodstuffs and raw materials gave incentives to Latin American governments to develop economies that would rely strongly on exports of primary goods accompanied by imports of manufactured goods, which lead to a path of a dependent economic growth and vulnerability to constant external intervention (Skidmore and Smith 2005:42-62). During this time, the U.S.also started to establish regional hegemony beginning with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and leading to the war with Mexicoin 1847 where seeded half of its territory with the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo the following year. In the late nineteenth century, the Mexico U.S.felt confident enough to make stronger claims to regional hegemony in the . Hence President Theodore Roosevelt replaced Spanish rule in Caribbean Basin Cubaand the in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War. In addition, the Philippines U.S.also assumed outright control of Puerto Rico and Guam and in 1903 took control of, and started to build the canal in . By the first decade of the twentieth century, the Panama U.S.had succeeded in prevailing over Europe effectively establishing its sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. These regional conflicts never achieved the destruction magnitude that would force states –the in particular- to develop and accept an institutional framework capable of superseding national institutions (Smith 1996:63-86; Schoultz 1998:123-175). U.S.
 For a detailed account of the sequence and development of the Latin American weak path to state formation see Fernando López-Alvez. (2000). State Formation and Democracy in
Latin America1810-1900. Durhamand . Duke University Press. London
 Contemporary international relation theorists occasionally refer to the
U.S.role in Latin Americaas a classic example of hegemonic management. In some cases such as in Central America during the 1980, the U.S. role has been more of hegemonic “mismanagement” which prompted independent efforts such as the one launched by the Contadora group (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007: 82).
 These normative principles emerged simultaneously with the newly independent Latin American states in 1824 and had been kept alive through the American Congresses of 1826 in Panama, 1847 in Lima, 1856 in Santiago and Washington, and 1864 in Lima, but were deemed ineffectual for the lack of U.S. support (Fenwick 1956; Smith 1996).
 Since 1824 Latin American newly independent states have advocated the establishment of a Pan-American confederation able to support some kind of a mutual security pact and a framework for resolving inter-states’ disputes. But the constant
U.S.interference raised fears and pervasive distrust of intentions, obstructing its progress. This is why only limited headway was achieved towards a Pan-American society during the subsequent conferences in U.S. Mexico1902, 1906, Rio de Janeiro1906, in Buenos Aires1910, Santiago de Chile 1923, La Habana 1928, Lima1938, La Habana 1940, and even in Chapultepecin 1945. Latin-American preoccupation with the preservation of self-determination and sovereignty prevailed over efforts toward the development of strong regional institutional framework. Nevertheless the idea of a hemispheric society of states rallied around a common purpose prevailed and resurfaced during periods of stability (Diamint, 2000:1-25; Holden and Zolov 2000:15-149).
 The JID, the Inter-American Defense Conference, was established in order to foster an inter-military regional cooperation, whose objectives comprised the standardization of equipment, military organization and training. The TIAR, the Inter-American treaty for Reciprocal Assistance, declared that an attack on any state of the
Western Hemispherewill be considered an attack on all (Diamint 2000:3-8 and Ramon Martino 2000: 123-151).
 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett define a pluralistic security community as a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. Security communities have shared identities, values and meanings about the social reality, and a common understanding of certain norms and values, sharing many-sided and direct relationship among its members. These members exhibit a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interest, obligation and responsibility. Members of a loosely coupled security community expect no bellicose activities from other members and, therefore, consistently practice self restraint. Tightly security communities tend to comprise a “mutual aid” society in which they construct collective system arrangements. Loosely or tightly comprised, security communities possess a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional, centralized government with an institutional framework that provides a collective security system (Adler and Barnett 1998:30-31).
 The Truman Doctrine was based mainly on the principle of Containment which proclaimed that the
U.S.would assume the role of global policeman in charge of stopping the Soviet Union’s ambitions of world domination. This often led to the acquiescence of military coups and dictatorships (Smith 1996: 119-135).
 For a complete history of U.S.-Latin American relations see (Smith 1996: 190-261 and Skidmore and Smith 1986: 396-434).
 President Clinton backed these efforts toward multilateralism by the OAS General Assembly. The Assembly charged the Permanent Commission with the creation of a work group that would study and formulate recommendations for a common security hemispheric agenda. (Bermudez Torres 2003:83). Under the OAS umbrella, this working group began to revise the role of both the Junta Interamericana de Defensa (JID) and the Colegio Interamericano de Defensa (CID), to achieve the demilitarization of border conflicts, especially in Central America (Martino Ramos 2000:143-44), and with the final goal of modifying the hemispheric security doctrine to include all the abovementioned issues (Perry and Primorac 1994; Martino Ramos 2000; Bermudez Torres 2003).
 In an effort to frame the drug problem as a shared concern and to defuse the widespread condemnations of the 1989
Panamamilitary intervention by most Latin American governments; the first Bush administration decided to participate in the CartagenaI, , and Cartagena II Summits. Through this participation, the San Antonio U.S.government acknowledged the need for its hemispheric commitment to a greater multilateral cooperation on drug control issues as well as the need to create the conditions for an anti-drugs consensual regime in the by developing cooperative, multilateral decision-making mechanisms to find a way to deal with the “drug problem” in a comprehensive way. The OAS spearheaded a multilateral process that started with the Inter-American Program of Action in Americas in 1987, followed by the establishment by the OAS General Assembly of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), and the adoption of the Declaration and Program of Action of Ixtapa in 1991. So far, the Rio de Janeiro has been willing to acquiesce some of its authority and cooperate with neighboring states to confront the drug problem (Horwitz 2007: 120-130). U.S.
 For more information on CICAD, MEM, and multilateral efforts from U.S. and Latin American states through the OAS please see Betty Horwitz, (2007) The Role of the Organization of American States in the Promotion of a Multilateral Framework for Regional Governance. Ph D Dissertation,
. Chapter 4. Universityof Miami
 Since 1995, DMA conferences have taken place in
Williamsburg, 1995; Buenos Aires, 1996; , 1998; Manaos, 2000; and Santiago de Chile, 2002. Since then, Cartagena Washingtonhas increasingly subordinated free trade initiatives to security concerns. The need to tie economic cooperation became more explicit in the content of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Act approved by the U.S. Congress in 2002 (Hirst 2003::38). U.S.
 This exemption became possible because Article 98 of the American Service members Protection Act of 2002 prohibited any form of military aid to countries that did not agree to submit U.S. military members to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Rhem 2006:1).
 At the November 2004 defense ministerial in Quito, U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had already linked terrorism and drug trafficking, hostage takers and criminal gangs as “an anti-social combination” aimed at destabilizing civil societies (Green 2006:1)
 The current inter-American security infrastructure is comprised of several institutions. It can be traced back to 1942 with the creation of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) or Junta Interamericana de Defensa JID in an advisory capacity in response to the hemispheric threat of the then Axis powers. The IADB/JID oversees the
American Defense Collegedesigned to train and prepare military personnel from all countries of the Americasexcept . Moreover, within the Cuba there are also a number of sub-regional agreements and arrangements that deal with defense and security issues. For instance Americas Canadaand the are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and share responsibilities for continental air defense in the form of North American Aero Defense Command (NORAD) and NORTHCOM. In addition, the sub-regional components with security components are: the Rio Group, the Central American Democratic Security Treaty, the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS), the South American Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the Andean Charter for Peace and Security (Soriano and Macay 2005:2-5). United States
 The 1995 OAS Declaration of Santiago on Confidence-and Security- Building Measures adopted a list of goals strongly influenced by the Central American peace process in Esquipulas focused primarily on disarmament issues and on engagement among civilian and military forces. In 1998, the San Salvador Meeting on Confidence-and Security-Building measures included various issues related to disarmament. Hence the Convención Interamericana Contra elTráfico Ilícito de Armas de Fuego, Municiones, Explosivos y Otros Materiales Relacionados, known only through its English acronym CIFTA, was signed in 1997 and ratified by most countries by the end of the decade (Hayes 2007: 76-77.
 In 1996, the OAS convened an Inter-American Specialized Conference on Terrorism in
. At the time, it did not appear likely that terrorism would become a major issue in the hemisphere. At the meeting the Declaration of Lima to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism was adopted without stirring much regional opposition. In 1998 the OAS established the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism or Comité Interamericano Contra el Terrorismo (CICTE). Known only by its acronym in Spanish, CICTE was signed by thirty three of thirty four members of the OAS on June 3, 2002, but only twelve –including the U.S. - had ratified the treaty as of 2007 (Mares 2007: 107). Lima
 The thirty four OAS member states had planned to hold a Special Conference on Security in 2004, but due to the events of September 11, an agreement was reached in Barbados at the XXXII General Assembly of the OAS to hold such a conference in May 2003 in Mexico City (Soriano and Macay 2005:2-3).
 During the Mar del Plata Summit on November 2005, the
arrived with no new alternatives. Once more, the U.S. U.S.proposed the same policies of free trade, open markets, privatization and fiscal authority that had increased social and economic inequality in Latin America. It became obvious that the U.S.had lost interests, credibility and support for the FTAA project first launched during the Summitof the Americasin in 1995 (Horwitz 2007: 220-224). Miami
 Three year ago, set up by
Cuba’s leader Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) was supposed to represent a “solidarity” pact that rejects the free-trade model of integration espoused by . Now, Mr. Chávez wants to turn it into a mutual defense pact that would protect its members from attack by the Washington United Statesand its ally, . But the other three ALBA members: Colombia Bolivia, Nicaraguaand ; have met this proposal with derision. Populist leaders in the Andean region such as Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega, or Mr. Chávez are merely looking to boost their flagging support at home by manufacturing external threats (The Economist 2008:46). Dominica
 This fragmentation and distancing from
is exemplified by the establishment of the Banco del Sur. The conditionality imposed by Washington Washingtonor international organisms such as the IMF or the IDB is prompting Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguayand probably , to find alternative ways to promote investment in infrastructure and to help stimulate greater regional trade and integration. On November 3, 2007, these countries formed the Banco del Sur. To date, it remains to be seen if this institution with up to $7 billion in initial capital, can successfully become an alternative to the current institutional framework favored by Colombia (Barrionuevo 2007). To be sure, it will be interesting to watch whether or not Washington Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez or Bolivia’s Evo Morales can assert their influence over its neighbors, and whether will actually allow it. So far, Brazil has increasingly shown its willingness to assert its leadership in the region by, together with Paraguay, not yet ratifying Venezuela’s adhesion to MERCOSUR (Marirrodriga 2007:8A). Brazil
 South American countries disagree with the
regarding which are the threats that need to be confronted cooperatively. U.S. Braziland Argentina, for example, have voiced their concerns to authorities over the need to link security issues to the strengthening of state institutions, civil society and - most of all - to economic opportunity. Opposition to U.S. policies in the region continues to spread. For instance, in April of 2005 Washington Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez suspended military operations and exchanges with the U.S.and ordered American military instructors accused of fomenting unrest out of . Venezuela Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa has announced his intention to close the military base in Manta when the base treaty expires in 2009. Finally, the U.S. has yet to come up with a comprehensive alternative able to address the security and economic concerns of the Southern Cone states. U.S.
 On December 2, 2007, President Hugo Chávez lost the referendum that would have allowed him to amend the Venezuelan Constitution. The opposition plus many chavista supporters showd that they are increasingly desillutioned with Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution and were not willing to put their confidence indefinitely on one caudillo leader (The Economist 2007: 12 and 30-32).
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